City of Dallas v. George

157 S.W.2d 987, 1941 Tex. App. LEXIS 1077
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 14, 1941
DocketNo. 2186
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 157 S.W.2d 987 (City of Dallas v. George) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Dallas v. George, 157 S.W.2d 987, 1941 Tex. App. LEXIS 1077 (Tex. Ct. App. 1941).

Opinion

LESLIE, Chief Justice.

The City of Dallas, originally instituted this suit against R. B. George and the State Fair of Texas, a corporation, as defendants, seeking to recover a large sum of money charged to have been converted by defendant George, or withheld by him knowing it to be in equity the property of the plaintiff.

The City also prayed for an injunction against George restraining him from interfering with its exclusive ownership and control of the Fair Park. The cause was tried before the court and jury, and at the conclusion of the testimony the court granted a motion of the defendant George for an instructed verdict against the City. A judgment was entered accordingly and this appeal is prosecuted from that action of the trial court.

In its statement of the case, the City states the purpose of the suit as one also “seeking an accounting from R. B. George and The State Fair of Texas under and by virtue of certain contracts * * *.” On its first appearance in the case, The State Fair applied to the court and obtained permission to align itself with the City of Dallas as plaintiff, instead of as co-defendant with R. B. George and adopted the pleadings and sought the same remedy against George as that prayed for by the City. At the conclusion of the trial, however, the State Fair moved for an instructed verdict in its favor against the City of Dallas and in favor of R. B. George, which said motion was likewise granted. As stated by the City, it thus appears that the State Fair at the conclusion of the trial “switched its position from that of co-plaintiff with the City of Dallas (assumed in the outset) to that of co-defendant with R. B. George.”

In this opinion, The State Fair of Texas, a private corporation, will be spoken of as the “Fair”; the Texas Centennial Central Exposition, a private corporation, as the “Centennial”; the Greater Texas Pan American Exposition, a private corporation, as “Pan American”; and the City of Dallas, a municipal corporation, as the “City.” (All italics herein are ours.)

The different contracts ' between the parties affecting the rights and forming the basis of respective claims, or the pertinent parts thereof, will now be noticed:

On May 8, 1924, the City and the Fair entered into a contract whereby the latter undertook for a period of 20 years from that date to conduct an annual State Fair in a public park belonging to the City of Dallas, known as Fair Park. By that contract the City turned over to the Fair for a limited • time each year said Park for the purpose of preparing for and presenting an annual State Fair and holding exhibitions in connection therewith. The Fair was granted the privilege of holding an annual race meet, carnival, or other entertainments. The contract provided for care of the property, repairs of buildings, general supervision, etc., during its life. The income from admission fees, concessions, etc., were to be devoted by the State Fair to purposes reflected by the following provisions thereof:

“That it is further mutually understood that all receipts and revenues of whatever nature, unless otherwise provided for by special contract that may now exist or may hereafter exist between the said Park Board and the State Fair of Texas, shall be used and appropriated for and applied to, the following purposes and none other:

“(a) For the purposes of conducting and maintaining an Annual Fair, Exposition and Entertainment of a high grade and excellence, as contemplated herein.
“(b) For the purpose of insuring a Spring Carnival, Festival, Entertainment or Race Meeting in the spring of each year.
“In this connection, it is distinctly understood the payment of premiums, purses, attractions and other expenses necessary to the conduct of a first-class annual fair, exposition and entertainment, and a spring carnival, festival, entertainment or race meeting in the spring of each year, shall be deemed to be a proper application of such funds.
“(c) For permanent buildings and improvements of said grounds suitable and appropriate for Fair purposes.
“(d) For Park Purposes.
“It is further mutually understood that unless otherwise provided by special contract between the said Park Board and the State Fair of Texas, the funds shall be set aside and appropriated in the order here-inabove set forth; provided, that after the [989]*989necessary funds are set aside for the conduct of the annual Fair and Exposition and the Spring- Carnival, Festival, Entertainment or Race Meeting, as provided by subdivisions (a) and (b) hereof, such remaining funds and revenues may be kept in tact with the consent of the Park Board for the construction of any particular improvement until such fund is increased to a sufficient amount to make any such particular improvement. That in case of emergency, the future receipts to be derived from the operation of the State Fair may be pledged to aid in carrying out the making of any particular improvement agreed upon by and between said Park Board and the State Fair of Texas; provided that in all such cases the said State Fair of Texas, as well as the Park Board of the City of Dallas, shall not pledge any such receipts so as to jeopardize the success of opening and conducting the annual Fair, Exposition and Entertainment, as herein provided.”

Paragraph 24 states again the purpose of that contract in this language; “ * * * the true purpose and spirit of this agreement is to create a cordial cooperative relationship between the City of Dallas on the one part and the State Fair of Texas on the other, in securing and perpetuating of the giving of an annual Fair, Exposition and Entertainment of a high standard of excellence.”

This contract is signed “The City of Dallas by Park Board, by L. Blaylock, Mayor, President of Park Board”, and State Fair of Texas by its president.

Another provision of that contract is in part as follows: “It is further mutually understood that all buildings or other improvements of a permanent nature placed in or upon said Fair Park from whatever fund, shall be and remain the property of the City of Dallas, subject to the right of the use thereof by the State Fair of Texas in accordance with the terms of this contract and agreement.”

The contract further provided that:

“The State Fair of Texas agrees, at its own cost and expense, to assume all the necessary upkeep and repair to all buildings and improvements now used for fair and exposition purposes for the entire term of this agreement, as well as such as may be hereafter built or constructed under the terms of this contract, and in consideration thereof shall have control of and receive all revenues from all sources within said Fair Park during the life of this contract * * *_»

Thereafter, on February 24, 1934, the Fair, City, Park Board, and R. B. George entered into a contract whereby certain expensive improvements were to be added to the Fair Park.

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Related

City of Dallas v. George
169 S.W.2d 473 (Texas Supreme Court, 1943)

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Bluebook (online)
157 S.W.2d 987, 1941 Tex. App. LEXIS 1077, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-dallas-v-george-texapp-1941.