IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CITY OF GRANITE FALLS, No. 88094-2-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HEATHER L. BUCHHOLZ, an individual; THE ESTATE OF MITCHEL W. BUCHHOLZ,
Appellants,
SNOHOMISH COUNTY, THE HEIRS AND DEVISEES OF THE ESTATE OF JOSEPHINE CHAPPELL, and JANE DOES 1-100,
Defendants.
COBURN, J. — The City of Granite Falls sued Heather Buchholz and her late husband’s estate for Buchholz’s obstruction of public access to a right-of-way that runs adjacent to her property. Following a two-day bench trial at which Buchholz appeared pro se, the trial court entered a judgment and decree on December 20, 2024, quieting title of the right-of-way to the City. Buchholz did not appeal the judgment and decree within 30 days of its entry. On April 8, 2025, the trial court entered an order approving the City’s proposed survey and legal description of the right-of-way as consistent with its December 20 decision. Within 30 days of the April 8 order, Buchholz filed a notice of appeal designating both the December 20 and April 8 orders.
Because Buchholz’s arguments on appeal are substantively limited to the underlying merits of the trial court’s final judgment entered on December 20 and/or were never properly presented to the trial court, and Buchholz fails to establish extraordinary circumstances under RAP 18.8(b), we dismiss her appeal as untimely. Additionally, we deem this appeal frivolous and grant the City’s request for attorney fee sanctions on appeal under RAP 18.9(a).
FACTS
Buchholz owns property on both sides of a 40-feet-wide public right-of-way segment in Snohomish County that runs between State Route (SR) 92 1 and Old Jordan Road in Granite Falls, hereinafter referred to as the “right-of-way.” Established by petition in 1892, the right-of-way was initially owned by the County and annexed by the City by ordinance in 1992. In December 2021 the City sued Buchholz and the estate of her late husband to quiet title of the right-of-way and for injunctive relief, 2 alleging that Buchholz took various actions to claim ownership of and block public access to the right-of-way.
In July 2023 Buchholz, individually represented at that time by counsel, 3 filed an amended answer, affirmative defenses, counterclaims, and a third-party complaint against Snohomish County and additional third-party defendants. 4 Buchholz asserted a quiet title counterclaim for the right-of-way, asserting that the City did not obtain
1 Also referred to as “West Stanley Street.”
2 The City also raised claims of nuisance and trespass, which the City moved to dismiss without prejudice prior to trial. These claims are not at issue in the instant appeal.
3 Buchholz’s first set of attorneys filed the response to the City’s lawsuit, including the third-party complaint, only on behalf of “Heather Buchholz.”
4 The County and additional third-party defendants named in Buchholz’s third-party complaint are not parties to this appeal.
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ownership of the right-of-way in 1992 because the County had previously abandoned it after realigning the intersection of SR 92 and Old Jordan Road in 1984. Buchholz based her quiet title counterclaim under common law abandonment “and/or RCW 36.87.080.” 5 Buchholz alternatively asserted that the City “merely has easement rights at best over a portion of the area they seek to quiet title and [Buchholz’s] use does not unreasonably interfere with those limited rights.” Buchholz requested the trial court to quiet title to her subject to any applicable easements.
In June 2024 the court set the case for bench trial on November 14. Buchholz’s counsel, consisting of two attorneys at the same law firm, subsequently withdrew from the case in September. The first set of attorneys initially filed a notice of withdrawal as to Buchholz in July. Buchholz obtained new counsel, who later withdrew on October 16. On November 4 Buchholz filed a “REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE THIRD- PARTY TRIAL,” asking for trial to be rescheduled on or after March 20, 2025, to provide her time to obtain counsel and respond to the County’s recently filed trial brief. Buchholz did not note her request for a hearing.
Buchholz appeared pro se at the bench trial held on November 14 and 15. Prior to opening statements, the trial court asked if Buchholz’s trial brief contained any preliminary motions that needed to be addressed. Buchholz said:
Yeah, I – I am at a disadvantage because I didn’t – I thought I’d get a continuance, and I don’t have an attorney. And it’s been years and I’ve spent, you know, a tremendous amount of money, and now I have no attorney. So I’m at a – I feel like I’m at a disadvantage.
5 In her third-party complaint, Buchholz also sought entry of quiet title to the right-of-way against the county “by virtue of common law abandonment and/or RCW 36.87.080.”
4
The court responded, “And you are, just to be completely plain about it. Obviously, presiding has made the decision to assign this matter out to trial, and so that’s a decision I won’t revisit.” The court proceeded to provide an overview of expectations for pro se representation and the structure of trial, including that Buchholz was required to “comply with the law as much as an attorney would.” In consideration of parties’ expectations for the length of trial, the court asked Buchholz how many witnesses she expected to call. Buchholz said she was not prepared with witnesses at that time because she did not know there was going to be a trial. Buchholz said:
I even tried to get [former counsel] to represent me and he said, “You don’t have a case. I don’t know what you’re talking about. You don’t have a case.” … So he wasn’t even aware. And so I did not know that there was going to be a trial. I thought we were only going to discuss the third-party plaintiff. And so I had no idea that this was happening. So, no, I’m not prepared. And I will do the best I can, but I’m not – I’m not prepared for this.
The court expressed skepticism that Buchholz was unaware of the trial date, noting that trial was set back in June and Buchholz’s first set of attorneys withdrew in July, and that notice of trial indicated trial coming up in November. 6 At the close of trial, the court issued an oral ruling, finding that the 40-feet-wide right-of-way was established by petition in 1892, that ownership of the right-of-way transferred from the County to the City when the City annexed it in 1992, and that neither municipality abandoned the right-of-way. The trial court acknowledged that the road’s use may have been “extremely sparse,” “possibly only being used by … [Buchholz] and her family,” but was still “a city street … that the City is entitled to enforce.” The court found that the City “does have a clear legal right in the right-of-way
6 The record is devoid of any declaration from Buchholz or any of her previous attorneys that asserted Buchholz was never notified when her matter was set for trial.
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segment for public use and will quiet title with regard to that easement, insofar as any challenge to its existence as a city street shall be quieted.” Though the court determined that a permanent injunction was unnecessary, the court instructed Buchholz not to obstruct the right-of-way. The trial court further found that an existing structure owned by Buchholz that protruded onto the right-of-way “will be found in equity to possess its own right of existence onto the right-of-way, notwithstanding the existence of the right- of-way,” but prohibited “any expansion or modification of the structure that would expand its presence upon the right-of-way” absent an agreement with the City. 7 On December 20 the trial court entered a judgment and decree and findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with its oral ruling. In its written findings and conclusions, the court found that the right-of-way was legally described as:
That portion of the existing asphalt road formerly known as the Old Arlington Granite Falls Road, being a portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 13, Township 30 North, Range 6 East, W.M., Said portion lying North of the North margin of State Route No. 92, as conveyed by deed, as described in Auditors File No. 9407220525, and lying South of the centerline of the abandoned Northern Pacific Railroad Right of Way, and Lying East of the West line of the East 567.13 feet of said Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter.
The court concluded that the City “has demonstrated a clear legal right in the right-of- way … for public use and the actions of [Buchholz] impaired that right” and “[a] Judgment and Decree should enter consistent with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.”
The trial court’s judgment and decree quieted title of the right-of-way to the City based on its findings and conclusions, including the legal description. The court further ordered that the right-of-way be located to accommodate the public utilities and to
7 The record supports that the structure was part of a deck.
6
minimize the amount of encroachment of Buchholz’s existing improvements. The judgment and decree further stated:
The City is authorized to cause the right of way segment to be surveyed, to have a record of survey prepared and to have a complete legal description prepared for the right of way segment. The court retains jurisdiction to review and approve the survey and to authorize the recording of the record of survey.[8]
Though the email is not in the record, it is undisputed that on January 10, 2025, Buchholz sent an email titled “Petition for Reconsideration” to the trial court’s clerk. Buchholz did not note the matter for a hearing. On February 7, 2025, Buchholz filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment and decree. On February 10 Buchholz filed a declaration, dated February 6, that she was “submitting this motion for reconsideration in according with Washington State superior court procedures.” That same day, Buchholz noted the motion for a hearing on February 18. On February 28 the trial court denied Buchholz’s motion for reconsideration, determining that both the motion and hearing request were untimely under CR 59(b). The court found that Buchholz, “in proceeding pro se, had a duty to comply with Court Rules and timeliness, and … failed to do so.”
On March 13 the City moved for the trial court’s approval of legal description for the right-of-way prepared by surveyor Metron and Associates, Inc., and permission to record the survey, including the legal description, with the County auditor. The City’s motion relied on the trial court’s findings and conclusions and judgment and decree entered on December 20, 2024, and the professional record of survey. The City’s motion stated:
8 The judgment and decree also dismissed Buchholz’s counterclaims against the County with prejudice.
7
This Court previously ordered that [the City] shall have the opportunity to conduct a survey and have a legal description of the right of way segment prepared consistent with the Court’s findings in the trial. The City has caused Metron and Associates to conduct a survey, prepare a Record of Survey, and draft a consistent legal description.
Consistent with the Court’s order, [the City] seeks to have the legal description approved by the Court and to gain permission to record the Record of Survey with the County Auditor.
… Based on the Court’s previously entered Findings, [the City] is entitled to the entry of an order granting it permission to record the Record of Survey and respectfully asks the Court to enter the same.
On April 1 Buchholz filed a “REQUEST FOR DEFERRAL,” asserting that she found conflicts and errors in the City’s survey report and legal description and hired another surveying company, Cascade Surveying & Engineering, Inc. (Cascade Surveying), “to research and assess these discrepancies.” Buchholz attached a purported letter from the surveyor stating that the surveyor needed “at least several weeks” to review “evidence” provided by Buchholz. Buchholz requested the court “defer hearing until the June 2025 time frame.”
On April 4 Buchholz filed a “DESIGNATION OF EVIDENCE” to permit the introduction of “newly discovered, pertinent materials … to expose errors in [the City’s] motion” under CR 60(b)(3). 9 The designation requested the entry of six documents into court records, listing each document “with a statement of relevance to the motion brought forward.”
Three days later, Buchholz filed a response to the City’s motion to approve and record the legal description, to which the City replied that same day. The April 7 response again asked the court to allow newly discovered evidence under CR 60(b)(3) and listed certain documents with a “statement of relevance.” In her response, Buchholz
9 The motion also cited CR 60(b)(5) and (6).
8
asserted purported errors in the survey report and legal description that required “refinement to final judgement issued of December 20, 2024, on which the motion is based.” Buchholz disputed the trial court’s findings underlying its judgment and decree, argued that the right-of-way was abandoned, and requested the court award title of the right-of-way to her. Buchholz stated that her “arguments … demonstrate appropriate corrections of [all but two of the trial court’s] findings of facts[; 10] #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10 and #11 on which Judgement and Decree of 12-20-24 was based.”
The trial court held a hearing on the City’s motion to approve the legal description of the right-of-way and record the survey on April 8. The court acknowledged Buchholz’s request for a deferral based on her professed hiring of Cascade Surveying. Before it reached the question of “deferring any sort of hearing,” the court inquired with Buchholz about “what conflicts and errors in the survey … [she saw] that led [her] to feel the need to retain an independent expert.” Buchholz proceeded to argue that the property lines were not accurate and were based an easement possessed by the state department of transportation (DOT) and that she hired her own surveyor to review the property boundaries, “which would eliminate the City’s allegations against me because then the property line would be on the edge of the existing road, and so my building would be outside of it.” The court observed that Buchholz seemed to be relitigating issues decided at trial. Buchholz responded, “Well, mainly because the important things were not discovered. Like … there’s a current survey report that was never brought in.” The court explained that “the trial is over. … So this isn’t a forum to relitigate the trial. So
10 This did not include the trial court’s finding “1” regarding the legal description of the right-of-way and its finding “2” that Buchholz owned property on either side of the right-of-way, “but her deeds … exclude Old Jordan Road.”
9
my ruling at the trial stands. And so the entry of the survey to conform with my ruling is something that I am planning on moving forward with.”
THE COURT: Now, if you tell me that there’s an error in the survey because it doesn’t conform to my ruling in some fashion or because it just has something that is objectively wrong and not supported by the physical landmarks of the area, such that I might call into question the competency of the survey, that’s one thing.
But if you’re telling me that we’re going back and we’re attempting to relitigate the question of the easement, the question of the placement of the county road, the question of how I ultimately decided to determine what the City’s property rights were, then I have to tell you, that’s a no-sail as far as this trial is concerned.
[BUCHHOLZ]: Okay. Well, the finding of facts says it’s part of the 1892 road map, which is not a true finding.
THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you. You had your opportunity to be consider [sic] it and –
[BUCHHOLZ]: Excuse me, I’m not quite done.
THE COURT: Well, I think actually you are. Thank you. You had an opportunity to have either the trial appealed or reconsidered. Neither was timely brought. And so you’re beginning now by telling me you want a deferral to essentially give you more time to bring an action which you no longer actually have a right to bring.
[BUCHHOLZ]: Well, the case – but is the case closed? … THE COURT: The case is closed.
[BUCHHOLZ]: I can’t ask for an appeal?
THE COURT: You need to speak to an attorney about what your rights to an appeal are; however, as far as this Court is concerned as far as what you can do in front of this judge, your timeline for having a reconsideration has passed. You did not timely file a motion for reconsideration. …
[BUCHHOLZ]: Well, I have – I do have concerns with the – with the survey.
THE COURT: I need to know what concerns you have, when – keeping in mind the requirement that the survey just has to conform with
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what my court order was at trial – what legitimate concerns you have.
Because I do question why you didn’t lead with those concerns if that’s what we’re here about today.
After further attempt from Buchholz to relitigate issues resolved at trial, including that the survey overlapped with an easement acquired by the DOT, the court concluded:
I’m going to sign the order.
The survey, as far as I can tell, is in conformance with my findings of fact and conclusions of law. Those findings of fact and conclusions of law still remain the law of this case. I have not heard anything that tells me that my findings of fact and conclusions of law have not been accurately recorded on this.
I’m hearing, instead, that the surveys themselves are not accurate.
That, again, seems to be predicated on arguments that were brought at trial. And so, again, you have a recourse if you feel that the trial court incorrectly determined the facts and the law, but relitigating it at this point is not your recourse.
The court entered a written order on April 8 granting the City’s motion and approving the legal description of the right-of-way prepared by Metron and Associates as consistent with court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment and decree. The court permitted the City to record the survey with the County auditor.
On April 25 Buchholz filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the trial court’s “Final Order, dated April 8, 2025” and the “Judgment and Decree, dated December 20, 2024.” Buchholz attached the trial court’s order granting the City’s motion for approval of legal description and permission to record and the judgment and decree.
DISCUSSION
Timeliness
The City argues that Buchholz’s appeal must be dismissed because it is untimely. We agree.
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A. Judgment and Decree RAP 2.2(a)(1) allows a party to appeal a “final judgment entered in any action or proceeding.” To initiate review, the party seeking review must file a notice of appeal “within the time provided by [RAP] 5.2.” RAP 5.1(a). RAP 5.2 provides in relevant part that a notice of appeal must be filed in the trial court within the longer of “30 days after the entry of the decision of the trial court that the party filing the notice wants reviewed” or 30 days after the entry of a motion for reconsideration under CR 59. RAP 5.2(a), (e). The 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal under RAP 5.2(a) is not extended upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the trial court if the moving party has failed to both file and serve the motion within 10 days after entry of judgment, as required by CR 59(b). Schaefco, Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n, 121 Wn.2d 366, 367-68, 849 P.2d 1225 (1993); 11 see Stedman v. Cooper, 172 Wn. App. 9, 14, 292 P.3d 764 (2012) (“[A] timely motion for reconsideration in the trial court will extend [the time to file a notice of appeal] until 30 days after entry of the order deciding that motion.”).
Here, the trial court entered the judgment and decree on December 20, 2024. On January 10, 2025, Buchholz sent an email titled “Petition for Reconsideration” to the trial court’s clerk and did not note the motion. On February 7 Buchholz filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment and decree and later noted the motion for a hearing on February 18.
In her opening brief, Buchholz assigns error to the trial court’s denial of her “motions” for reconsideration of the judgment and decree, 12 asserting that the court
11 Though both RAP 5.2 and CR 59 has been amended since Schaefco, the relevant language of the rules has remained the same.
12 Buchholz’s notice of appeal did not designate the trial court’s order denying her motion to reconsider the judgment and decree. See RAP 5.3(a)(3).
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erred in determining her motion was untimely under CR 59(b). Buchholz argues that the trial court should have considered her January 10 email as a motion for its content, rather than its form. In support, she cites Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Merlino, wherein this court held that a letter sent by bank-plaintiff’s counsel to the trial judge was sufficient to constitute a motion for reconsideration. 35 Wn. App. 610, 613-15, 668 P.2d 1304 (1983). Observing that “[a] court will measure the sufficiency of a motion not by its technical format or its language, but by its content,” the Merlino court held that the content of the letter met the minimum requirements for a motion. 13 Id. at 614-15.
In the instant case, the January 10 email is not designated in the record, precluding our ability to assess its content. 14 Regardless, even assuming arguendo that the January 10 email constituted a motion for reconsideration, it still did not satisfy the 10-day requirement under CR 59(b). Therefore, as relevant to the question of the timeliness of her appeal, Buchholz’s untimely motion for reconsideration did not toll the commencement of the 30-day timeframe. 15 See In re Marriage of Orate, 11 Wn. App. 2d 807, 814, 455 P.3d 1158 (2020) (“A person who does not timely appeal a trial court ruling cannot extend the period to appeal by arguing an untimely reconsideration.”) (citing Schaefco, 121 Wn.2d at 367-68). Under RAP 5.2(a), the deadline for Buchholz to
13 The letter “contained the name of the court on the inside address, the title of the action and the file number, identification of the nature of the paper, and concluded explicitly, ‘[W]e, ... wish you to hear a motion for reconsideration.’” Merlino, 35 Wn. App. at 614 (alteration in original).
14 It is Buchholz’s burden as the appellant to perfect the record on appeal. See In re Marriage of Haugh, 58 Wn. App. 1, 6, 790 P.2d 1266 (1990).
15 Further, even assuming arguendo that the trial court’s February 28, 2025, order denying Buchholz’s motion for reconsideration commenced the 30-day clock, Buchholz’s April 25, 2025, notice of appeal would still have been late.
13
appeal the judgment and decree was 30 days from its entry on December 20, 2024. Buchholz did not meet this deadline, filing her appeal on April 25, 2025.
Buchholz contends that her appeal is timely because the judgment and decree entered on December 20 was not the final decision in the case. She argues that because the trial court, in the judgment and decree, expressly retained jurisdiction to review and approve a survey of the right-of-way, the 30-day timeframe to appeal the judgment and decree was not triggered until the court’s “final” April 8, 2025, order that approved the City’s proposed survey and legal description.
Buchholz’s contention is premised on the Supreme Court’s statement in Franz v.
Lance:
A party need not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of every appealable order or judgment but may instead await the final decision in the case. Fox v. Sunmaster Prods., Inc., 115 Wn.2d 498, 505, 798 P.2d 808 (1990). If a timely notice of appeal is filed from that decision, the appellate court will review prior orders and judgments, even those which were immediately appealable, if they prejudicially affect the final judgment. [Id.]
119 Wn.2d 780, 781, 836 P.2d 832 (1992) (per curiam).
The decision in Franz considered whether the timely appeal of an order imposing sanctions against the Lances brought up the underlying judgment that held them liable for trespassing on the Franzes’ property under RAP 2.4(b), which allows an appellate court to review an order or ruling not designated in a notice of appeal, including if “the order or ruling prejudicially affects the decision designated in the notice” and “the order is entered, or the ruling is made, before the appellate court accepts review.” 16 Franz, 119 Wn.2d at 781-82. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s judgment on the
16 Amendments to RAP 2.4 that have occurred since Franz are not relevant to this opinion’s discussion.
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merits of quiet title and trespass issues prejudicially affected the trial court’s later award of attorney fees and costs as a sanction against the Lances “for filing a baseless answer to the Franzes’ complaint and for filing a frivolous counterclaim.” Id. at 782. Determining that the Franzes’ timely notice of appeal of the sanctions award allowed review of the underlying judgment, the court stated, “The award therefore must stand or fall based on the findings and conclusions the trial court entered in support of the [prior] judgment.” Id.
Buchholz also relies on language from the Supreme Court’s later decision in Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Community Council, wherein the court considered whether a notice for discretionary review of the trial court’s discovery order brought up the trial court’s prior denial of a motion to dismiss and order continuing a motion for summary judgment under RAP 2.4(b). 146 Wn.2d 370, 376-80, 46 P.3d 789 (2002). The Right-Price Recreation court stated that under Franz, a prior order “prejudicially affects” a decision designated in a notice of appeal as set forth in RAP 2.4(b) if “the order appealed from would not have happened but for the first order.” Id. at 380. The Supreme Court held that “in this case, granting the motion to dismiss would have terminated the action and precluded the designated discovery order,” and was thus reviewable under RAP 2.4(b). 17 Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
In 21st Mortgage Corp. v. Nicholls, this court considered Franz and RAP 2.4(b) in a case where the defendant in a judicial foreclosure action filed a notice of appeal that timely designated the trial court’s orders confirming the property sale and disbursing funds but untimely designated the October 2023 judgment that “declared that 21st had a
17 As to the order continuing the motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court decided that because the continuance order occurred after the discovery order designated in the notice of appeal, “the continuance is independent of any prejudicial effect on the designated order.” Right-Price Recreation, 146 Wn.2d at 380.
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valid lien on the Property, foreclosed that lien, authorized the sale of the property, entered judgment in 21st’s favor, and directed … proceeds of sale be applied to satisfy the judgment.” 35 Wn. App. 2d 899, 901-07, 579 P.3d 802 (2025). We observed, “The question in Franz was whether an appeal from a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees also brought an earlier judgment up for appeal. In that case, the earlier judgment did not resolve the parties’ entitlement to fees.” Id. at 905 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Holding that the defendant’s appeal of the October 2023 judgment was untimely, we reasoned that Franz did not apply to a judgment like the October 2023 judgment that “‘finally determines the rights of the parties in the action[,] … even if it directs performance of certain subsidiary acts in carrying out the judgment, the right to the benefit of which is adjudicated in that judgment.’” Id. at 905-06 (alterations in original) (quoting Wlasiuk v. Whirpool Corp., 76 Wn. App. 250, 255, 884 P.2d 13 (1994)).
In Kemmer v. Keiski, we examined an appeal that untimely designated the trial court’s initial judgment granting a 12-foot easement and the trial court’s second judgment expanding the easement to 30 feet at certain points. 116 Wn. App. 924, 925, 931, 933-34, 937, 68 P.3d 1138 (2003). In Kemmer we stated that Franz does not:
excuse[ ] a party from timely appealing a judgment that resolves all claims and all parties then pending before the court, including all then-pending claims for fees and expenses. In other words, … Franz … [does not excuse] a party from timely appealing a judgment that leaves nothing unresolved; and if such a judgment is not timely appealed, it directly precludes all further proceedings in the same case, except proceedings to “clarify” or enforce.
…
We reverse the [second] judgment, for it is precluded by the [initial]
judgment that was not timely appealed. We decline to review or disturb the
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[initial] judgment, for it precludes this appeal. Except for proceedings to enforce the [initial] judgment, if any, we direct that no further proceedings occur under this cause number.
Id. at 937; see id. at 932 (stating that if not appealed within 30 days, a judgment that disposes of all claims and all parties “directly precludes all further proceedings in the same case” with the exception of clarification and enforcement proceedings) (citing Rivard v. Rivard, 75 Wn.2d 415, 418, 451 P.2d 677 (1969); RAP 7.2(c); In re Marriage of Burrill, 113 Wn. App. 863, 873, 56 P.3d 993 (2002)).
The analyses in 21st Mortgage Corp. and Kemmer are consistent with the Washington Supreme Court’s history of “generally defin[ing] a final judgment in terms of its effect on the underlying cause of action. … That is, whether it resolved the merits of a party’s legal claims.” Denney v. City of Richland, 195 Wn.2d 649, 654, 462 P.3d 842 (2020) (emphasis added). In other words, “[a] final judgment is a judgment that ends the litigation, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Herdson v. Fortin, 26 Wn. App. 2d 628, 635, 530 P.3d 220 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It concludes the action by resolving the plaintiff’s entitlement to the requested relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court’s December 20, 2024, judgment and decree fully resolved the parties’ dispute regarding the ownership of the right-of-way and its legal boundaries. Buchholz’s assertion that “[t]he trial court reserved the authority to modify the legal description of the property granted by quiet title in the December 20 Order based on the results of the property survey” is not supported in the record. (Emphasis added.) The trial court explained at the April 8, 2025, hearing on the City’s motion to approve the legal description and record the survey that it would not consider
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Buchholz’s attempts to relitigate the court’s findings and conclusions underlying the judgment and decree. Rather, the hearing provided Buchholz the opportunity to present any concerns regarding the accuracy of the survey based on the court’s December 20 decision. After providing Buchholz the opportunity to raise any relevant concerns, the trial court concluded the survey conformed with its findings of fact and conclusions of law that “remain the law of this case.”
Buchholz avers in her opening brief that the trial court’s April 8 order “expanded”
the City’s “right to the land beyond the right-of-way.” In support she cites her untimely motion to reconsider the judgment and decree, solely premising her assertion on disputes about the trial court’s previous findings of fact entered via the December 20 judgment and decree. Buchholz otherwise asserts in her reply brief without citations to the record that the April 8 order “expanded upon and modified the description of the contested segment of [the] right of way.” Such bald claims do not warrant our review. See RAP 10.3(a)(6) (requiring an appellant’s brief to provide “argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record”); Cook v. Brateng, 158 Wn. App. 777, 794, 262 P.3d 1228 (2010) (“Appellate courts need not consider arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, references to the record, or meaningful analysis.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s judgment and decree constituted the trial court’s final decision in the case. 18
18 Because the judgment and decree resolved all claims in the case, Buchholz’s citation to RAP 2.2(d), which allows interlocutory review of a trial court’s “final judgment that does not dispose of all the claims or counts as to all the parties,” is inapposite.
18
“A necessary prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction is the timely filing of the notice of appeal.” Buckner, Inc. v. Berkey Irrig. Supply, 89 Wn. App. 906, 911, 951 P.2d 338 (1998). “A person who does not timely appeal from a trial court ruling cannot extend the period to appeal by rearguing the issue.” Orate, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 809. Akin to the defendant in 21st Mortgage Corp., Buchholz, “given the well-recognized interest in finality of judgments,” cannot belatedly challenge the judgment and decree by appealing a later order that “merely carried out the directives contained in that judgment” as a means to attack “the propriety of the judgment itself.” 21st Mortg. Corp., 35 Wn. App. 2d at 907; see Stanley v. Cole, 157 Wn. App. 873, 887, 239 P.3d 611 (2010) (“In Washington, there is a strong policy favoring the finality of judgments on the merits.”). Hence, we conclude that the trial court’s judgment and decree cannot be brought up by Buchholz’s appeal of the later, subsidiary April 8 order under RAP 2.4(b). See 21st Mortg. Corp., 35 Wn. App. 2d at 905-07.
Buchholz’s appeal of the judgment and decree is untimely.
B. Order Approving Legal Description and Permission to Record There is no dispute that Buchholz timely appealed the trial court’s April 8 order approving the City’s proposed survey and legal description. However, her substantive arguments on appeal regarding the April 8 order do not concern the accuracy of the survey and legal description in accordance with the trial court’s judgment and decree. Rather, she substantively challenges the legal status and boundaries of the right-of-way previously determined by the judgment and decree. Such arguments are waived by Buchholz’s failure to timely appeal the judgment and decree. See 21st Mortg. Corp., 35 Wn. App. 2d at 907; Orate, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 809.
19
Additionally, we decline to consider Buchholz’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in its April 8 order by failing to consider newly discovered evidence under CR 60(b)(3). Prior to the April 8 hearing, Buchholz filed her CR 60(b)(3) motion but did not properly note it for a hearing. When the trial court provided Buchholz with the opportunity to clarify her argument against the City’s proposed survey at the April 8 hearing on the City’s motion to approve the legal description, she either repeated or raised new arguments regarding the legal status of the right-of-way previously litigated at trial. Moreover, though the April 8 hearing transcript indicates that Buchholz attempted to rely on purported new evidence, she never raised the merits of her CR 60(b)(3) motion for the trial court’s consideration. We may decline to review any claim of error that was not raised before the trial court. RAP 2.5(a). “Arguments or theories not presented to the trial court will generally not be considered on appeal.” Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wn.2d 246, 290, 840 P.2d 860 (1992). We generally require issues to be advanced below to allow the trial court an opportunity to consider and rule on the relevant authority. Id. at 291 (citing RAP 2.5(a)). Because the CR 60(b)(3) motion 19 was never properly presented to the trial court, we need not consider Buchholz’s related claim on review. C. RAP 18.8(b)
Generally, the proper remedy for an untimely appeal is dismissal of the appeal.
Schaefco, 121 Wn.2d at 368. Buchholz argues that even if her appeal of the December 20, 2024, order was untimely, her misinterpretation of the application of RAP 2.4 should be excused based on her “reasonable diligence” and “good faith effort” in timely
19 We express no opinion as to the merits of such a motion.
20
appealing the April 8, 2025 order. Buchholz relies on RAP 18.8(b), which authorizes an appellate court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal only in extraordinary circumstances and to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice.
In considering RAP 18.8(b), “[t]he appellate court will ordinarily hold that the desirability of finality of decisions outweighs the privilege of a litigant to obtain an extension of time.” “In contrast to the liberal application we generally give the [RAPs], RAP 18.8 expressly requires a narrow application.” Beckman ex rel. Beckman v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 102 Wn. App. 687, 693, 11 P.3d 313 (2000) (referring to RAP 18.8(b)). “Extraordinary circumstances” that are sufficient to allow extension of time within which party must file a notice of appeal are “‘circumstances wherein the filing, despite reasonable diligence, was defective due to excusable error or circumstances beyond the party’s control.’” Beckman, 102 Wn. App. at 694 (quoting Reichelt v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 52 Wn. App. 763, 765-66, 764 P.2d 653 (1988)). It is “‘in such a case, the lost opportunity to appeal would constitute a gross miscarriage of justice because of the appellant’s reasonably diligent conduct.’” Id. (quoting Reichelt, 52 Wn. App. at 765-66).
Buchholz cites cases that satisfied the rigorous standard under RAP 18.8(b)
based on circumstances that do not apply to her untimely appeal of the trial court’s judgment and decree. See Weeks v. Chief of Wash. State Patrol, 96 Wn.2d 893, 895- 96, 639 P.2d 732 (1982) (timely notice of appeal was filed in the wrong court); State v. Ashbaugh, 90 Wn.2d 432, 438, 583 P.2d 1206 (1978) (notice of appeal was timely but initially rejected for lack of a filing fee); Structurals N.W., Ltd. v. Fifth & Park Place, Inc.,
21
33 Wn. App. 710, 714, 658 P.2d 679 (1983) (notice of appeal timely when filed within 30 days of the entry of a stipulated amended judgment).
Buchholz’s reference to Scannell v. State is likewise unpersuasive. In Scannell, the Supreme Court deemed a pro se litigant’s untimely appeal was excusable based on his reasonable confusion over a recent “drastic” change to RAP 15.2(a) that removed a motion for indigency’s prior tolling effect on the timeline to appeal under RAP 5.2(a). 128 Wn.2d 829, 832-35, 912 P.2d 489 (1996). The court observed that RAP 15.2(a) was amended three months prior to Scannell’s appeal and a continuing reference in RAP 5.2(a) to RAP 15.2(a) created a “trap for the unwary.” Id. at 833. “Had the old rule been in effect, Scannell’s acts would have been in full compliance.” Id. The court determined the “unique circumstances” justified an extension under RAP 18.8(b) but warned that future misinterpretations of the amended rule “will not be treated with equal leniency.” Id. at 835-36.
The circumstances in Scannell are not present in the instant case. Buchholz has not demonstrated that her failure to timely appeal the trial court’s judgment and decree was excusable or based on circumstances outside of her control. A misinterpretation of the well-established, foundational rule that a trial court’s decision must be appealed within 30 days does not suffice. See Davidson v. Nat’l Can Co., 150 Wash. 370, 371-72, 273 P. 185 (1928). Even if an appeal raises important issues, “it would be improper to consider those issues absent sufficient grounds for granting an extension of time.” In re Dependency of A.L.F., 192 Wn. App. 512, 525, 371 P.3d 537 (2016) (citing Schaefco, 121 Wn.2d at 368).
22
We conclude that Buchholz’s untimely appeal must be dismissed. 20 Attorney Fees on Appeal
We agree with the City that Buchholz’s untimely appeal warrants the imposition of a sanction of attorney fees under RAP 18.9. RAP 18.9(a) provides:
The appellate court on its own initiative or on motion of a party may order a party or counsel ... who uses these rules for the purpose of delay, files a frivolous appeal, or fails to comply with these rules to pay terms or compensatory damages to any other party who has been harmed by the delay or the failure to comply or to pay sanctions to the court.
In determining whether an appeal is frivolous and was thus brought for the purpose of delay to justify the imposition of sanctions, this court is:
guided by the following considerations: (1) A civil appellant has a right to appeal under RAP 2.2; (2) all doubts as to whether the appeal is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the appellant; (3) the record should be considered as a whole; (4) an appeal that is affirmed simply because the arguments are rejected is not frivolous; (5) an appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ, and it is so totally devoid of merit that there was no reasonable possibility of reversal.
Streater v. White, 26 Wn. App. 430, 434-35, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). Because Buchholz did not timely file her appeal as set forth in RAP 5.2(a), she no longer has the right to appeal under RAP 2.2. Her appeal is therefore “frivolous in the extreme,” warranting the imposition of sanctions under RAP 18.9(a). See In re Marriage of Penry, 119 Wn. App. 799, 804, 82 P.3d 1231 (2004).
CONCLUSION
We dismiss this appeal. Upon the City’s proper application under RAP 18.1(d), a
20 We decline to consider Buchholz’s claim that the trial court improperly denied her November 4, 2024, motion to continue trial because she never noted the motion for a hearing, and because she waived that claim when she did not timely appeal the trial court’s judgment and decree. See RAP 2.5(a); RAP 5.2(a).
23
commissioner of this court will enter an order awarding reasonable attorney fees on appeal consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR: