NUMBER 13-21-00414-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, Appellant,
v.
GINA RIOS AND YSABEL MARTINEZ, AS NEXT FRIEND TO E.M., Appellees.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
Appellees Gina Rios and Ysabel Martinez as next friend to E.M. filed a negligence
suit against appellant the City of Corpus Christi (City) relating to a traffic accident involving a stolen Corpus Christi Police Department (CCPD) vehicle. The City filed a plea to the
jurisdiction arguing that it was protected by governmental immunity from appellees’ suit,
which the trial court denied. In three issues, the City argues that its immunity was not
waived because: (1) appellees’ claims did not arise from the City’s operation or use of a
motor vehicle as required for a waiver under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), see TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(1); (2) the City’s officers were entitled to official
immunity; and (3) appellees did not assert a valid waiver of immunity for their claims that
the City’s officers failed to properly handcuff and supervise the arrestee who
commandeered the CCPD vehicle. We reverse and render.
I. BACKGROUND 1
CCPD Officer Armando Vasquez responded to a report of a theft in progress at a
CVS pharmacy in Corpus Christi, Texas. CCPD officers arrested the suspect, later
identified as Alonso Sandoval III, after he fled the store on foot. Officer Vasquez
handcuffed Sandoval with his hands behind his back, placed him in the backseat of his
patrol vehicle, and restrained him with a seat belt. As Officer Vasquez was standing
outside of the vehicle talking to another officer, Sandoval removed his seatbelt and slid
his cuffed hands from behind his back, underneath his feet, to the front of his body. 2
Officer Vasquez then reentered the vehicle and drove back to CVS to finish his
investigation. Officer Vasquez did not see that Sandoval was now unbuckled with his
cuffed hands in the front of his body. Upon his arrival at CVS, Officer Vasquez instructed
fellow officer Graciela Luna-Garcia to monitor Sandoval while he was inside the store.
1 The following facts are derived from the jurisdictional record. The facts are undisputed, except
where otherwise noted.
2 These events were captured on the vehicle’s in-car camera.
2 Officer Vasquez left his key in the ignition so that the air conditioner would continue to run
while Sandoval was in the back seat. The patrol vehicle’s rear doors could not be opened
from the inside, and a plexiglass divider was located between the front and rear seats.
As requested, Officer Luna-Garcia monitored Sandoval from her nearby patrol
vehicle, which was parked directly behind Officer Vasquez’s unit. A short time later,
Officer Luna-Garcia observed Sandoval moving around the back seat area. She
approached the vehicle, opened the front driver side door, and saw that Sandoval had
kicked out the plexiglass divider and was trying to access the front seat. Officer Luna-
Garcia radioed for help while attempting to push Sandoval back into the rear seat.
However, Sandoval overpowered her and gained access to the driver seat. Sandoval
kicked Officer Luna-Garcia away from the vehicle and drove away. Sandoval disregarded
a red light at a nearby intersection and collided with appellees’ vehicle, causing appellees
to suffer personal injuries.
Appellees filed suit against the City alleging that their injuries were due to the
CCPD officers’ negligence. Appellees alleged that the City’s governmental immunity from
suit was waived by the TTCA because their injuries arose from the operation or use of a
motor-driven vehicle. See id. The City answered the suit and filed a plea to the jurisdiction.
In the plea, the City argued that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because
no waiver of immunity applied. Specifically, the City argued that the officers’ use of the
vehicle as a holding cell did not constitute the operation or use of a motor vehicle as
contemplated by the TTCA. The City further maintained that there was no causal nexus
between the officers’ alleged negligent use of the vehicle and appellees’ injuries because
Sandoval’s theft of the vehicle was not foreseeable, nor was it the actual cause of the
3 resulting accident. Finally, the City argued that it was immune from vicarious liability for
the officers’ actions because they were protected by official immunity. See City of San
Antonio v. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. 2022) (“If [an] employee is protected from
liability by official immunity, the employee is not personally liable to the claimant and the
government retains its sovereign immunity under [Section 101.021(1)].” (quoting DeWitt
v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1995) (alterations in original))).
The City attached the following pertinent evidence to its plea: (1) CCPD Officers
Vasquez and Luna-Garcia’s depositions; (2) CCPD Officers George Alvarez, Richard
Olden, and Donald Moore’s affidavits; and (3) Albert Rodriguez’s expert opinion report.
The City argued that the testimony of the CCPD officers and Rodriguez’s expert report
established each element of the official immunity defense. See id. at 537–38 (“Official
immunity is an affirmative defense that inures to all governmental employees who perform
discretionary functions in good faith and within their authority.” (cleaned up)). In his report,
Rodriguez, an expert in law enforcement training, stated that the plexiglass barrier in
Officer Vasquez’s patrol vehicle was designed to keep a detainee contained in the back
seat. Rodriguez further explained that the vehicle’s rear passenger doors could not be
opened from inside the vehicle. He stated that the back seat was equipped with a seat
and shoulder belt system to secure the detainee. Rodriguez opined that, in responding to
a report of theft and arresting the suspect, Officers Vasquez and Luna-Garcia were acting
“within the parameters of the duties and responsibilities law enforcement officers are
assigned to perform.”
Rodriguez explained that Officer Vasquez was performing discretionary functions
in securing, transporting, and monitoring Sandoval. Specifically, Rodriguez stated that
4 “[w]hen and how often to monitor a detainee in the back seat, while in transport, is a
discretionary law enforcement function” and that “[a]ny reasonable and well-trained law
enforcement officer could have reasonably believed Sandoval was adequately secured.”
Rodriguez opined that “[a]ny reasonable law enforcement officer could have believed that
there was no special need to continuously monitor Sandoval, versus checking vehicular
and pedestrian traffic while driving.” Rodriguez emphasized that “the rear seat . . . is
specifically designed to secure detainees with the special[ly] designed seat belts” and
“doors [that] cannot be opened from the inside.” Rodriguez explained that “[i]t is a
common practice for officers to leave patrol units running for the purposes of providing
detainees with appropriate environmental temperatures” and that “[a]ny prudent law
enforcement officer could have believed that there was no reason to suspect that
Sandoval would attempt to escape[] or succeed in escaping” given the secure nature of
the rear seat compartment.
Rodriguez stated that “Officer Luna-Garcia was required to use her judgment and
discretion on how to monitor Sandoval.” He further stated that Officer Luna-Garcia
properly monitored Sandoval as shown by her immediate response after observing
Sandoval moving from side to side. Rodriguez explained that she was able to catch
Sandoval “in the act” of trying to escape, and her actions in trying to stop him “were
consistent with the actions of a reasonable and well-trained law enforcement officer.”
Rodriguez summarized:
Sandoval was handcuffed, the handcuffs were double locked, he was seat belted in, placed in the rear seat of the patrol unit that would not allow a detainee to open the door from inside, the patrol unit contained a plexiglass safety barrier that separated the front area of the patrol unit, the back seat was designed to contain detainees, and Sandoval was monitored by Officer Luna-Garcia. Officer Luna-Garcia monitored Sandoval to the degree that
5 she noticed his movement within the patrol unit and caught him before he made any physical attempt to put his body through the plexiglass barrier. Based on the numerous procedures employed by Officers Vasquez and Luna-Garcia, no reasonable law enforcement officer could have anticipated Sandoval’s unlawful actions.
Officer Alvarez testified that he assisted in arresting Sandoval. He explained that
law enforcement officers frequently return to the site of the criminal offense to continue
an investigation while the arrestee is secured in the back seat of the patrol vehicle. Officer
Alvarez also testified that he often leaves the patrol vehicle running when he exits his
patrol car to provide air-conditioning or heat to a detainee. Officer Alvarez explained that
he will often ask a fellow officer to monitor an arrestee for him if he is required to walk
away from his police vehicle.
Officer Olden, who investigated the collision, testified “that the decisions and
actions of the police officers [involved] were reasonable judgment calls, and in keeping
with my own training and experience as a Senior Officer with the CCPD.” Officer Olden
testified that he has engaged in the same practices as Officer Vasquez with respect to
leaving his patrol unit running with an arrestee in the rear seat.
Officer Moore, the captain of CCPD’s training division, testified similarly to Officers
Alvarez and Olden. Officer Moore further explained:
In view of the temperatures reached and the general climate of the City of Corpus Christi throughout most of the year, it is an exercise of common sense that individuals kept in a police vehicle’s cage must have adequate ventilation. It is precisely because an arrestee does not have access to the vehicle’s controls, cannot open the backseat windows or the doors—that an officer may decide to leave the engine running. Upon information and belief, there is no written policy expressly authorizing or prohibiting such action(s), but I am aware that it is a common practice amongst the rank of CCPD officers, and I opine that it is an accepted practice often mandated by the exercise of good judgment and common sense.
6 Officers Alvarez and Olden were unaware of any prior incident where a detained suspect
kicked out the plexiglass barrier to gain access to the front seat of a CCPD police vehicle.
Appellees filed a response to the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the
City’s immunity was waived because Officer Vasquez’s failure to secure his patrol vehicle
for safe nonoperational use constituted “the final and essential act of operating a motor
vehicle.” Appellees argued that there was a fact issue as to whether this failure caused
appellees’ injuries. Appellees further argued that Officers Vasquez and Luna-Garcia were
not entitled to official immunity because they were performing a ministerial task rather
than a discretionary one and that they were not acting in good faith. Appellees attached
the following pertinent evidence to their response: (1) CCPD officers’ depositions; (2) the
City’s expert Rodriguez’s deposition; (3) backseat camera footage from Officer Vasquez’s
patrol unit; (4) CCPD policy; and (5) the report of appellees’ expert, Dan Montgomery.
Appellees cited CCPD policy provisions requiring officers to handcuff prisoners
with their hands behind them and to operate vehicles carefully and prudently.
Montgomery, a police-practices expert, opined that Officers Vasquez and Luna-Garcia
did not act “in concert with generally accepted police practices” with respect to their
supervision of Sandoval. Montgomery further stated that “[r]easonable police officers
would not have performed in that manner.” Montgomery explained that the officers “failed
to take the necessary steps to adequately control the actions of [Sandoval].” He
specifically cited the officers’ failure to monitor Sandoval and leaving him “unattended,”
thereby failing to observe the removal of his seat belt and placement of his handcuffs to
the front of his body. Montgomery opined that Officer Luna-Garcia’s failure to immediately
remove the keys from the ignition upon arrival at Officer Vasquez’s patrol car and her
7 later failure to employ her Taser as Sandoval was maneuvering through the plexiglass
opening were tactical choices that were “not in concert with generally accepted police
practices.” However, Montgomery acknowledged that Officer Luna-Garcia attempted to
stop Sandoval through “physical hands-on efforts.”
After a hearing, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction. The City now
appeals. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8).
II. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Because it is dispositive, we first address the City’s second issue, in which it argues
that its officers are entitled to official immunity.
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
“A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a
cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Bland Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea challenges the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over a pleaded cause of action. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife
v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law; therefore, when the determinative facts are undisputed, we review the trial court’s
ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Id.
A plaintiff has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2019). “When a defendant
challenges jurisdiction, a court ‘is not required to look solely to the pleadings but may
consider evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues
raised.’” Id. (quoting Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555); see Jones v. Turner, 646
S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex. 2022) (explaining that a plea to the jurisdiction may challenge the
8 pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both). This is true even when the
jurisdictional issue intertwines with the merits of the case. Town of Shady Shores, 590
S.W.3d at 550.
When jurisdictional facts are challenged, our standard of review mirrors that of a
summary judgment. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 805 (Tex.
2018). We must take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor, and disregard
contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id. at 771; Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 228. If the evidence raises a fact issue regarding jurisdiction, the plea cannot
be granted, and a factfinder must resolve the issue. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28. On
the other hand, if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact issue, the plea must
be determined as a matter of law. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d
629, 635 (Tex. 2012); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
Governmental immunity deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over lawsuits in which
a political subdivision has been sued unless immunity is waived by the Legislature. Travis
Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54, 57–58 (Tex. 2011). The TTCA provides
a waiver of immunity for an employee’s acts of negligence arising out of the operation or
use of a motor vehicle if “the employee would be personally liable to the claimant
according to Texas law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(1). However, “[i]f
the employee is protected from liability by official immunity, the employee is not personally
liable to the claimant, and the government retains its immunity under [the TTCA].” DeWitt,
904 S.W.2d at 653 (first citing K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 597 (Tex. 1994) (per
curiam); and then citing City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1993));
9 see Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam)
(“Official immunity is an affirmative defense that protects a governmental employee from
personal liability and, in doing so, preserves a governmental employer’s sovereign
immunity from suit for vicarious liability.”).
“[O]fficial immunity is designed to protect public officials from being forced to
defend their decisions that were reasonable when made, but upon which hindsight has
cast a negative light.” Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 463 (Tex. 2002). “Nowhere
else in public service is official immunity more appropriate or necessary than in police
work. In their routine work, police officers must be free to make split-second
judgments . . . based on their experience and training, without fear of personal liability.”
Id. (quoting Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 103 (Tex. 1992) (Cornyn, J.,
concurring)) (alterations omitted). A governmental employee is entitled to official immunity
if he (1) performs a discretionary duty, (2) in good faith, (3) within the scope of the
employee’s authority. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d at 642–43. Official immunity is an affirmative
defense; therefore, the City bears the burden of proving each element. Univ. of Hous. v.
Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000).
“An official acts within the scope of her authority if she is discharging the duties
generally assigned to her.” City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 658 (Tex.
1994). “A discretionary act is one involving ‘personal deliberation, decision and judgment’;
in contrast, actions requiring obedience to orders ‘or the performance of a duty to which
the actor has no choice’ are ministerial.” City of Houston v. Jenkins, 363 S.W.3d 808, 814
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (quoting Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at
654). However, the simple fact that an employee has a general duty not to commit
10 wrongful acts in his official capacity will not render an act ministerial. See Chambers, 883
S.W.2d at 653. In other words, “[t]he test to determine whether a governmental
employee’s act is discretionary focuses on whether the employee is performing a
discretionary function, not whether the employee has discretion to do an allegedly
wrongful act when discharging that function.” Los Fresnos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Southworth, 156 S.W.3d 910, 917 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet.
denied) (citing Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653).
To establish good faith, the City must show that a reasonably prudent officer, under
the same or similar circumstances, might have reached the same decision. 3 See Riojas,
640 S.W.3d at 541. The question is not what a reasonable officer would have done, but
what a reasonable officer could have believed. Id. If the officers establish good faith, the
plaintiff must offer evidence that no reasonable officer in the same or similar circumstance
could have believed that his conduct was justified. Id. It is not enough to show that a
reasonable officer could have reached a different decision. Id. An official can act
negligently and still meet the test for good faith. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 655.
B. Analysis
1. Scope of Authority
There is no dispute that Officers Vazquez and Luna-Garcia were acting within the
scope of their authority at all pertinent times. The evidence establishes that both officers
were on duty and were acting in response to a report of criminal activity. The officers were
discharging their assigned duties pertaining to the arrest and supervision of Sandoval.
3 Because appellees do not complain of any officer actions related to the pursuit of Sandoval, the
need versus risk balancing assessment which is required in high-speed pursuit cases does not apply. See City of San Antonio v. Riojas, 640 S.W.3d 534, 540 (Tex. 2022).
11 See id. at 658 (holding defendant officers were within the scope of their authority while
conducting a high-speed chase of a suspect because each was on duty, in a squad car,
and pursuing a suspect).
2. Discretionary Duty
The City argues that the officers were performing a discretionary duty because
they were obligated to use their judgment and discretion in how to monitor Sandoval. The
City maintains that officers in general are required to use their discretion when
transporting arrestees and when and how often to monitor an arrestee during transport.
Appellees respond that the officers were performing ministerial functions because
CCPD’s applicable policies do not leave any room for interpretation. Appellees cite the
following CCPD policies:
Arresting officers . . . are responsible for prisoner welfare and property until the prisoner is officially accepted by the City Detention Center.
Officers transporting a prisoner from the scene of an arrest . . . assume the responsibility for compliance with this policy[. . . .]
Under ordinary circumstances, all prisoners shall be handcuffed with their hands behind them.
Officers shall operate official vehicles carefully and prudently.
We disagree that CCPD’s policies rendered the officers’ actions ministerial. CCPD
policy explicitly provides for discretion in whether to handcuff a prisoner at all: “Possible
exceptions may include . . . [a]ny other prisoner which the officer may have a specific,
articulable reason for not handcuffing.” In any event, none of the policies cited by
appellees directly address the manner in which an officer is to monitor prisoners during
transport. Regarding the transportation of prisoners more generally, these policies clearly
require officers to exercise personal deliberation and judgment. See Jenkins, 363 S.W.3d
12 at 814; see also City of Coppell v. Waltman, 997 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1998, pet. denied) (interpreting policy requiring the constant supervision of a prisoner and
concluding that “[t]he manner in which the dispatcher monitored the prisoner while
performing her other duties was subject to personal deliberation, decision, and
judgment”). Finally, the City presented evidence that there was no policy requiring officers
to remove the key from the ignition when leaving a vehicle with an arrestee secured in
the rear cabin. To the contrary, the evidence showed that it was consistent with CCPD
practice to leave the vehicle running so that adequate temperature and ventilation could
be maintained for the arrestee. We conclude that the evidence establishes that Officers
Vasquez and Luna-Garcia were performing discretionary functions at all relevant times
pertaining to their interactions with Sandoval. See Jenkins, 363 S.W.3d at 814.
3. Good Faith
The City argues that the officers were acting in good faith, citing evidence that
Sandoval was properly handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol vehicle that
was specifically designed to secure arrestees. In arguing to the contrary, appellees rely
on the officers’ failure to notice that Sandoval was improperly restrained prior to Officer
Vasquez leaving the vehicle with the engine running.
Rodriguez, the City’s expert witness, opined that a prudent law enforcement officer
could have believed the following:
Sandoval was properly restrained with the handcuffs behind his back[;]
[Sandoval] was properly secured considering all of the restraining and security procedures undertaken[;]
[T]here was no reason to do anything other than drive off [upon entering the patrol unit with Sandoval in the backseat;]
13 [T]here was no special need to continuously monitor Sandoval, versus checking vehicular and pedestrian traffic while driving[;]
[T]here was no reason to suspect that Sandoval would attempt to escape[] or succeed in escaping, after he was restrained with numerous security devices in place[; and]
[L]eaving the patrol car on, for the purposes of providing the appropriate environmental temperature for Sandoval, was reasonable and justified[.]
Rodriguez further opined that Officer Luna-Garcia’s actions “were consistent with the
actions of a reasonable and well-trained law enforcement officer.” Several CCPD officers
testified that Officers Vasquez and Luna-Garcia acted in compliance with CCPD
procedures. We conclude that the City has established that reasonably prudent officers,
under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that their actions were
justified. See Riojas, 640 S.W.3d at 541.
To create a fact issue on this element, appellees were required to offer evidence
that no reasonable police officer in the officers’ position could have believed that the facts
were such that they justified the challenged actions. See id. at 542. Appellees rely on
Montgomery’s expert report in this regard. Montgomery opines that Officers Vasquez and
Luna-Garcia did not act “in concert with generally accepted police practices” with respect
to their supervision of Sandoval. Montgomery cites the officers’ failure to monitor
Sandoval and leaving him “unattended.” Montgomery also cites Officer Luna-Garcia’s
failure to immediately remove the keys from the ignition upon arrival at Officer Vasquez’s
patrol car and her later failure to employ her Taser as Sandoval was maneuvering through
the plexiglass opening.
Montgomery’s conclusory statement that “[r]easonable police officers would not
have performed in that manner” does not create a fact issue as to whether Officers
14 Vasquez and Luna-Garcia acted in good faith. The test for good faith turns not on “what
a reasonable person would have done,” but rather on “what a reasonable [person] could
have believed.” Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tex. 2004).
(quoting Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465). At best, Montgomery’s report shows only that the
officers may have been negligent or that reasonably competent officers could disagree
as to the appropriate manner of supervising and transporting Sandoval. See Chambers,
883 S.W.2d at 655 (“The complex policy judgment reflected by the doctrine of official
immunity, if it is to mean anything, protects officers from suit even if they acted
negligently.”). It does not establish that no reasonable officer could have believed that the
officers’ conduct was justified under the same or similar circumstances. See Telthorster,
92 S.W.3d at 466–67 (holding that the plaintiff did not controvert good faith element where
its evidence was conclusory); Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466–67 (Tex.
1997) (explaining that an expert witness’s conclusory statement that a reasonable officer
could not have taken some action will not raise a fact issue to defeat summary judgment
if the expert fails to “address what a reasonable officer could have believed under the
circumstances”); Padilla v. Mason, 169 S.W.3d 493, 507 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet.
denied) (concluding that expert witness affidavit concerning the use of force failed to
create a fact issue on whether an officer acted in good faith). We conclude that the
evidence established good faith and that appellees have failed to present evidence
creating a fact issue as to this element.
4. Summary
The City presented evidence establishing that its officers were entitled to official
immunity from appellees’ claims. Appellees failed to respond with evidence creating a
15 fact issue regarding any element of the defense. See Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635. Further,
because the City’s officers are officially immune, its governmental immunity has not been
waived. See DeWitt, 904 S.W.2d at 653. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred in
denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. We sustain the City’s second issue. We need
not address the City’s remaining issues because this issue is dispositive. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 47.1.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render a judgment dismissing appellees’
suit for want of jurisdiction.
L. ARON PEÑA JR. Justice
Delivered and filed on the 16th day of November, 2023.