City of Charleston v. Moore

Appellate Court of Illinois

City of Charleston v. Moore

94 Ill. App. 51, 1900 Ill. App. LEXIS 622

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois

DecidedFebruary 28, 1901

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 94 Ill. App. 51 (City of Charleston v. Moore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

City of Charleston v. Moore, 94 Ill. App. 51, 1900 Ill. App. LEXIS 622 (Ill. Ct. App. 1901).

Pincite

Opinion

Me. Presiding Justice Haeker

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Coles County awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus, compelling the mayor and city council of Charleston to pass an ordinance disconnecting from the city certain lands of appellees lying within its corporate limits. The petition was in proper form and contained all the statutory requirements.

It is contended that the territory sought to be disconnected does not come within the intent and meaning of the statute, because, over thirty years ago, it was platted for taxing purposes by an assessor, as lots in an assessor’s division, and has been conveyed from time to time under such description. It is clear to our minds that the expression, “ laid out into city or village lots or blocks,” as it appears in the statute, has no reference to such a subdivision.

It is next contended that the court was not warranted in awarding the writ, because only the city was made a defendant in the petition and the members of the city council were not made parties. Where mandamus is resorted to, to compel the passage of a city ordinance in performance of a duty imposed by law, it is only necessary to make the city a party defendant; but when the writ issues it should be against the individual members of the city council. Village of Glencoe v. The People ex rel. John A. Owen, 78 Ill. 382; The People ex rel. Ins. Co. v. Getzendaner, 137 Ill. 262.

The case is like Young et al. v. Cary et al., 184 Ill. 613, where the Supreme Court, reversing the judgment of this court, held, that on a petition to disconnect territory from a village, on a proper showing by petition and proofs, the president and board of trustees of the village could exercise no discretion. In the light of that authority the Circuit Court properly awarded the writ in this case, and the judgment will be affirmed.

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Me. Presiding Justice Haeker

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Coles County awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus, compelling the mayor and city council of Charleston to pass an ordinance disconnecting from the city certain lands of appellees lying within its corporate limits. The petition was in proper form and contained all the statutory requirements.

It is contended that the territory sought to be disconnected does not come within the intent and meaning of the statute, because, over thirty years ago, it was platted for taxing purposes by an assessor, as lots in an assessor’s division, and has been conveyed from time to time under such description. It is clear to our minds that the expression, “ laid out into city or village lots or blocks,” as it appears in the statute, has no reference to such a subdivision.

It is next contended that the court was not warranted in awarding the writ, because only the city was made a defendant in the petition and the members of the city council were not made parties. Where mandamus is resorted to, to compel the passage of a city ordinance in performance of a duty imposed by law, it is only necessary to make the city a party defendant; but when the writ issues it should be against the individual members of the city council. Village of Glencoe v. The People ex rel. John A. Owen, 78 Ill. 382; The People ex rel. Ins. Co. v. Getzendaner, 137 Ill. 262.

The case is like Young et al. v. Cary et al., 184 Ill. 613, where the Supreme Court, reversing the judgment of this court, held, that on a petition to disconnect territory from a village, on a proper showing by petition and proofs, the president and board of trustees of the village could exercise no discretion. In the light of that authority the Circuit Court properly awarded the writ in this case, and the judgment will be affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

94 Ill. App. 51, 1900 Ill. App. LEXIS 622, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-charleston-v-moore-illappct-1901.

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