City of Frankfort v. Fuss

29 S.W.2d 603, 235 Ky. 143, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 300
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedJune 20, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 29 S.W.2d 603 (City of Frankfort v. Fuss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Frankfort v. Fuss, 29 S.W.2d 603, 235 Ky. 143, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 300 (Ky. 1930).

Opinions

Opinion of the Court by

Commissioner Hobson

Reversing.

John Fnss, a citizen and taxpayer of Frankfort, brought this action in April, 1928, against the city, alleging in his petition these facts: Frankfort is a city of the third class, having a population of more than 10,000 but less than 15,000; the assessed value of the property in the city is $7,753,151. The city has, an outstanding, legally incurred bonded indebtedness of $290,000, of which $215,000 was incurred before the adoption of the present Constitution. In addition to this, the city had an outstanding floating indebtedness of approximately $121,000 legally incurred. The city for many years made no provision to create a sinking fund to pay the interest or retire the bonded indebtedness of the city, but every year, since the adoption of the Constitution, took from the revenues derived from the regular levy a sum sufficient to pay the interest on the bonded indebtedness, thereby depriving the city of funds sufficient to pay the current expenses of the city, although the city did not in any year create an indebtedness in excess of revenues of that year. On April 9, 1928, the council enacted an ordinance providing for the issuing of $120,000 of bonds to fund a like amount of the floating indebtedness of the city, providing’ by the ordinance when the bonds should be payable and providing for a levy each year to provide a sinking fund and pay the interest on the bonds. A purchaser had offered to take the bonds at par, bearing interest at 4% per cent, per annum. He alleged that the ordinance created an indebtedness of the city beyond the current revenues for the year and prayed that the council be enjoined from issuing and selling the bonds. Other taxpayers intervened and filed pleadings, charging that the indebtedness of $120,000 had not been lawfully-created, also that the city had not a population of 10,000 and that the council was without authority to issue the bonds. Proof was taken, and on final hearing the circuit *146 court granted the plaintiffs an injunction as prayed. The city appeals.

The proof wholly fails to show that any part of the indebtedness was illegally created. The' presumption is that the officers did their duty. The burden of proof to show the illegality of the indebtedness was upon the party alleging that the indebtedness was illegal. Bradford v. City of Glasgow, 143 Ky. 404, 136 S. W. 647, and cases cited. Section 157 of the Constitution, after providing that the tax rate of cities, towns, etc., shall not exceed a certain amount, concludes with these words: “No county, city, town, taxing district, or other municipality, shall be authorized or permitted to become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof, voting at an election to be held for that purpose; and any indebtedness contracted in violation of this section shall be void. Nor shall such contract be enforceable by the person with whom made; nor shall such municipality ever be authorized to assumje the same. ’ ’

Section 158 of the Constitution, after providing that the cities and towns, etc., shall not be authorized to incur indebtedness exceeding a certain percentage of the taxable property therein, concludes with these words: “Provided, Any city, town, county, taxing district, or other municipality may contract an indebtedness in excess of such limitations when the same has been authorized under laws in force prior to the adoption of this Constitution, or when necessary for the completion of and payment for a public improvement undertaken and not completed and paid for at the time of the adoption of this Constitution: And provided further, If, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, the aggregate indebtedness, bonded or floating, of any, town, county, taxing district or other municipality, including that which it has been or may be authorized to contract as herein provided, shall exceed the limit herein prescribed, then no such city or town shall be authorized or permitted to increase its indebtedness in an amount exceeding two per centum (2%), and no such county, taxing district or' other municipality, in an amount exceeding one per centum (1%), in the aggregate upon the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained as herein provided, until the aggregate of its indebtedness shall have *147 been reduced below the limit herein fixed, and thereafter it shall not exceed the limit, unless in case of emergency, the public health or safety should so require. Nothing herein shall prevent the issue of renewal bonds, or bonds to fund the floating indebtedness of any city, town, county, taxing district or other municipality. ’ ’

In the City of Winchester v. Nelson, 175 Ky. 69, 193 S. W. 1040, 1043, the court thus stated its conclusion as to the proper construction of these provisions: “It is our judgment that the proper construction of these three provisions of sections 157 and 158 of the Constitution is: First, that the first provision of section 157 is simply a limitation upon the power of the taxing authorities, without the assent of -the voters, to levy taxes; second, that the second provision of section 157 permits with the consent of the voters, the creation of an indebtedness that cannot be taken care of out of the levy permitted in the first part of section 157; and, third, that section 158 of the Constitution places a final limitation upon the power to create debt of the voters themselves.”

In Vaughn v. Corbin, 217 Ky. 521, 289 S. W. 1104, 1105, the court, after quoting section 158 of the Constitution and section 3284, Kentucky Statutes, said: “But it will be observed that bonds issued to fund the lawfully contracted floating indebtedness of any city are excepted out of the operation of that section. It results therefore that the city council has power to issue the $75,000 of bonds, although this may increase the bonded indebt(edness of the city beyond the limit fixed in that section.

“The issuing of bonds to fund a floating debt adds nothing to the indebtedness of the city. It merely changes the form of the existing debt. The power to fund a .floating indebtedness is as broad as the power to incur such indebtedness.”

To same effect, see City of Covington v. O. F. Moore Co., 218 Ky. 102, 290 S. W. 1066; Wilson v. Covington, 220 Ky. 798, 295 S. W. 1068; Davis v. Newport, 224 Ky. 546, 6 S. W. (2d) 693; Baker v. Rockcastle County Court, 225 Ky. 99, 7 S. W. (2d) 846; Welch v. Nicholasville, 225 Ky. 312, 8 S. W. (2d) 400; Wilson v. Board of Education, 226 Ky. 476, 11 S. W. (2d) 143; Rowland v. Paris, 227 Ky. 570, 13 S. W. (2d) 791; Masonic, etc., Home v. Corbin, 229 Ky. 375, 17 S. W. (2d) 215.

*148 The record indicates that the debt of $120,000 has been gradually created by reason of unusual expenses falling upon the city. To illustrate, the bridge over the Kentucky river, connecting the south side and the State Capitol with the main business portion of the city, became in a dangerous condition, and the public safety required that it be repaired at once, and this cost a large sum. Two of the main sewers fell in and the outfall sewer was not properly performing. The public needs required that these be put in order, and there were other like unusual expenses, in all amounting to a large sum.

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Bluebook (online)
29 S.W.2d 603, 235 Ky. 143, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-frankfort-v-fuss-kyctapphigh-1930.