City of Bastrop v. Johnson
This text of 403 So. 2d 717 (City of Bastrop v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Effective March 9, 1980, the driver’s license of defendant, Lavinia D. Johnson, was suspended for sixty days by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety, Office of Motor Vehicles. On October 7, 1980, defendant was ticketed for driving while her license was under suspension in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:415a.1 She was found guilty and sentenced to thirty days in jail. A writ was granted to review the conviction and sentence.
Since the period of suspension had expired when defendant was ticketed, she contends she was not guilty of driving under suspension. At most, defendant contends she was operating a vehicle without a driver’s license.
The State makes two answering arguments. First, it contends that defendant’s license remained under suspension because she had not paid the $15 required by LSA-R.S. 32:874B.2 This argument is unsound. Prior to its amendment by Act No. 229 of 1976, the statute stated that a license would remain suspended until the reinstatement fee was paid. That language was deleted by the 1976 amendment. At the conclusion of the suspension period, defendant’s license was not reinstated but was no longer suspended.
City of Lake Charles v. Iford, 375 So.2d 937 (La., 1979) dealt with the question of financial responsibility under LSA-R.S. 32:896,3 after a conviction of driving while intoxicated. Financial responsibility is not [719]*719at issue here. Defendant Johnson was eligible for a license whereas Iford was not because the requirements of LSA-R.S. 32:896 had not been satisfied.
Second, the State relies on LSA-R.S. 32:415B4 which provides that a period of suspension shall automatically be extended for one year upon conviction of a motor vehicle offense during the suspension period. On May 8, 1980, defendant Johnson had been cited for driving under suspension; she pled guilty and received a fine.
Assuming the validity of an automatic extension, the facts do not support one here. The suspension was for a period of 60 days, beginning March 9, 1980. The 8th day of May, 1980, is the 61st day thereafter. The offense on May 8 was committed after the suspension period, and the statute does not apply.
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of the defendant are reversed and set aside.
REVERSED.
Judges J. Burton Foret, Jimmy M. Stoker and P. J. Laborde of the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justices Ad Hoc joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Associate Justices Marcus, Blanche and Watson.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
403 So. 2d 717, 1981 La. LEXIS 10171, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-bastrop-v-johnson-la-1981.