City of Cars, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.

175 So. 2d 63, 1965 Fla. App. LEXIS 4148
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedApril 30, 1965
DocketNo. 5163
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 175 So. 2d 63 (City of Cars, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Cars, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 175 So. 2d 63, 1965 Fla. App. LEXIS 4148 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).

Opinion

WIGGINTON, JOHN T., Associate Judge.

This appeal presents for our review a summary final judgment entered in a re-[64]*64plevin action by which a motor vehicle was adjudged to be owned by appellee, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, under a defaulted chattel mortgage held by it encumbering the vehicle in question. The defendant in the action was the purchaser of the vehicle for a valuable consideration and without actual or constructive notice of the outstanding and unpaid lien. The controlling facts in the case were stipulated by the parties, so we are concerned only with the question of whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in rendering the judgment appealed.

On March 27, 1962, one Randal Harrington purchased the motor vehicle in question from a dealer in Akron, Ohio. To secure the unpaid purchase price Harrington executed a chattel mortgage encumbering the vehicle, the principal amount of which was repayable in periodic installments. The chattel mortgage was properly assigned to appellee, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, who recorded its lien in Summitt County, Ohio, as required by the laws of that State entitling it to a valid lien as against the mortgagor and all subsequent purchasers and creditors. A certificate of title to the vehicle was duly issued by the proper authority showing Harrington to be the owner of the vehicle, and appellee to be the holder of a lien thereon.

Without either the knowledge or consent ■of appellee, and at a time when payments under the chattel mortgage were in default, Harrington removed the vehicle from Ohio to Alabama contrary to the express terms of the mortgage. By some unexplained means Harrington succeeded in securing Alabama license plates and a certificate of registration showing the vehicle to be unencumbered. This was accomplished in February 1963. After obtaining a clear Alabama certificate of registration, Harrington removed the vehicle to Florida where he applied for and received on March 4, 1963, a title certificate to the vehicle showing it to be free and clear of all encumbrances.

Appellee did not file its chattel mortgage for record either in the State of Alabama or Florida, and the Florida certificate of title contained no information indicating that the motor vehicle was originally purchased in Ohio or was in any way en-, cumbered by a lien recorded in that or any other state. The Florida certificate of title did reveal, however, that Alabama was the state of previous registration and the vehicle bore Alabama license plates at the time the new certificate of title was issued by Florida.

On March 8, 1963, Harrington sold the vehicle to one J. R. Campbell, who in turn sold it to appellant, City of Cars, Inc. All procedural requirements of the law of Florida for transferring title to the vehicle from Harrington to Campbell, and from Campbell to appellant, were complied with. Neither Campbell nor appellant had any knowledge of the Ohio lien held by appellee at the time either of them purchased the vehicle.

The primary question presented for decision is whether the lien of appellee’s chattel mortgage, which was valid in the State of Ohio and superior to the rights of all subsequent purchasers or creditors in that State, will be enforced in Florida under the doctrine of comity as against the interest of an innocent purchaser of the vehicle for value and without notice of appellee’s lien, where there was an intervening registration in another state showing the vehicle to be unencumbered, and on the basis of which intervening registration a Florida certificate of title showing no encumbrances was issued.

It has long been the law of Florida that motor vehicle liens valid in and registered under the law of the state wherein such liens were created will be enforced in this state under the rule of comity.1

[65]*65In Vincent v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,2 the Supreme Court reasserted the enforceability of foreign liens against motor - vehicles situate in Florida under the doctrine of comity by suits instituted in this state against subsequent innocent purchasers without notice. In discussing the rule of comity applicable to cases of this kind the court said:

“ * * * Under this rule, as applied by the great majority of courts in other jurisdictions, the lien of a conditional sales contract duly recorded in accordance with the law of the state where made and where the property was situate at the time of the contract, is superior to and has priority over the rights and claims of innocent purchasers from or creditors of the conditional vendee subsequently acquired in another state to which the chattel has been removed without the consent or knowledge of the conditional vendor. See cases collected in the annotation in 13 A.L.R.2d, beginning at page 1318.”

The reason for applying the rule of comity in such cases was adopted from an opinion written by Mr. Justice Hart in the case of Motor Inv. Co. v. Breslauer as follows:

“The rule, however, appears to be founded upon the principles of equity and natural justice. As applied to cases of the character of the one before us, it can produce no harsh or unjust results. The principle underlying it may be analogized to that upon which the owner of property stolen from him and taken or transported to another state may follow the thief into the latter state and reclaim or take possession of the pilfered goods or chattels wherever found. A state may, it is true, refuse to recognize the rule of comity in such cases; but, should it do so, -it would become a party to every such fraudulent transaction. It is not going too far to say and to hold that it is preferable and more desirable that an innocent purchaser or incumbrancer of personal property brought into a state under such circumstances as those characterizing the transaction with which we are here concerned should suffer loss, which possibly his own improvidence or want of diligence has brought to him, than that the state should assume and maintain an attitude towards such transaction which would necessarily stigmatize it as an accessory after the fact to the fraud inhering therein.” 3

In recognizing the applicability of the rule of comity in situations of this kind, the First District Court of Appeal in Capital Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,4 in an opinion authored by Justice Drew of the Supreme Court, said:

“The controversy arises over applicability of the rule of comity enunciated in earlier decisions of the Florida Supreme Court so as to give to liens validly created in other states priority over subsequent holders of such encumbered vehicles under the law of this jurisdiction. In the case at bar the court construed those decisions to be ‘bottomed on the strong policy of applying the rule of comity and giving full effect to the contract rights acquired and perfected under the law of the state where the contract was made and the property situate at the time, and that the courts of Florida would enforce such rights unless our statutes clearly direct otherwise.’ ”

And lastly, adherence to the rule of comity in the enforcement of liens duly record[66]*66ed in foreign states against motor vehicles sold in Florida to innocent purchasers for value and without notice, was recognized and followed by this Court in the case of Strickland v. Motors Acceptance, Inc.5

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Related

Northside Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
255 So. 2d 560 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1971)
Brinkley v. Freedom National Bank of New York
210 So. 2d 465 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1968)

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175 So. 2d 63, 1965 Fla. App. LEXIS 4148, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-cars-inc-v-general-motors-acceptance-corp-fladistctapp-1965.