IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0014 Filed December 3, 2025
CITY OF COLFAX, Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 238, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Thomas P. Murphy,
Judge.
The City of Colfax appeals the district court’s ruling granting summary
judgement for the Teamsters Union in an employment dispute. AFFIRMED.
Melissa A. Schilling (argued) and Anthony D. Siegrist of Dickinson,
Bradshaw, Fowler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Emily Schott Hood of Rush & Nicholson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, and Jill M.
Hartley (pro hac vice) (argued) of The Previant Law Firm, S.C., Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, for appellee.
Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller and
Langholz and Sandy, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
The City of Colfax appeals the district court’s ruling granting summary
judgement for the Teamsters Union in an employment dispute that went to binding
arbitration. Colfax argues (1) the arbitrator exceeded her authority in sustaining
the union’s grievance, (2) “just cause” is not required to terminate Officer Clark,
(3) due process is not required in the collective bargaining agreement, (4) there is
no progressive discipline requirement, and (5) the district court rewrote the
arbitrator’s findings. We find the district court did not err in finding the arbitrator
acted within her authority, so we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In April 2023, the City of Colfax’s Police Chief recommended Police Officer
Andrea Clark be terminated. The city council approved the termination. The
Teamsters Local Union 2381 filed a grievance on behalf of Clark. The parties
proceeded to binding arbitration.
In January 2024, the arbitrator issued an award sustaining the union’s
grievance and reinstating Clark to her position as a police officer. The arbitrator
found (1) termination was not a proper remedy for the alleged rule violations by
Clark, (2) Clark was not given notice of the allegations against her or an
opportunity to be heard prior to termination, and (3) Colfax did not engage in
progressive discipline as contemplated by the agreement prior to terminating
Clark.
1 Colfax and the union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that contains a grievance procedure including binding arbitration. The collective bargaining agreement is referred to as “the agreement” throughout this opinion. 3
Colfax filed an application to vacate the award in April 2024. The parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court issued its order
granting the union’s motion for summary judgment and denying Colfax’s motion
for summary judgment. Colfax now appeals.
II. Review
We review an appeal from a district court’s review of an arbitration award
for correction of errors at law. Ales v. Anderson, Gabelmann, Lower & Whitlow,
P.C., 728 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Iowa 2007). “However, our review is limited.” Id.; see
also Humphreys v. Joe Johnston L. Firm, P.C., 491 N.W.2d 513, 514 (Iowa 1992)
(“Judicial review of arbitration awards is very limited in Iowa.”). “Our function is not
to determine whether the arbitrator has correctly resolved the grievance.” Ales,
728 N.W.2d at 839. This is because “[o]ur law favors arbitration as an alternative
to civil litigation. Arbitration avoids the expense and delay generally associated
with traditional civil litigation, and draws on experts in the specific area of the
dispute to resolve the matter.” $99 Down Payment, Inc. v. Garard, 592 N.W.2d
691, 694 (Iowa 1999) (internal citation omitted). “Our supreme court has made
clear:
To allow courts to “second guess” an arbitrator by granting a broad scope of judicial review would nullify the very advantages of arbitration. Moreover, limited judicial review gives the parties what they bargain for in agreeing to binding arbitration, not merely arbitration which is binding if a court agrees with the arbitrator’s award.
Id. (internal citation omitted). “The fact that the relief awarded could not or would
not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to
confirm the award.” Iowa Code § 679A.12(2) (2024). 4
“A refined quality of justice is not the goal in arbitration matters. Indeed
such a goal is deliberately sacrificed in favor of a sure and speedy resolution.”
Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 515 (quoting Reicks v. Farmers Commodities Corp.,
474 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1991) (en banc)). “As long as an arbitrator’s award
does not violate one of the provisions of section 679A.12(1), we will not correct
errors of fact or law.” Ales, 728 N.W.2d at 839.
III. Discussion
Colfax argues the district court erred when it did not vacate the arbitration
award. They argue (1) the district court rewrote the arbitrator’s findings, (2) “just
cause” is not required to terminate Officer Clark, (3) due process is not required in
the collective bargaining agreement, (4) and there is no progressive discipline
requirement. We address each in turn.2
At the core of Colfax’s claim is that the arbitrator exceeded her authority
under Iowa code section 679A.12(1)(c). The arbitrator’s power and authority is
defined by any arbitration agreement between the parties and Iowa Code
chapter 679A. Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 516. In Humphreys, our supreme court
prescribed the role of the arbitrator, stating:
Put most simply, the arbitrator is the parties’ officially designated “reader” of the contract. He (or she) is their joint alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial agreement. Thus, “misinterpretation” or “gross mistake” by the arbitrator becomes a contradiction in terms. In the absence of fraud or an overreaching of authority on the part of the arbitrator, he is
2 We assume without deciding error was preserved on each issue. The district
court order stated, “Even if the arbitrator exceeded her powers by examining “due process” and ‘just cause,’ she had the power to determine if what the officer did was serious enough to warrant termination.” We do not decide whether that is sufficient to preserve error and proceed to the merits. 5
speaking for the parties, and his award is their contract. That is what the “final and binding” language of the arbitration clause says. In sum, the arbitrator’s award should be treated as though it were a written stipulation by the parties setting forth their own definitive construction of the labor contract. Absent limitation by the parties to the contrary, the arbitrator becomes the final judge of the facts and law. Thus, “[m]istakes of either fact or law are among the contingencies the parties assume when they submit a dispute to arbitration.”
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). The arbitrator’s authority was
defined by the parties in the agreement. The relevant portion of the agreement
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 25-0014 Filed December 3, 2025
CITY OF COLFAX, Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 238, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Thomas P. Murphy,
Judge.
The City of Colfax appeals the district court’s ruling granting summary
judgement for the Teamsters Union in an employment dispute. AFFIRMED.
Melissa A. Schilling (argued) and Anthony D. Siegrist of Dickinson,
Bradshaw, Fowler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Emily Schott Hood of Rush & Nicholson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, and Jill M.
Hartley (pro hac vice) (argued) of The Previant Law Firm, S.C., Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, for appellee.
Heard at oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller and
Langholz and Sandy, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
The City of Colfax appeals the district court’s ruling granting summary
judgement for the Teamsters Union in an employment dispute that went to binding
arbitration. Colfax argues (1) the arbitrator exceeded her authority in sustaining
the union’s grievance, (2) “just cause” is not required to terminate Officer Clark,
(3) due process is not required in the collective bargaining agreement, (4) there is
no progressive discipline requirement, and (5) the district court rewrote the
arbitrator’s findings. We find the district court did not err in finding the arbitrator
acted within her authority, so we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In April 2023, the City of Colfax’s Police Chief recommended Police Officer
Andrea Clark be terminated. The city council approved the termination. The
Teamsters Local Union 2381 filed a grievance on behalf of Clark. The parties
proceeded to binding arbitration.
In January 2024, the arbitrator issued an award sustaining the union’s
grievance and reinstating Clark to her position as a police officer. The arbitrator
found (1) termination was not a proper remedy for the alleged rule violations by
Clark, (2) Clark was not given notice of the allegations against her or an
opportunity to be heard prior to termination, and (3) Colfax did not engage in
progressive discipline as contemplated by the agreement prior to terminating
Clark.
1 Colfax and the union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that contains a grievance procedure including binding arbitration. The collective bargaining agreement is referred to as “the agreement” throughout this opinion. 3
Colfax filed an application to vacate the award in April 2024. The parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court issued its order
granting the union’s motion for summary judgment and denying Colfax’s motion
for summary judgment. Colfax now appeals.
II. Review
We review an appeal from a district court’s review of an arbitration award
for correction of errors at law. Ales v. Anderson, Gabelmann, Lower & Whitlow,
P.C., 728 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Iowa 2007). “However, our review is limited.” Id.; see
also Humphreys v. Joe Johnston L. Firm, P.C., 491 N.W.2d 513, 514 (Iowa 1992)
(“Judicial review of arbitration awards is very limited in Iowa.”). “Our function is not
to determine whether the arbitrator has correctly resolved the grievance.” Ales,
728 N.W.2d at 839. This is because “[o]ur law favors arbitration as an alternative
to civil litigation. Arbitration avoids the expense and delay generally associated
with traditional civil litigation, and draws on experts in the specific area of the
dispute to resolve the matter.” $99 Down Payment, Inc. v. Garard, 592 N.W.2d
691, 694 (Iowa 1999) (internal citation omitted). “Our supreme court has made
clear:
To allow courts to “second guess” an arbitrator by granting a broad scope of judicial review would nullify the very advantages of arbitration. Moreover, limited judicial review gives the parties what they bargain for in agreeing to binding arbitration, not merely arbitration which is binding if a court agrees with the arbitrator’s award.
Id. (internal citation omitted). “The fact that the relief awarded could not or would
not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to
confirm the award.” Iowa Code § 679A.12(2) (2024). 4
“A refined quality of justice is not the goal in arbitration matters. Indeed
such a goal is deliberately sacrificed in favor of a sure and speedy resolution.”
Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 515 (quoting Reicks v. Farmers Commodities Corp.,
474 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1991) (en banc)). “As long as an arbitrator’s award
does not violate one of the provisions of section 679A.12(1), we will not correct
errors of fact or law.” Ales, 728 N.W.2d at 839.
III. Discussion
Colfax argues the district court erred when it did not vacate the arbitration
award. They argue (1) the district court rewrote the arbitrator’s findings, (2) “just
cause” is not required to terminate Officer Clark, (3) due process is not required in
the collective bargaining agreement, (4) and there is no progressive discipline
requirement. We address each in turn.2
At the core of Colfax’s claim is that the arbitrator exceeded her authority
under Iowa code section 679A.12(1)(c). The arbitrator’s power and authority is
defined by any arbitration agreement between the parties and Iowa Code
chapter 679A. Humphreys, 491 N.W.2d at 516. In Humphreys, our supreme court
prescribed the role of the arbitrator, stating:
Put most simply, the arbitrator is the parties’ officially designated “reader” of the contract. He (or she) is their joint alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial agreement. Thus, “misinterpretation” or “gross mistake” by the arbitrator becomes a contradiction in terms. In the absence of fraud or an overreaching of authority on the part of the arbitrator, he is
2 We assume without deciding error was preserved on each issue. The district
court order stated, “Even if the arbitrator exceeded her powers by examining “due process” and ‘just cause,’ she had the power to determine if what the officer did was serious enough to warrant termination.” We do not decide whether that is sufficient to preserve error and proceed to the merits. 5
speaking for the parties, and his award is their contract. That is what the “final and binding” language of the arbitration clause says. In sum, the arbitrator’s award should be treated as though it were a written stipulation by the parties setting forth their own definitive construction of the labor contract. Absent limitation by the parties to the contrary, the arbitrator becomes the final judge of the facts and law. Thus, “[m]istakes of either fact or law are among the contingencies the parties assume when they submit a dispute to arbitration.”
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). The arbitrator’s authority was
defined by the parties in the agreement. The relevant portion of the agreement
states:
The Arbitrator shall not have the power to add to, subtract from, or in any manner modify the terms of this Agreement. The decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties, and the Arbitrator shall be requested to issue his/her decision within thirty (30) days after the conclusion of the hearing.
Here, the terms of the agreement require Colfax to either (1) exhaust all
other forms of discipline or (2) show the seriousness of the offense warrants
termination under the terms of the agreement. The arbitrator found “[e]ven if
Clark’s behaviors as addressed in the city’s enumerations were valid, termination
of employment was too harsh a penalty.” We conclude that finding was within the
authority of the arbitrator and is binding on the parties.
a. Is just cause and due process required to terminate Officer Clark?
Colfax alleges the arbitrator exceeded her authority by finding just cause
and due process is required before Officer Clark may be terminated. The arbitrator
relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill. See 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). In that case, the Supreme
Court addressed the process a public employee is entitled to before termination by
stating: 6
The essential requirements of due process, and all that respondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.
Id. The arbitrator expressly did not impose a just-cause requirement on Colfax.
Instead, she found due process is the only component of just cause that is
required. The arbitrator relied on the fact that “Clark was not provided with
advance notice of the charges against her nor was she provided a meaningful
opportunity to respond to the charges.” So, we turn to the agreement to determine
if due process is required.
The agreement states that if an employee’s conduct violates the rules,
the City Administrator or supervisor shall inform the employee promptly and specifically of such deficiencies. If appropriate and justified, following a discussion of the matter, a reasonable time for improvement or correction may be allowed before any further disciplinary action is initiated. In situations where an oral warning has not resulted in the correction of the condition or where more severe initial action is warranted, a written reprimand shall be sent to the employee and a copy placed in the employee’s personal folder.
There is a requirement that the employee be informed of a violation of the rules
prior to more serious discipline being imposed. Further, the employee is entitled
to invoke the agreement’s grievance procedure but cannot do so without first
having notice of the alleged violations and the opportunity to speak with a city
administrator or supervisor.
Therefore, we find the arbitrator did not exceed her authority in stating that
the agreement required due process before termination. 7
b. Is progressive discipline required before termination?
Next, Colfax argues the arbitrator exceeded her authority by finding it was
required to engage in progressive discipline before terminating Clark. While we
agree the words “progressive discipline” do not appear in the agreement, a
progressive discipline structure does.
Article 8 of the agreement governs discipline and termination. Section A
establishes the potential penalties for violations of the rules in the following
manner:
1. Oral Warning 2. Written reprimand 3. Suspension with loss of pay 4. Demotion to a lower pay grade for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days 5. Discharge
Then section B states that upon a violation, the employee’s supervisor shall inform
the employee and give the employee a reasonable opportunity to improve “before
any further disciplinary action is initiated.” Section C, which covers suspension,
states “where one or more written reprimands have not proven to be effective, or
in those cases where the seriousness of the events or conditions warrant it, an
employee may be suspended.” And finally, section D allows for termination if
“other forms of disciplinary action have proven ineffective or where the seriousness
of the offense or condition warrants.”
We find the agreement establishes a progressive discipline model with
exceptions for serious offenses and the arbitrator did not exceed her authority by
stating that a progressive discipline model existed.
c. Did the district court rewrite the arbitrator’s findings? 8
First, Colfax alleges the district court rewrote the arbitrator’s finings to avoid
finding the arbitrator exceeded her authority under Iowa Code
section 679A.12(1)(c). They allege the district court ignored the discussion of “just
cause,” “due process,” and “progressive discipline,” which are not mentioned
anywhere in the agreement. Our review of the record does not support that
conclusion. The district court’s review of the arbitrator’s decision is required to be
extremely deferential. See $99 Down Payment, 592 N.W.2d at 694 (“Our law also
indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of an arbitration
award. Consequently, judicial involvement in arbitration is very limited.” (internal
citation omitted)).
At the outset, we have already resolved Colfax’s arguments regarding just
cause, due process, and progressive discipline. In reviewing whether the arbitrator
exceeded her authority, the district court found:
Even if the arbitrator exceeded her powers by examining “due process” and “just cause,” she had the power to determine if what the officer did was serious enough to warrant termination. The arbitrator specifically found that nothing the officer did warranted the “too harsh a penalty” of termination. That decision did not “add to, subtract from, or in any manner modify” the agreement.
We agree with the district court that this decision was within the arbitrator’s
authority, and we find no instance where the arbitrator exceeded her authority. So,
we find the district court conducted a thorough review of the arbitration award and
did not commit any legal error in its review. Accordingly, we affirm. 9
IV. Conclusion
Because we conclude the district court correctly found the arbitrator was
within her authority to find the termination was not warranted, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.