City of Camarillo v. County of Ventura

26 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 920, 94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5609, 94 Daily Journal DAR 10237, 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 753
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJuly 21, 1994
DocketB077535
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 26 Cal. App. 4th 1351 (City of Camarillo v. County of Ventura) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Camarillo v. County of Ventura, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 920, 94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5609, 94 Daily Journal DAR 10237, 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

*1353 Opinion

YEGAN, J.

— We hold that delinquency penalties, collected on special taxes imposed pursuant to the Mello-Roos Community Facilities District Act of 1982, “follow the tax” and go to the public entity that levied the tax. (Gov. Code, §§ 53312, 53340, 53340.5.) 1 County of Ventura, Norman R. Hawkes in his capacity as Ventura County Auditor-Controller, and Harold S. Pittman in his capacity as Ventura County Tax Collector (County), appeal from a judgment awarding respondents, City of Camarillo (City) and the West Camarillo Community Facilities District No. i, $48,391.46 in tax delinquency penalties. County collected the tax penalties on behalf of respondents but refused to pay any portion of the funds. The trial court ordered County to disburse the funds to respondents. We affirm.

On March 14, 1990, City passed a resolution pursuant to the Mello-Roos Community Facilities District Act of 1982 (Mello-Roos Act) establishing the West Camarillo Community Facilities District No. 1 (District). (§ 53318 et seq.) The city council, acting as the legislative body of District, issued $13,955,000 in secured bonds. Special taxes were levied on real property located in the district. (§§ 53360, 53328.) County collected the taxes on behalf of the City and District. (§§ 50077, subd. (b)s 53340.)

During the 1991-1992 fiscal year, two property owners failed to remit $483,914.60 in Mello-Roos special taxes. A penalty assessment of $48,391.46 was imposed. On May 27, 1992, the property owners paid the special taxes and delinquency penalty. County distributed the taxes to City and District but kept the $48,391.46 penalty payment. County claimed that the funds should be distributed to the county general fund pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 4653.6.

City, acting for and on behalf of District, sued for unjust enrichment, declaratory relief and injunctive relief. The matter was tried without a jury and submitted on stipulated facts. County argued that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4653.6 governed the distribution of tax penalties levied pursuant to the Mello-Roos Act. The trial court disagreed and entered judgment against County. 2

Because the appeal involves the applicability of a statute based on stipulated facts, the issue presented is a question of law. (Southern California *1354 Edison Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1972) 7 Cal.3d 652, 659, fn. 8 [102 Cal.Rptr. 766, 498 P.2d 1014.) “When presented with uncontradicted facts on appeal in tax matters, the appellate court is free to make its own determinations. [Citation.] Our review of the legal question at issue is undertaken independently and we are not bound by the trial court’s determination.” (Ra in Bird Sprinkler Mfg. Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 784, 794 [280 Cal.Rptr. 362].)

Revenue and Taxation Code section 4653.6 provides: “Amounts paid as delinquent penalties shall be distributed to the county general fund.” County asserts that penalties, collected on delinquent Mello-Roos taxes, go to the county general fund. We disagree. “The general rule is that the penalties follow the tax.” (Long Beach City School Dist. v. Payne (1933) 219 Cal. 598, 601 [28 P.2d 663].) “ ‘Unless otherwise directed, interest, penalties, and costs collected on delinquent taxes follow the tax, and go to the state, county, or city according as the one or the other is entitled to the tax itself .... But the legislature may change this rule and dispose otherwise of interest or penalties.’ ” (Ibid.)

City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 999 [189 Cal.Rptr. 129] illustrates the general rule. There, the City of Los Angeles brought an action seeking its share of penalties on ad valorem property taxes assessed and collected after the adoption of Proposition 13. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A.) Revenue and Taxation Code section 93 (former Revenue and Taxation Code section 2237) required that the county distribute the revenues in accordance with the Government Code. The county, relying on Revenue and Taxation Code section 4653.6, claimed that it was entitled to keep the tax penalties.

The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that the penalties followed the tax. “County cites Revenue and Taxation Code section 4653.6 (enacted in 1951) which provides that ‘[a]mounts paid as delinquent penalties shall be distributed to the county general fund.’ [1] That contention is meritless. Revenue and Taxation Code section 2237, and later section 93, subdivision (b) each provides that property tax revenues are, since the advent of Proposition 13, to be distributed in accordance with the provisions of the Government Code, not the Revenue and Taxation Code, [¶] To rule in favor of the *1355 County in this matter would require us to ‘judicially legislate’ to fill in a gap in the implementing legislation under article XIII A, section 1, subdivision (a) as to the entitlement of cities to penalties on the portion of delinquent taxes collected on their behalf.” (City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 1003.)

In 1989 the Legislature “filled the gap” by amending Revenue and Taxation Code section 93, subdivision (b). (Stats. 1989, ch. 1230, § 1, p. 4812.) Section 93, as amended, governs the levy, allocation, and distribution of ad valorem property taxes. 3 Special taxes are not ad valorem property taxes. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 4; Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 487-489 [229 Cal.Rptr. 324, 723 P.2d 64].) The Legislature has provided that a Mello-Roos tax is “[a] special tax [and]. . . . shall not be construed to be on or based upon the ownership of real property.” (§ 53325.3.)

County, however, asserts that Revenue and Taxation Code section 93, in combination with Revenue and Taxation Code section 4653.6, controls the allocation and distribution of all taxes on the secured property roll, including Mello-Roos taxes. County also argues that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4653.6, enacted 30 years before the Mello-Roos Act, unequivocally requires that Mello-Roos penalty payments be allocated to the county general fund. We disagree.

Special taxes are “ ‘collected and earmarked for a special purpose, rather than being deposited in a general fund.’ [Citations.]” (City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 53 [184 Cal.Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935

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26 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 920, 94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5609, 94 Daily Journal DAR 10237, 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 753, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-camarillo-v-county-of-ventura-calctapp-1994.