City of Chester v. Kennedy

176 N.E. 430, 344 Ill. 224
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedApril 23, 1931
DocketNo. 20472. Reversed and remanded.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 176 N.E. 430 (City of Chester v. Kennedy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Chester v. Kennedy, 176 N.E. 430, 344 Ill. 224 (Ill. 1931).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Dunn

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal is from the judgment of the county court of Randolph county confirming a special assessment by the city of Chester to pay the cost of a street paving improvement. The court overruled the legal objections, and, a jury having found that the property of the objectors was not assessed more than it would be benefited or more than its proportionate share of the cost of the improvement, entered a judgment of confirmation, from which three of the objectors, F. C. Kennedy, John Darwin and T. W. Tackenberg, have appealed.

The city of Chester is situated on the east bank of the Mississippi river, partly on the low land between the bluff and the river, where the three railroads of the town and their stations, the steamboat landings and various business buildings are and where about a fourth of the city’s population reside, and partly on the bluff, where the court house, various business buildings and the residences of about three-fourths of the city’s population are. The improvement in question is about 2600 feet long and extends from the court house at the top of the bluff, where it connects with an existing pavement, to Water street, which is parallel with and close to the Mississippi river. The difference in elevation of the termini is about 240 feet. The width of the roadway to be paved is generally 26 feet. For many years Lower Chester, under the hill, has been connected with Upper Chester, above the hill, by a roadway, which has been improved by being macadamized and oiled, and it is the improvement of this roadway, with a change of about 200 feet in one part of its course, for which the ordinance which is the basis of this proceeding provides. Its course during part of the way up the hill is sinuous and its grades are steep, since the average for the whole distance is about 9.00 per cent. Starting at Water street with a grade of 11.38 per cent it extends along Ferfy street at right angles to Water one block to Randolph street, into which it enters by a right angle to the right, along which it extends at a grade of 5.2 per cent for nearly a block, then, with a curve to the left, crosses Angle street, which is at right angles to Randolph, diagonally on a grade of 8.33 per cent, and beyond Angle street enters and crosses diagonally lots 45 and 44 and the end of lot no, fronting Harrison street, lot no being the property of the Church of the Assembly of God, on which is a church. Harrison street is parallel to Water and Randolph, and after crossing Angle street and the three lots beyond it the roadway enters Harrison street, with a slight curve to the right, with a grade of 9.06 per cent, and then, with a greater curve to the left, crosses Harrison street diagonally, and continues across lots n and 12 of block 31 on a grade of 9.44 per cent to Hancock street, which runs at right angles to Harrison, Randolph and Water streets. The grade there is 10.31 per cent. The roadway continues on Hancock street a little over a block, until it reaches Buena Vista street, into which it turns at a right angle to the left. It continues in Buena Vista street to the upper terminus at the court house and the existing pavement, the grades at various points in Buena Vista street changing to 9.05, 8.62, and finally 4.3 per cent.

The objection made to the confirmation of the assessment is that the ordinance is unreasonable, and therefore void, because the grade of the proposed finished roadway is so steep and excessive as to be dangerous for use, unsafe for ordinary traffic and for safety in inclement weather, because the foundation or road-bed for a considerable part of its length is subject to slips, slides and sinks and will not hold in place the finished pavement, which will therefore not be permanent but will be temporary, of uncertain value and without benefit to the objectors’ property; because the pavement is to be built on the steep down-grade of the bluff, whose steep, rocky hillsides and loose, sinking and sliding character do not permit of improvement and increase of value; because there is no necessity for the proposed improvement, for the reason that there is a macadamized highway in good condition along the entire route sufficient for the use of the public.

The following partial sketch will help to an understanding of the scope of the improvement and the location and relation of the appellants’ property with respect to it:

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T. W. Tackenberg is the owner of lots 21 and 22 on the lower side of Randolph street, extending from Ferry street to Angle street, of lot 5, fronting 20 feet on the same side of Ferry street as lots 21 and 22 and extending back 100 feet, and of lot 14, fronting 36 feet on the opposite side of Ferry street, 100 feet deep, all marked “T” on this sketch and assessed at $2154.20. John Darwin is the owner of lots 28 to 31, inclusive, on the other side of Randolph street from Tackenberg’s lots, and of lot 20, fronting 70 feet on the opposite side of Ferry street from Tackenberg’s Randolph street lots, and running back 100 feet, all assessed at $1416.40 and marked “D.” F. C. Kennedy owns parts of two lots beyond Harrison street, assessed at $1116.20 and marked “K.” The.curved roadway extending from Ferry street along Randolph street and from the northeasterly side of Randolph street to the northwesterly side of Hancock street is called the Hillside road. Before 1927 the roadway used between the upper and the lower town came down the bluff along Hancock street to Harrison and there turned to the left along Harrison.

The chief contention of the appellants is that the improvement can only be temporary because the foundation upon which it is to be built in part is continuously sliding toward the bottom of the hill. Where this sliding process has been going on the formation is shale upon soapstone, and when it becomes water-soaked it shifts downward, destroying whatever structure may rest upon it as a foundation.

The evidence concerns generally that part- of the Hillside road on Randolph street between Ferry and Angle streets and that part beginning a little beyond Angle street and extending across Harrison street, including the strip of about 200 feet which crosses the lots owned by F. C. Kennedy and the lot owned by E. A. Crippen at the corner of Harrison and Hancock streets. Tackenberg’s lots 21 and 22 are on the lower side of the roadway where it runs along Randolph street and Darwin’s lots 28 to 31 on the upper side. One of the oldest slides to which the evidence referred occurred about forty-five years ago and affected these Darwin and Tackenberg properties and the roadway between. It turned over two of Tackenberg’s buildings, burst two cisterns and took the road in front clear across to the Darwin lots. The present roadway in front of Tackenberg’s lots is supported in part by a loose rock retaining wall four feet high, and in another part by a like retaining wall which is io feet high. Both are bulging. On the Darwin property above the roadway, and about 60 feet from it, is a cistern with its walls cracked, and there is also a crack in the ground about four or five inches wide. The most recent extensive slide occurred in 1927. It crossed Hancock street, which the old roadway then used, the lower end of the Crippen lot and a corner of the Kennedy lot, and extended downward across Harrison street, where the old roadway then followed that street.

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Bluebook (online)
176 N.E. 430, 344 Ill. 224, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-chester-v-kennedy-ill-1931.