City of Canon City v. Cingoranelli

Colorado Court of Appeals

City of Canon City v. Cingoranelli

740 P.2d 546, 1987 Colo. App. LEXIS 805

CourtColorado Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 25, 1987

Docket85CA1484

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 740 P.2d 546 (City of Canon City v. Cingoranelli) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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City of Canon City v. Cingoranelli, 740 P.2d 546, 1987 Colo. App. LEXIS 805 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

KELLY, Judge.

This is a dispute over a strip of land approximately eight feet in width and 444 *547 feet in length which Canon City claims by virtue of a common law acceptance and which Cingoranelli claims by adverse possession. The trial court ruled that the City acquired the property through common law acceptance of an improper dedication and that, therefore, Cingoranelli’s claim of title to the property by adverse possession is barred by § 38-41-101(2), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 16A). We affirm.

This case was tried on an agreed statement of facts. Among other things, it was agreed that there had been a statutory dedication but no statutory acceptance of a street within Canon City known as Harding Avenue. The disputed strip of land lies within the recorded right-of-way on a supplemental plat for Harding’s Second Addition. The trial court found that, although the City did not use the entire right-of-way and did not use any portion of the disputed strip, it had assumed control and possession of all the property within the recorded right-of-way by having opened up, maintained, and improved a gravel street within the right-of-way. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on Thornton v. Colorado Springs, 173 Colo. 357, 478 P.2d 665 (1970). We agree with this conclusion.

In Thornton, it was held that acceptance of a dedication may be made according to common law principles as well as in the manner provided by statute. No particular form is required so long as there are acts, unequivocal in nature, showing that the City has assumed control and possession of the property.

Since the trial court correctly ruled that the City had accepted the dedication, it follows that the defendant had no adverse possession claim to the strip lying within the right-of-way under the provisions of § 38-41-101(2). That section of the statute explicitly excepts cities from the operation of the adverse possession statute.

Judgment affirmed.

PIERCE and METZGER, JJ., concur.

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KELLY, Judge.

This is a dispute over a strip of land approximately eight feet in width and 444 *547 feet in length which Canon City claims by virtue of a common law acceptance and which Cingoranelli claims by adverse possession. The trial court ruled that the City acquired the property through common law acceptance of an improper dedication and that, therefore, Cingoranelli’s claim of title to the property by adverse possession is barred by § 38-41-101(2), C.R.S. (1982 Repl. Vol. 16A). We affirm.

This case was tried on an agreed statement of facts. Among other things, it was agreed that there had been a statutory dedication but no statutory acceptance of a street within Canon City known as Harding Avenue. The disputed strip of land lies within the recorded right-of-way on a supplemental plat for Harding’s Second Addition. The trial court found that, although the City did not use the entire right-of-way and did not use any portion of the disputed strip, it had assumed control and possession of all the property within the recorded right-of-way by having opened up, maintained, and improved a gravel street within the right-of-way. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on Thornton v. Colorado Springs, 173 Colo. 357, 478 P.2d 665 (1970). We agree with this conclusion.

In Thornton, it was held that acceptance of a dedication may be made according to common law principles as well as in the manner provided by statute. No particular form is required so long as there are acts, unequivocal in nature, showing that the City has assumed control and possession of the property.

Since the trial court correctly ruled that the City had accepted the dedication, it follows that the defendant had no adverse possession claim to the strip lying within the right-of-way under the provisions of § 38-41-101(2). That section of the statute explicitly excepts cities from the operation of the adverse possession statute.

Judgment affirmed.

PIERCE and METZGER, JJ., concur.

Robert Kint Glover, Gerald Kiefer, Marjorie R. Kiefer Marital Trust, Blair A. Kiefer Family Trust, Jane Raeleen Dunn, Friday LLC, and The Estate of Robert Kint Glover, Plaintiffs-Appellants: v. Serratoga Falls LLC Resource Land Holdings LLC Jesse McDowell Town of Timnath Kitchel Lake Development Corporation Kitchel Lake Partners, LLC James Righeimer Lee Lowrey and Kenneth Mitchell. Defendants-Appellees: and Gregory Cucarola, Appellant:

2021 CO 77 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2021)

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740 P.2d 546, 1987 Colo. App. LEXIS 805, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-canon-city-v-cingoranelli-coloctapp-1987.

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