City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank

40 F.2d 612, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3232
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedApril 30, 1930
DocketNo. 4141
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 40 F.2d 612 (City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Chicago v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 40 F.2d 612, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3232 (7th Cir. 1930).

Opinion

PAGE, Circuit Judge.

Iu the receivership of the Chicago Railways Company in the United States District Court, wherein mortgages are being foreclosed, the court, on July 18, 1928, entered a decree fixing the amounts and priorities of the liens. In that deeree, it was found that the first mortgage was a lien, upon all of the property of the company, prior to that of any of the defendants, except the Westinghouse Company.

The city of Chicago, the sole appellant, is here contending that it has the first and prior right to certain special funds (two of them created under the provisions of the ordinance under which the Railways Company operated), viz., (1) a renewals and depreciation fund, -amounting to over $10,000,000; (2) a Damage Reserve Fund of about $500,000; and (3) a fund, called in the decree a special renewal and equipment fund, of about $200,000, created by order of the Public Utilities Commission of Illinois, entered July 31, 1920.

Prior to 1907, the street railway lines, known as the Union,Traction System, were under receivership in the United States Court. A reorganization plan was effected, under direction of the court, by agreement of substantially all of-the interests. As a part of the reorganization plan, the Chicago Railways Company, here in receivership, was incorporated and took over the properties then in receivership and has operated them during the 20-year term of the ordinance, enacted by the city of Chicago on February 11, 1907, as a part of the reorganization plan.

At the time of the reorganization, the physical condition of the properties was very bad, and there were many secured and unsecured creditors and stockholders, whose interests had to be considered, reconciled and secured or otherwise disposed of. As a part of the reorganization plan, the city passed an ordinance, -requiring the expenditure of a very large sum of money for immediate rehabilitation of all the properties, and provided in great detail for the rehabilitation, maintenance, management, and operation of the system. As there was little money, the business and financial structure, required in and-set up under the ordinance for the protection of the various interests, including the public, and for the rehabilitation and operation of the properties, consisted of: (1) The corporation now in receivership, with a capital stock of $100,000; (2) a first mortgage, securing bonds, to be sold to procure money for the rehabilitation requirements. The plan also provided for subsequent mortgages and participation certificates, to secure the bonds, stoeks, etc., theretofore issued by and then outstanding against the Union Traction Company and its underlying companies. The ordinance also made provision for the first two of the special funds, above referred to, the disposition of which by the decree is here brought in question by the city.

The city makes three claims to the special funds: (1) That it is entitled to 55 per cent, of them under the ordinance; (2) that it or its licensee is entitled to them in ease a purchase is made by either under the ordinance; (3) that the city is the custodian of those funds for the public. The claim that the terms of the first mortgage do not cover the special funds will be later considered.

In the light of these claims, it is important to consider the origin, purpose, and the ordinance requirements for the ultimate disposition of the special funds in question.

The renewals and depreciation fund had its origin in section 16 of the ordinance, wherein it is provided: “The Company shall deposit with one or more of the said depositaries in a separate fund, appropriately designated, a sum equal to 8 per cent, of the gross receipts of said street railways and property for the preceding month. * * * ”

A part of the renewals and depreciation fund may also have had its origin under the terms of section 9 of the ordinance, providing that, after the period of immediate rehabilitation, property unnecessary and unadapted to the proper operation and maintenance of the system might be sold, and in ease of sale the proceeds should be added to and become a part of the renewals and depreciation fund.

The damage reserve fund had its origin in section 18 of the ordinance. After providing for the payment out of gross assets, as an operating expense, for all damages growing out of injuries to persons and property it further provided that “the Company may1 set aside, as a separate fund, such percentage of said gross receipts as the said Board of Supervising Engineers shall estimate to be sufficient to protect the Company against all such claims.”

The purpose, as stated in section 16, for which the renewals and depreciation fund was established, is “for taking care of Renewals and Depreciation of said street railways and property,” to be paid out as au[614]*614thorized by the board of supervising engineers.

The purpose of the damage reserve fund, as stated in section 18, is “to protect the Company against ail such claims, to the end that if the said City, or its licensee, shall elect to purchase the street railway property of the Company, as provided by this ordinance, there shall be then available to the Company a fund sufficient to meet and discharge all legitimate claims for such damages.”

Other than the reasons and purposes above stated, we do not find any reason why or purpose for which the above special funds were, or either of them was, established. We do not find any provision or apparent intent that the special funds should at any time cease to be the property of the company during the operation of the street railways, nor do we find that the company’s liability for any of the purposes for whieh the funds were established ended with the'establishment of 'those funds.

Other than the disposition of the funds in the manner and for the purposes for whieh they were established, as stated in the ordinance, there is no provision for the disposition of the renewals and depreciation fund during the operation of the railways by the company. There is, as to the damage reserve fund, however, a provision in section 18, that will be considered in connection with the city’s claim to 55 per cent, of that fund.

The special renewal and equipmentrfund had its origin in an order of the Public Utilities Commission of Illinois. The 8 per cent, of the gross assets, out of whieh the renewals and depreciation fund was created under section 16 of the ordinance is the same 8 per cent, out of whieh this special renewal and equipment fund was created. The order provides : “In lieu of depositing said sum, from month to month, in said Renewal and Depreciation Fund, as heretofore provided, said petitioners are hereby ordered to expend said sum, less aetual expenditures for current renewals, in the purchase of additional equipment. Said eight per cent, of said gross receipts shall be deposited from month to month in special accounts, called Special Equipment Fund, or otherwise appropriately designated.”

We are of opinion that, so far as here involved, this third fund should be treated exactly as though any unexpended portion of it was a part of the renewals and depreciation fund under section 16.

Section 20 gives the city the right to pur-, chase the street car system at any time upon the terms and conditions therein specified.

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Related

Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Chicago Rys. Co.
17 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Illinois, 1936)
Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Chicago Rys. Co.
56 F.2d 942 (Seventh Circuit, 1932)

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Bluebook (online)
40 F.2d 612, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3232, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-chicago-v-harris-trust-sav-bank-ca7-1930.