City of Eureka v. Hall

687 S.W.2d 917, 1985 Mo. App. LEXIS 3235
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 29, 1985
Docket48245
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 687 S.W.2d 917 (City of Eureka v. Hall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Eureka v. Hall, 687 S.W.2d 917, 1985 Mo. App. LEXIS 3235 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

SIMON, Presiding Judge.

This is an annexation case in which the County of St. Louis, a first class constitutional charter county, appeals from a declaratory judgment of the Circuit Court of the County of St. Louis which granted the City of Eureka authorization to proceed with annexation of approximately 1,243 acres (about 1.94 square miles) of land situated in unincorporated St. Louis County. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Eureka is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Missouri, as a city of the fourth class in St. Louis County, Missouri. On June 19,1979, Eureka’s Board of Aldermen adopted a resolution seeking to annex property described in the resolution. This property is contiguous and adjacent to the current city limits of Eureka and contains about 132 residents within its 1,243 acres. Six Flags Over Mid-America, a recreational amusement park, encompasses about one-half of the proposed annex area, although part of the Six Flags property remains undeveloped. The other major commercial development in the annex area is a Ramada Inn, with the remainder of the annex area largely rural. On August 7, 1979, the City of Eureka and the annex area held an election, in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, in which a majority of the votes cast within Eureka (394-21) and within the annex area (37-25) approved the proposed annexation. Eureka then filed its petition for declaratory judgment on September 17, 1979. Subsequent to Eureka’s filing its declaratory judgment action, Section 71.015 RSMo 1978 governing annexations was amended, effective May 1980. The nineteen days of trial in 1983 spanning eight weeks resulted in a voluminous record of more than 1700 pages in transcript and a multitude of exhibits from which the trial court’s lengthy findings of fact and law were culled. The trial court issued its judgment on December 16, 1983, granting Eureka authorization to proceed with the annexation.

On appeal, St. Louis County (County) pinpoints as error: (1) the failure of Eureka’s annexation efforts to conform to the newly amended annexation statute with its additional requirements; (2) the denial of St. Louis County’s post-trial motion to reopen the case for additional evidence; (3) the absence of evidence that the annexation was necessary to the proper development of Eureka; (4) the failure of Eureka to demonstrate its ability to furnish municipal services to the annexed area within a rea *919 sonable time after the effective date of the annexation; and (5) the absence of substantial evidence to show the annexation was reasonable and necessary, as to be fairly debatable before Eureka’s Board of Aider-men.

County’s first point argues that Eureka must comply with the host of procedural requirements contained in Section 71.015, as amended in 1980, which imposed more stringent requirements for annexation. For example, subsection (1) requires that at least 15% of the perimeter of the area to be annexed be contiguous with the city’s existing boundary. Subsection (2) requires development of a “Plan of Intent” to provide services to the annex area and a public hearing, and places a limit on the future effective date of the annexation. Subsection (3) requires good faith effort to notify all the owners of record and residents in the area proposed to be annexed. Subsection (4) requires presentation at a public hearing of the “Plan of Intent” with supporting evidence bearing on major services presently provided by the city, a proposed time schedule for providing such services to residents in the annex area within three years, and information as to city assessment, tax rates and how the city proposes to zone the annex area. Subsection (5) requires a declaratory judgment action by the city, following the hearing, if the city council adopts an ordinance to annex. One of the requirements of the petition is that it state facts showing the ability of the city to provide municipal services to the annex area within three years after the annexation becomes effective. Subsection (6) deals with the election procedures. Subsection (7) provides that failure to provide municipal services within the three year period will permit an action to be brought for deannexation. Subsection (8) exempts any city which has filed a declaratory judgment action prior to May 13, 1980, from compliance with subsection (5). Subsection (5) as noted relates to the declaratory judgment action which must be filed.

Eureka admits it did not meet the requirements set forth in Section 71.015 as amended in 1980, but argues that before the effective date of May 13, 1980, the annexation had already proceeded through all the legislative steps, gaining approval by the voters of both the annex and annexing area in August 1979. The suit for declaratory judgment was filed in September 1979, more than eight months before the effective May 1980 date for the amendment to Section 71.015. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that City of Branson v. Biedenstein, 618 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. banc 1981) is dispositive of this point. In City of Branson, our Supreme Court stated:

In order to comply with subsection (5), the city must be in a position to satisfy the requirements of the preceding subsections (1) through (4), mentioned above. Being relieved, however, by subsection (8) from compliance with subsection (5), it would follow that respondent would not be expected to comply with subsections (1) through (4), either. The legislature’s common sense approach is evident. It would be impossible for a city ... which had proceeded in good faith under the old § 71.015 to comply with the new requirements contained in subsections (1) through (5) without starting completely anew. It is clear that the legislature intended to relieve cities which had already commenced annexation proceedings from complying with subsection (1) through (4), as well as subsection (5), of the amendment. Subsection (7), which creates a cause of action for deannexation where the municipal services have not been provided within three years, likewise was not intended to apply to a city which, as here, was not required at the time it commenced annexation proceedings to furnish municipal services within three years of the effective date of annexation. Id. 670-71[6].

City of Branson, while holding that the amendments to Section 71.015, effective May 1980, were procedural, noted the amendments contain an exemption to relieve certain annexation efforts from compliance therewith. Id. We reject County’s *920 characterization that these comments are merely gratuitous. City of Kirkwood v. Allen, 899 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1966), upon which the County relies is readily distinguishable. City of Kirkwood dealt with a 1968 amendment to Section 71.015 RSMo 1959 requiring a vote in both the city and the area to be annexed in first class charter counties before a declaratory judgment was filed. The City of Kirkwood had completed only the preliminary legislative step of annexation by its passage of a resolution of its intent to annex certain land. The court held that the amendment providing for the dual election was procedural and applied to the previously filed annexation suit. Otherwise, the critical step affording residents of the annex area the right to vote on the annexation would not be met.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

City of St. Peters v. Ronald A. Winterhoff Living Trust
117 S.W.3d 698 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2003)
Sims v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
111 S.W.3d 454 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2003)
M.E.S. v. Daughters of Charity Services of St. Louis
975 S.W.2d 477 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1998)
City of Pacific v. Metro Development Corp.
922 S.W.2d 59 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1996)
City of Centralia v. Norden
879 S.W.2d 724 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1994)
Dallen v. City of Kansas City
822 S.W.2d 429 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991)
Wilson v. Brewster
809 S.W.2d 183 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991)
Stone v. Duffy Distributors, Inc.
785 S.W.2d 671 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1990)
Zundel v. Bommarito
778 S.W.2d 954 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1989)
O.J.G. v. G.W.G.
770 S.W.2d 372 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1989)
City of Ballwin v. Hardcastle
765 S.W.2d 324 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1989)
Greco v. Robinson
747 S.W.2d 730 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
687 S.W.2d 917, 1985 Mo. App. LEXIS 3235, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-eureka-v-hall-moctapp-1985.