City of Duluth v. Davidson

107 N.W. 151, 97 Minn. 378, 1906 Minn. LEXIS 706
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedMarch 2, 1906
DocketNos. 14,630—(212)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 107 N.W. 151 (City of Duluth v. Davidson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Duluth v. Davidson, 107 N.W. 151, 97 Minn. 378, 1906 Minn. LEXIS 706 (Mich. 1906).

Opinion

«LEWIS, J.

The city charter of Duluth provides that a sewer improvement may :be commenced by the city council upon a petition therefor signed by the ■owners of ten per cent, of the real estate to be assessed for the same. Section 356, in part, reads:

The city of Duluth is hereby authorized * * * to construct, lay, relay and repair * * * sewers * * * in, over or under any street * * * and the whole or any part of the expense of any such improvement may be, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, defrayed by an assessment upon the real estate benefited thereby in proportion to such benefits without regard to cash valuation, to be determined and levied in the manner hereinafter provided.

Section 372 provides that, when the board of public works shall be ordered by the common council to make such an improvement, it shall cause an estimate of the cost thereof to be made by the city engineer, and shall thereupon proceed at once to assess eighty per cent, of the ■estimated cost of such improvement as is assessable on the property to be benefited thereby in proportion, as nearly as may be, to the benefits resulting thereto, but in no case in excess of such benefits.

The owners of ten per cent, of the real estate abutting on the improvement petitioned the city council to construct a sanitary sewer on South street, from a point two hundred fifty feet west of Twenty-Third Avenue East, to connect with the sewer on South street at Nineteenth Avenue East. The matter was referred to the board of public works, ■ when the city engineer estimated the cost to be $2,324.85. A contract for the construction of the sewer was thereupon let, and the contractor paid the sum of $3,754.88, and thereafter the city engineer reported to [380]*380the board of public works that the cost of the sewer from the outlet at Nineteenth avenue to the manhole at Twenty-First avenue was $1,206.-73, and the cost of the portion east of that point $2,548.15, and that the engineering expenses were $190. Thereupon the board made an assessment against each of the twenty seven lots on the upper side of South street, abutting upon the sewer, adding six per cent, for engineering expenses, and assessed sixteen of the lots, those lying between Nineteenth avenue and Twenty-First avenue, at $79.95, and the eleven lots-east of Twenty-First avenue at $245.55 per lot.

The owner of a lot east of Twenty-First avenue, and also of a lot west thereof, took an appeal to the district court from the assessment, specifying that the assessment was made without regard to the actual benefits to the property to be assessed for the improvement, and the assessment was not divided equally or proportionately among all of the lots affected by the improvement, according to the benefits; that the board assessed some of the lots greatly in excess of the actual benefits and greatly iñ excess, of amounts assessed against other lots similarly situated and equally benefited; also, that the board did not act upon their own judgment, or exercise any judgment, in making such assessment, but that the same was made and determined in an unauthorized and illegal manner and upon an arbitrary or erroneous basis or rule.

The trial court found that the amounts of the assessments appealed from were not in excess of the benefits, respectively, to the lots against which the assessments were levied, and that such assessments, respectively, were not in excess of the proportionate cost of the improvement properly assessable against such lots, and ordered judgment confirming the assessment. It was stipulated at the trial that the clerk of the board of public works represented the board and that his testimony should be considered as the testimony of its members.

The object of appellant at the trial seems to have been to demonstrate that the board applied a wrong principle, and did not make the assessment upon the lots in question in accordance with the benefits as determined by them. The clerk testified that the entire work was divided for the purposes of assessment into two sections: One, including all those lots on the upper side of South street, west of Twenty-First avenue; and the other, constituting all of the lots upon the same side of [381]*381the street east of Twenty-First avenue. He stated that practically all -of the lots to the west of that point consisted of earth, and we shall hereafter call them “earth” lots, whereas the lots east of that point consisted almost entirely of rock, hereafter designated “rock” lots.

Q. How did the board figure that lots in the second district [rock lots] were benefited $245, and the lots in the first district [earth lots] $79, by the same improvement? A. The board were advised by the city attorney that the court had held with reference to' one of their assessments that the cost of the excavation must be charged to the lots particularly benefited by it, and that if any part of the excavation was not necessary to the obtaining of the sewer or building the sewer for any lot, these lots should not be charged for such part of the excavation. Q. Then the lots in the second section [rock lots] — the cost of the sewer in front of the lots in the second section were divided equally among those lots ? A. I think it was equally. The original assessment roll shows. Q. It was made higher in those blocks because the cost was — ? A. Yes. Q. According to the engineer’s estimate? A. Yes, sir. Q. On the second section? A. Yes. Q. Not because the benefits to these lots were any-greater? A. No. Q. What was the reason actuating the board in making two sections of this assessment area? A. To comply with the instructions of the court in making sewer assessments. * * * Q. Are you familiar with the lay of the land out there along South street? A. No. * * *
Q. (by city attorney). You may state whether or not, in the judgment of the board, all of these — each of these — lots was “benefited to at least the amount of the highest assessment. A. In the judgment of the board they were. * * * Q. You may state whether or not, on account of the absolute cost being limited to $79.95 in the lots between Nineteenth and Twenty-First [avenues,] the board reduced the amount of benefits to the amount of the cost as to those lots ? A. They did. Q. And the board, in dividing this work at the manhole at Twenty-First .avenue, did it on account of the rock in the section east of that manhole and comparatively little or none west of it — is that right? [382]*382A. Yes. Q. And that action was taken on account of the setting-aside of an assessment by this court in a case in which the board, assessed in a similar improvement the cost divided proportionately against each of the lots in the entire improvement? A. It-was. * * *
Q. (by counsel for appellant). I would like you to restate-the proposition, explaining how you assessed one lot for this improvement $79.95 and one adjoining it for the same improvement' $245.55. A. He [city engineer] followed the instructions of the-board of public works. Q. What were those instructions? A. That all of those items of the cost that were applicable to all' property between both ends of the sewer should be assessed' against all the property benefited by the sewer. But the division-was made at the point where the rock began, and the entire cost of it was charged to the property lying east of the point where the rock began. Q. The entire cost of it — of what ? A. Of the-rock excavation. Q.

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Bluebook (online)
107 N.W. 151, 97 Minn. 378, 1906 Minn. LEXIS 706, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-duluth-v-davidson-minn-1906.