City of Greensboro v. Hodgin

11 S.E. 586, 106 N.C. 182
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedFebruary 5, 1890
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 11 S.E. 586 (City of Greensboro v. Hodgin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Greensboro v. Hodgin, 11 S.E. 586, 106 N.C. 182 (N.C. 1890).

Opinion

MerbimoN, C. J.:

The organic law of this State requires and provides for the free education of the people. The 9th *186 article of the Constitution is devoted exclusively to the subject of education. It declares its prime importance, and that it sháll “ forever be encouraged.” The second section of that article provides that “the General Assembly, at its first session under this Constitution, shall provide, by taxation and otherwise, for a general and uniform system of public schools, wherein tuition shall be free of charge to all children of the State between the ages of six and twenty-one years.” Thus, the Legislature is required to promote popular education by devising and establishing a plan — a scheme — consisting of necessary and well-appointed constituent parts, and the whole organized into a complete system of public schools. Such system must be general — not local — not limited to one or more places or localities in the State; it must extend and prevail throughout its borders’; and so, also, it must be uniform in all material respects as contemplated by the Constitution— that is, the system cannot be so regulated by statute as that it will apply and operate as a whole in some places, localities and sections of the State, and not in the same, but in different ways, in other places, localities and sections. An essential requirement of the provision above recited is that the system, whatever it may be, in whatever manner constituted, must be general and uniform as a whole, and therefore so in all its material parts, the purpose being to extend to all the children within the prescribed ages, wherever they may reside in the State, the same opportunity to obtain the benefits of education in free public schools — certainly to the extent that the State itself shall supply means to support such schools. The provision declares that tuition in such schools shall be free of charge to all the children of the State between the ages of six and twenty-one years” — not to one child more or less than another, nor to children in one place or locality more than another.

The fourth section of the article cited above prescribes what property and funds of the State shall be devoted to *187 the support of such schools, and it declares that the same “shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining in this State a system of free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever.” Obviously, this clause has reference to the general and uniform system of public schools referred to above. The means so provided, and required to be provided, are to be faithfully appropriated and devoted to the support of such system of schools — not in one place or locality more or less than another, but in all places in and throughout the State in like manner and just and equal proportion.

A very material part of the fund thus devoted to the support of public schools is taken from the ordinary revenue of the State, raised by taxation, but this does not imply, nor does it follow, that the fund thus raised is to be distributed to the support of schools located in the neighborhood of those tax-payers who paid the taxes, or most, thereof, but it is to be distributed as nearly as may be per capita for the education of all the children in the State, as prescribed, without regard to who paid the taxes, or the locality from which the fund, or most of it, came. The State supports the system of schools out of certain of its specified resources, and its ordinary revenue to a large extent, and without charge to those who send their children to such schools, and this is a chief purpose of the system. It is deemed essential by the State and the people, and they have declared in their organic law that all the children of the State, as prescribed, rich and poor alike, shall have free opportunity to share in the benefits of such schools without charge, and there appears a clear purpose to extend such benefits equally to all — every one — without distinction as to individuals or localities.

• But the funds necessary for the support of public schools — the public school system — are not derived exclusively from the State. The Constitution plainty contemplates and *188 intends that the several counties, as such, shall bear a material part of the burden of supplying such funds. Section 3 of the article cited, provides that, “Each county of the State shall be divided into a convenient number of districts, in which one or more public schools shall be located four months in every year; and if the commissioners of any county shall fail to comply with the aforesaid requirements of this section, they shall be liable to indictment.” The duty thus imposed upon the county commissioners is peremptory, and it is intended that they shall discharge it, and they fail to do so at their serious peril. But how can they maintain such schools without means to do so? The necessary inference is that the Legislature shall invest the proper county authorities with power to levy taxes in their respective counties for the support of such schools. Otherwise, the provision just recited would be meaningless and practically nugatory.

That the Constitution intends that each county, as such, shall have permanent constituent connection with the public school system, and join in the support of such schools within its bounds, appears further in that the fifth section of the article thereof cited, prescribes and defines what property and resources of the several counties shall constitute the “ County School Fund,” and it declares and requires that such fund “ shall belong to and remain in the several counties, and shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools in the several counties of this State: Provided, That the amount collected in each county shall be annually reported to the Superintendent of Public Instruction.” It seems that the settled purpose in making the counties of the State severally constituent parts of the public school system is to give it additional strength and greater local efficiency. It facilitates in some measure the distribution of taxes paid for the support of such schools in the counties where they were levied, and *189 this, it seems, is not deemed unreasonable or unjust. But, whatever the motive, the provision and purpose appear.

As we have seen, the general school fund of the State is distributed to each county in proportion to the number of children in each within the age prescribed. The county school fund must be disbursed in the county to which it belongs, and in addition to that supplied by the State. The clause of the section last above recited provides that the county school fund “shall belong to and remain in the several counties.” It would be idle to bear the burden of the inconvenience and expense of a county school fund, if it is to be considered and treated as a part of the general public school fund of the State. In that case the funds that make up the county school fund might as well be paid into the State treasury at once. We may add that the Legislature has uniformly interpreted the clause last mentioned as we have done. We do not doubt the correctness of our interpretation of it.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
11 S.E. 586, 106 N.C. 182, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-greensboro-v-hodgin-nc-1890.