City of El Paso v. Donohue

352 S.W.2d 713, 163 Tex. 160, 5 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 181, 1962 Tex. LEXIS 728
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 3, 1962
DocketA-8378
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 352 S.W.2d 713 (City of El Paso v. Donohue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of El Paso v. Donohue, 352 S.W.2d 713, 163 Tex. 160, 5 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 181, 1962 Tex. LEXIS 728 (Tex. 1962).

Opinion

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ROBERT W. HAMILTON

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondents, Gene Donohue, Trustee, et al., applied to the City Planning Commission of El Paso to have Lots 13 to 32 in Block 30, Woodlawn Addition to the City of El Paso, rezoned from A-3, which is restricted to residences and apartments, to C-4, which provides for commercial construction. The City Planning Commission denied the rezoning application. Respondents appealed to the City Council of El Paso. The City Council denied the application. Respondents then brought suit in the District Court of El Paso County to have the ordinance declared invalid as to respondents’ property. That court held that the action of the City in refusing the application was arbitrary and unreasonable, and entered judgment decreeing that the zoning ordinance in so far as it applies to respondents’ property in Block 30, Woodlawn Addition to the City of El Paso, El Paso County, is unreasonable, arbitrary and void. From this judgment the City of El Paso prosecuted its appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, which court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 344 S.W. 2d 185. The City of El Paso perfected its appeal to this court.

*162 The question before this court is whether under the record in this case there were any issuable facts or conditions which would authorize the City Council of El Paso to exercise its discretion in determining whether or not respondents’ property should be rezoned from residential and apartments to business. The trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals have held that the City Council had no discretion in the matter, and held as a matter of law that the ordinance was invalid as to respondents’ property. We do not agree with these holdings.

The respondents contend that the property in question under its present zoning, that is, for residences and apartments only, is unsuitable for such purposes, and that under such zoning restriction the property has little or no practical value, which amounts to a confiscation of the property. In support of these contentions the respondents rely on the testimony of a number of real estate and mortgage loan company men.

The real estate men testified in effect that the property is unsuitable for such purposes because of the following conditions and circumstances: Block 30, in which the property in question is located, adjoins Paisano Drive; Paisano Drive is a six-lane, divided thoroughfare which is designed to carry fast traffic, and the speed limit on said drive is forty-five miles per hour for approximately a mile east and a mile west of Block 30; a drainage ditch located some one hundred feet to the southwest of the property at times gives off unpleasant odors; the city sewage disposal plant, which gives off unpleasant odors, is some seven or eight blocks southeast; a baseball park and Washington Park, which has various recreational and amusement facilities, are located nearby; the Cordova Bridge across the Rio Grande into Mexico is some eight or nine blocks south. There are also some five or six non-conforming small businesses located within the area. Directly to the west of Block 30 and across a street is a gasoline filling station and truck stop which is zoned commercial. Some several blocks to the east on Paisano Drive is located the City Coliseum, where various forms of entertainment, including rodeos, from time to time are held.

In the opinion of the real estate witnesses the large volume of traffic which Paisano carried and the speed at which the traffic was allowed to move, the unpleasant odors from the city sewage disposal plant and the drainage ditch, as well as the large crowds gathering at the coliseum and the baseball park, made the area undesirable for residential purposes. They testified that the market value of 25-foot lots in Block 30 was from *163 $500.00 to $750.00 under the present zoning, that if said property were commercially zoned it would be worth from $2500 to $5000 per lot. The mortgage and loan company people testified that the area was unsuitable for individual residences and apartments, and that they would not recommend that loans be made for building under the present zoning.

The city contends that the area is suitable for the purposes for which it is presently zoned and that the zoning of the property in Block 30 for commercial purposes would be detrimental to the residents of the area in question. The city further contends that the zoning of property on Paisano as commercial would cause traffic congestion and would defeat the purpose for which Paisano was built, that is, to facilitate the movement of traffic into the downtown section and out of the downtown section, as well as traffic through the city.

In addition to several witnesses who were residents living near Block 30 testifying that they objected to the rezoning of Block 30 because it would be detrimental to their homes, the city used one witness who had been a member of the City Planning Commission for ten years and was at the time of testifying its chairman. Another witness used was the Director of Planning of the City of El Paso. He had been executive secretary of Walla Walla, Washington, Planning Commission from 1947 to 1952, was a Director of Planning of Spokane County, Washington, from 1952 to 1957, was Planning Director of the Puget Sound Governmental Conference in 1957, and was consultant to a number of cities and to legislative committees of the State of Oregon. The City also used a city building official who had had several years’ experience in engineering and design field supervision.

The Chairman of the Planning Commission testified that Paisano Drive was built about ten years previously at a cost of several million dollars for the purpose of relieving traffic on Alameda Street, which carried U. S. Highway 80 traffic, and was designed to move the traffic rapidly through the city; that to zone property on Paisano as commercial would lead to congestion of traffic and defeat the purpose for which Paisano Drive was built at such a tremendous cost. He testified that he had made a study of zoning problems in El Paso for ten years, that the area in question is properly zoned as residential, and that it is suitable for such purposes; that it was imperative to maintain Paisano Drive for fast moving traffic and that it was a policy of the Planning Commission to recommend that it be so *164 maintained at least until an expressway is provided through the city.

The director of city planning testified that the plan and purpose of the city in building Paisano Drive was for a major traffic carrying facility, and that purpose has been accomplished reasonably well. It was his opinion that the area in question was zoned suitably, that it was a growing residential section, that many new houses were being built in the area and in fact at the time of trial plans were being made for the building of a new school at a location several blocks southeast of the respondents’ property to take care of the growing needs of the children of school age; that individual residences were located on the property across Paisano Drive to the north, to the south across Central Avenue from Block 30 were a number of residences. On the very property which is sought to be rezoned are a number of residences which are occupied and have been for many years.

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Bluebook (online)
352 S.W.2d 713, 163 Tex. 160, 5 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 181, 1962 Tex. LEXIS 728, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-el-paso-v-donohue-tex-1962.