City of Austin v. L. S. Ranch, Ltd., and Circle C Land Corp.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJune 11, 1998
Docket03-98-00024-CV
StatusPublished

This text of City of Austin v. L. S. Ranch, Ltd., and Circle C Land Corp. (City of Austin v. L. S. Ranch, Ltd., and Circle C Land Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Austin v. L. S. Ranch, Ltd., and Circle C Land Corp., (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN




NO. 03-98-00024-CV

City of Austin, Appellant


v.



L. S. Ranch, Ltd., and Circle C Land Corp., Appellees



FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 97-1048, HONORABLE JACK ROBISON, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellees L. S. Ranch, Ltd. and Circle C Land Corporation, landowners, filed suit against appellant, City of Austin, seeking a declaration that a proposed annexation by the City was invalid. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004 (West 1997). The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting the absence of a justiciable controversy. The trial court denied the plea, and the City perfected this interlocutory appeal. We will dismiss the appeal as moot.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 31, 1997, appellees made the requisite filings in the real property records of Hays and Travis Counties to create a "water quality protection zone" (hereinafter "the Zone"). See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 26.179(d) (West Supp. 1998). Later that same day, appellees filed this suit against the City seeking a declaration that (1) section 26.179 of the Water Code is a valid statute, (2) the Zone was properly designated and became effective upon filing in the real property records, and (3) Austin may not annex areas within the Zone nor enforce any of its ordinances within the Zone. Appellees' petition alleged that the City had earlier published notice of its intent to adopt an ordinance annexing into the City an area of land that included the Zone. The appellees' petition alleged that after creation of the Zone, such annexation was statutorily prohibited. (1)

The City responded to appellees' suit by filing several pleadings, including a plea to the jurisdiction. On December 11, the district court held a hearing on the City's plea to the jurisdiction. On January 20, 1998, the court signed an order denying the plea. The City perfected this interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 1998). On appeal, the City asserts that appellees' petition fails to allege a ripe, justiciable controversy, but instead asks the trial court to render an advisory opinion.



DISCUSSION

Interlocutory Appeal Under Section 51.014(a)(8)

Appellees first assert that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provision on which the City relies allows such interlocutory appeals only when the asserted lack of jurisdiction in the trial court is based on sovereign immunity. The relevant statute provides: "A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court that: . . . grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 1998). Section 101.001 defines "governmental unit" to include "a political subdivision of this state, including any city." Id. § 101.001(3)(B). Notwithstanding the literal terms of the statute, appellees contend section 51.014(a)(8) was not intended to allow an interlocutory appeal from the denial of any plea to the jurisdiction filed by a governmental entity, but only from the denial of a plea that is based on sovereign immunity.

The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that a court must look to the intent of the legislature and must construe the statute so as to give effect to that intent. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. 1997). When determining legislative intent, courts look to the language of the statute, legislative history, the nature and object to be obtained, and the consequences that follow alternate constructions. Id.; Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 249 (Tex. 1991); see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023 (West 1988). If possible, however, we are to discern legislative intent from the plain meaning of the words of the statute. See Monsanto v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex. 1993).

Through a plea to the jurisdiction, a movant may raise any ground on which the movant claims the court has no subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, a governmental unit that has been sued is not limited to the issue of sovereign immunity, but may file a plea to the jurisdiction on any appropriate basis. Appellees suggest, however, that by referencing the definition of "governmental unit" contained in the Tort Claims Act, the legislature meant section 51.014(a)(8) to apply only to situations in which sovereign immunity was the asserted basis for the plea to the jurisdiction.

The language of section 51.014(a)(8) does not contain the suggested limitation. Nonetheless, appellees assert that the provision's legislative history supports such a construction. Subsection (a)(8) was added by Senate Bill 453 of the 74th Legislature. See Act of May 27, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4936, 4937. The sponsor of the bill, Senator Robert Duncan, stated that the purpose of the subsection was to add to the list of orders eligible for interlocutory appeal "the granting or denying a plea to the jurisdiction by a government unit; that is whether or not a government may--governmental unit may be sued." Hearing on Tex. S.B. 453 before the Senate Committee on Jurisprudence, 74th Leg. R.S. 2-3 (Feb. 24, 1997). This testimony does not conclusively demonstrate the restriction appellees assert. While sovereign immunity is one reason a trial court may lack jurisdiction over a suit against a governmental unit, so too are other jurisdictional requirements. Senator Duncan's comments do not necessarily show that the legislature intended for a governmental unit to be limited in perfecting interlocutory appeals to pleas to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity.

Appellees also point to testimony of an assistant attorney general, Carey Smith, that the need for an interlocutory appeal of a plea to the jurisdiction order arises in contract suits filed against the State notwithstanding its immunity from suit. Id. at 10-15. Smith testified to the high cost of defending those suits until sovereign immunity is vindicated on appeal after final judgment. Id. at 10. As with Senator Duncan's comments, this testimony demonstrates one basis for the statute, but does not suggest the exclusion of other bases. The high cost of defending a suit against a governmental entity, borne ultimately by the public, is strong motivation for allowing any jurisdictional issue to be resolved before the merits of the suit are litigated.

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