City of Cathedral City v. County of Riverside

163 Cal. App. 3d 960, 210 Cal. Rptr. 60, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 1553
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 22, 1985
DocketB004280
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 163 Cal. App. 3d 960 (City of Cathedral City v. County of Riverside) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Cathedral City v. County of Riverside, 163 Cal. App. 3d 960, 210 Cal. Rptr. 60, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 1553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

*962 Opinion

ARABIAN, J.

Introduction

City of Cathedral City (City) filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting the trial court to compel County of Riverside (County) to pay to City the documentary transfer taxes collected by County, with respect to the sale or transfer of real property within the city limits of City, from and after November 16, 1981, the date on which City adopted its documentary transfer tax ordinance. The trial court denied City’s petition and City appealed.

Issue

This is a case of constitutional interpretation. The sole issue is whether Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 4) prohibits cities incorporated after its effective date, July 1, 1978, from sharing in documentary transfer tax revenues collected by a county pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 11911. We conclude that it does not.

Facts

City was incorporated on November 16, 1981. On that date, the city council of City adopted ordinance number 2, omnibus in nature, establishing City’s municipal code, creating its administration, and providing for its revenue and finances. One section of the newly adopted municipal code, chapter 3.22, provided for the imposition of a real property documentary transfer tax, at the rate of $.27 per $500 of the assessed value of the property being transferred, as authorized by Revenue and Taxation Code section 11911, subdivision (b). 1 A documentary transfer tax is the fee paid in connection with the recordation of deeds or other documents evidencing transfers of ownership of real property.

Many years prior to City’s incorporation, County had adopted County ordinance number 516, imposing a documentary transfer tax at the rate of *963 $.55 per $500 of the assessed value of the property being transferred, the maximum rate authorized and allowed by Revenue and Taxation Code section 11911, subdivision (a). 2 Section 11911 provides for these tax revenues to be shared by any incorporated city in the county requesting it, one-half to go to the city and one-half to be retained by the county. The statutory mechanism for effecting the sharing provisions of this section is the adoption by a city of an ordinance imposing the tax (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 11911, subd. (b)), the payment of which is allowed as a credit against the tax owing a county on the same transfer (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 11911, subd. (c)). 3

Thus, chapter 3.22 of City’s new municipal code declared, in effect, that City was entitled to receive one-half of all documentary transfer tax revenues henceforth collected by County as a result of property transfers within City limits and demanded that these revenues be paid over to City. The “tax” thus created did not increase the tax liability of any person; it merely required the allocation of existing County tax revenues to City in accordance with the statutory scheme (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 11911).

Revenue and Taxation Code section 11931 requires each county to administer the documentary transfer tax ordinances of the cities. County refused to administer City’s ordinance, on the ground that it violated section 4 of Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. XIH A, § 4, effective July 1, 1978), although County was then, and is now, transferring similar revenues to all other cities in County which were incorporated prior to 1978. After City’s claim was rejected by County, City filed its petition for writ of mandate in the superior court to compel County to transfer these tax revenues. This appeal is from the trial court’s denial of City’s petition.

Discussion

The purpose of Proposition 13 was “to provide effective real property tax relief.” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. *964 of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 230 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) Section 4 of Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 4) provides: “Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of real property within such City, County or special district.”

Since the tax in issue is not an ad valorem tax on real property, nor a sales tax, the focus of our inquiry is on whether it is the type of “transaction tax ... on the sale of real property” which is prohibited by Proposition 13. Los Angeles County Transportation Com. v. Richmond (1982) 31 Cal.3d 197, 202, 203 [182 Cal.Rptr. 324, 643 P.2d 941], is instructive. In Richmond our Supreme Court, quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal. 3d 208, set forth the following familiar rules for the construction of a constitutional provision: “It should be construed ‘in accordance with the natural and ordinary meaning of its words. . . . The literal language .... may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the apparent intent of the framers . . .’ and the language used must ‘receive a liberal, practical common-sense construction which will meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the people.’” (Id., at pp. 202-203.) With the foregoing rules in mind we find as follows:

First, the full documentary transfer tax is presently being collected by County in the maximum amount permitted by statute. Thus, implementation of ordinance number 2 will not increase any tax obligation of the taxpaying public whom Proposition 13 was designed to protect and, as such, it does not create a new or additional tax within the meaning of article Xm A, section 4.

Second, it is clear from an examination of the ballot arguments 4 in the official voters’ pamphlet published prior to the election that article XIII A, section 4, was not intended to deprive newly incorporated cities of a right enjoyed by existing cities to share in already existing county revenues. The opening paragraph of the ballot arguments by the authors of the initiative, Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann, states: “Limits property tax to 1 % of market value, requires two-thirds of both houses of the legislature to raise any other taxes, limits yearly market value tax raises to 2% per year, and requires all *965 other tax raises to be approved by the people.” 5

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
163 Cal. App. 3d 960, 210 Cal. Rptr. 60, 1985 Cal. App. LEXIS 1553, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-cathedral-city-v-county-of-riverside-calctapp-1985.