City of Atchison v. Price

45 Kan. 296
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJanuary 15, 1891
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 45 Kan. 296 (City of Atchison v. Price) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Atchison v. Price, 45 Kan. 296 (kan 1891).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

JOHNSTON, J.:

The decision and decree of the court holding the special taxes to be illegal, and enjoining the making of any provision for their payment, is placed upon the failure of the city and its officers to make an assessment upon the property in blocks 14 and 17 for a proportion of the cost of the sewer. The other conclusions are against the defendants in error, and although they excepted to the rulings adverse to them, and asked for a new trial, they have presented no petition or cross-petition in error, asking for a review of such adverse rulings, as they might have done.

The property in blocks 14 and 17 which was omitted from the assessment is contiguous to another sewer, which, with laterals now built or that may be built, will afford adequate sewer facilities for the occupants of these blocks. The same may be said of block 18, which is in asimilar situation. The property omitted from the assessment in these blocks was not accommodated or benefited by the construction of the new sewer, and such taxes can only be imposed in proportion to the special benefits received. A part of lots 1 and 2, in block [311]*31114, which could not be reached by the sewer already constructed, and which was so subdivided as to abut on the new sewer, was benefited, and was properly assessed. It is contended, however, that no sewer district was ever created or defined by which the expense of the construction of the sewer could be placed exclusively upon the owners of the territory upon which the assessment' was made by the city council; but that if there was a distinct sewer district which might be held liable for the entire cost of the sewer, that it extended south to White Clay creek, and included blocks 14, 17, and the most of 18, as also the other property within this territory.

It appears that in 1884 a six-foot brick sewer was built from White Clay creek and Main street, northward, along the center of Fourth street, for a distance of a block and a half, and to a point twenty-nine and one-half feet south of the alley running through blocks 13 and 14, with wings extending to the ends of the alleys in said blocks, and on either side, and a lateral sewer was afterward constructed through the alley in block 14, which emptied into the brick sewer. This improvement was made at the expense of all the taxpayers of the city. The sewer in question, which was constructed' in 1889, connected with the brick sewer, and extended from the connection, northward, along the center of Fourth avenue, near to Mound street, with laterals through the alleys of the blocks on either side, thus draining the territory from Third to Fifth streets.

It is claimed that the new sewer is simply an extension of the one built in 1884, and that the entire territory between Third and Fifth streets, from White Clay creek northward to Mound street, constitutes a sewer district, and that the special taxes should be apportioned to the entire property within that district. The district court appears to have adopted the view that this territory should be treated as a distinct district, and that the exemption of the property in blocks 14 and 17 from contributing toward the cost of the sewer rendered the assessment that was made illegal.

[312]*312 2 sewer last oost-lwha^a~ temtory hable,

[313]*3131. City-con-sewéra-lia-tncte — tax. [312]*312We think this entire territory is not to be treated as a single district, and that the exemption of the property not assessed in blocks 14, 17 and 18, which is and may be accommodated by the brick sewer built prior to 1889, did not invalidate the assessment that was made. A general system of sewerage for the entire city has been adopted, and the construction of the whole at once may be impracticable and unnecessary. The fact that a sewer constructed in one district or portion of the city connects with or is an extension of another already constructed, does not make the territory drained by both a single and distinct district, nor does it require that all the property within that territory shall be assessed for the sewer last constructed. It is for the city to determine how early and rapidly the system shall be completed, and any section or extension of the system may be built whenever it is deemed necessary and expedient. When a section or extension is made, the territory drained and specially benefited by the construction of an extension or section, however small, may be regarded as a district. A lateral running through an alley of a single block, and connected with another sewer, may be constructed by the city, and the territory specially benefited will alone constitute a district upon which the entire cost of the lateral may be assessed. In this case only the property contiguous to the new sewer and specially bene-gy jj. was assesse(J for jj;S cost, To have apportioned any share of the expense to the omitted property in blocks 14 or 17, would have been palpably unjust and illegal. The owners of the lots not assessed received no benefit from the extension of the sewer, and as has been said, “only those whose property is specially benefited by the improvement can be compelled to pay such taxes. Special taxes to pay. for sewers and drains can be levied only upon the property of persons who can use such sewers and drains, and not upon persons who cannot use them. And the taxes should be apportioned in accordance with the special benefits received by each individual severally.” (Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kas. 167.) Even property that may be within the exterior lines [313]*313or boundaries of what may be called a district, but which does not abut on the sewer, or from the topography of the ground or other cause cannot be drained or specially benefited by the sewer, cannot be specially assessed or taxed for its construction. It is not required, nor is it necessary that the boundaries of a sewer district shall be define¿ by an ordinance, and indeed the statute contemplates that sewers may be constructed by districts or otherwise. (Gen. Stat. of 1889, ¶ 563.) When a sewer system is adopted and is being built by districts, it is then important that the records shall show the territory or property assessed for any part of the sewer which is constructed, so that it shall not be again assessed for a sewer in another portion of the city. When property has paid its full proportion for a sewer in a certain territory or district, it cannot be transferred to another district, nor held liable for the construction of sewerage facilities in another district of the city. So far as the sewer in controversy is concerned, the public records sufficiently show the extent of the district, as well as the property benefited and assessed for the sewer, and no dispute can arise in the future in this regard. Under an ordinance adopted in 1888, the city of Atchison was authorized to and did enter into a contract with certain engineers to furnish the city with plans and specifications for a complete sewer system. In pursuance of this contract, maps, plans and specifications were duly prepared and furnished, which were paid for by the city. The system thus provided was adopted by the city, and the Fourth street sewer was made a separate one under the plans and system provided. These plans and specifications, together with the map made and furnished by the city engineer, and the assessment which has been made, sufficiently indicate the existence of the district and the property taxed to fully protect the tax-payers from a second assessment for the same purpose.

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Bluebook (online)
45 Kan. 296, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-atchison-v-price-kan-1891.