City of Coppell v. State ex rel. Burns

435 S.W.2d 919, 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2254
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 22, 1968
DocketNo. 17126
StatusPublished

This text of 435 S.W.2d 919 (City of Coppell v. State ex rel. Burns) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Coppell v. State ex rel. Burns, 435 S.W.2d 919, 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).

Opinion

DIXON, Chief Justice.

This is a quo warranto proceeding. It challenges the validity of two disannexation ordinances passed by the Town of Coppell, now known as City of Coppell.

It is the second time the dispute has been before us. The first action was not in the form of quo warranto. We reversed the trial court’s judgment on the ground, among others, that the validity of the dis-annexation ordinances could be questioned only in a quo warranto proceeding. Lusby v. Cozby, 402 S.W.2d 799 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas 1966, no writ). In conformity with such holding this action was thereafter filed by the State of Texas on the relation of John Burns, J. R. McDonald and others similarly situated.

On March 1, 1965 the Council of the Town of Coppell passed Ordinance No. 20 disannexing a certain area in the City lying north of Sandy Lake Road. On February 1, 1966 the Council passed Ordinance No. 28 disannexing an area still farther north of Sandy Lake Road, but contiguous to the first area.

In each of the ordinances the City made express finding that area being disannexed contained 10 or more acres, that each of the areas was uninhabited, that in each area there were not three or more occupied residences or business structures on any one acre. These findings were made in an effort to comply with Art. 973, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.

Petitioners contend that the above findings are false and untrue; and were made as part of a conspiracy on the part of the mayor and councilmen to deprive the inhabitants of the two areas of their rights as citizens of the City — in particular their right to vote in pending elections in which it was well known that they would vote in opposition to the Council’s policies. It was [921]*921also charged that Ordinance No. 20 was passed to eliminate, and did eliminate, Councilman J. R. McDonald as a member of the Council. McDonald, a resident of the disannexed area, was a leader in opposing the administration in various matters, particularly in a bond election soon to be held.

In answer to four special issues a jury found that (1) there were three or more occupied residences or business structures on any one acre as of March 1, 1965 within the area defined by Ordinance No. 20; (2) the same finding was made as of February 1, 1966 with reference to the area defined in Ordinance No. 28; (3) a majority of the City Council conspired to pass Ordinance No. 20 for the purpose of preventing the residents of the area from voting in the bond election of March 27, 1965; and (4) a majority of the Council conspired to pass Ordinance No. 28 for the purpose of preventing the residents of the area from voting in the City election of April, 1966.

The trial court overruled the City’s motions for judgment non obstante veredicto and to disregard certain answers of the jury. The motion of petitioners for judgment on the verdict was sustained. The two ordinances were declared to be invalid and null and void. The areas purportedly disannexed by the ordinances were declared still to be a part of the City of Coppell and their citizens and residents to be still entitled to their rights and privileges as if Ordinances Nos. 20 and 28 had not been passed.

The nature of appellants’ points of error requires us to go into some detail in our account of the evidence.

EVIDENCE

Much of the evidence is undisputed. Ordinance No. 20 was passed on March 1, 1965, only 26 days before a bond election to be held March 27, 1965. The election was to determine whether the City would issue bonds of $440,000 to install a water and sewer system. The system if installed would not serve the two disannexed areas north of Sandy Lake Road. The Council’s position was that it would be too expensive to include the areas. It was common knowledge that the 50 voters in the area described in Ordinance No. 20 would vote solidly against the issuance of the bonds. They were not permitted to vote in the election. Even then one of the four issues carried by only nine votes; none of the others by more than 20 votes.

From time to time petitions had been presented to the Council seeking disannexation of the areas. However at the time Ordinance No. 20 was passed all petitions had been withdrawn. There is testimony that at that time the residents of the two areas did not desire to be disannexed.

At the meeting held March 1, 1965 when Ordinance No. 20 was passed two proposed ordinances had been prepared and were before the Council for consideration. One proposed ordinance would disannex the property and residence of Councilman McDonald and his father. The other would allow his property to remain in the City. McDonald was asked whether he wanted to remain in the City. He replied that he did. Nevertheless the ordinance was passed which disannexed his property. McDonald had made it plain that he would vote against the issuance of the bonds. The disannexation of his property had the effect of eliminating him as a member of the Council.

Ernest Perkins fared better with the Council. He also requested that his property not be disannexed. He stated that he favored the issuance of the bonds. His property was not included in the area which was disannexed.

Ordinance No. 28 was passed a short time before the City election of 1966, in which election a mayor and two councilmen were to be chosen. There was testimony that the voters in this area, about 25 in number, were opposed to the City administration and its policies.

The area disannexed by Ordinance No. 28 lies north of the area earlier disannexed [922]*922by Ordinance No. 20. One reason given for the second disannexation was that the area first disannexed lay between the City and the second area, thus making it necessary to go through the area earlier disan-nexed in order to serve the second area. However there was testimony that the second area could be served by running facilities along Sandy Creek Road. Though the City of Coppell had disannexed the two areas the City Council a short time later refused to waive its extra-territorial jurisdiction when the inhabitants of the two areas attempted to organize their own municipality under the name of the City of Jamestown. The nearby Cities of Dallas and Carrollton had waived their extra-territorial rights. Art. 970a, Sections 3, subd. A and 8, subd. A, V.A.C.S.

It is undisputed that before making its findings the Council did not cause a formal survey of the two areas to be made. The only investigations made by the City were made by members of the Council who either observed the areas from automobiles or afoot.

There is testimony from two licensed surveyors that there were several acres within the area on each of which there were three or more occupied residences or business structures. These surveys were not made on March 1, 1965 or February 1, 1966, so the licensed surveyors were not able to testify as to occupancy of the structures on said dates. However several of the residents of the areas did testify that on said dates residences and business structures, at least three in number, were occupied on each of several acres.

The mayor and two members of the Council testified that they voted for dis-annexation because the residents of the two areas apparently wanted to be disan-nexed; and since the sewer and water system and other city services would not be available to them the City thought to accommodate them by disannexing them, thus relieving them of all taxes.

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Bluebook (online)
435 S.W.2d 919, 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2254, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-coppell-v-state-ex-rel-burns-texapp-1968.