City of Akron v. Russell, Unpublished Decision (4-29-1998)

CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 29, 1998
DocketC.A. Nos. 18207, 18206.
StatusUnpublished

This text of City of Akron v. Russell, Unpublished Decision (4-29-1998) (City of Akron v. Russell, Unpublished Decision (4-29-1998)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Akron v. Russell, Unpublished Decision (4-29-1998), (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: Suppression of Evidence — warrantless entry of home Exigent circumstances — progressive, sequential intrusion — reasonableness

Following pleas of no contest to charges of attempted drug abuse, the defendants were found guilty and sentenced to ninety (90) days on a work release program at the Oriana House by the Summit County Common Pleas Court.

Defendants, husband and wife, appeal assigning a single error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE WHICH WAS THE PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH OF DEFENDANTS' HOME WHERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED TO JUSTIFY THE OFFICERS' NONCONSENSUAL ENTRY AND WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF APPELLANTS' HOME. SUCH ACTIVITY WAS VIOLATIVE OF DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 4TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO.

In the afternoon of July 14, 1996, three Akron police officers entered the residence-home of John and Angela Russell, on Oregon Avenue, in Akron. As a consequence of the entry, they discovered contraband, cocaine residue. This criminal prosecution followed.

The singular issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the contraband upon the pretrial suppression motion of the defendants.

The motion, and this appeal, claim favor of a fundamental principle of constitutional law:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (emphasis added).

Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, through almost identical language, provides these same assurances to its people.

The trial court sits as fact finder on such motions. Here the trial court favors us with an extensive judgment, finding facts and concluding that the entry and seizure fall within the "emergency exigency doctrine" and are, therefore, "reasonable" within the meaning of these constitutional provisions. Our inquiry on appeal was recently enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. ___, ___,134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920. An appellate court must review the trial court's findings of historical fact only for clear error, giving due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by the trial court. The trial court's legal conclusions, however, are afforded no deference, but are reviewed de novo. Id.

Exigency/Reasonableness — a Sequential Analysis
The question of whether an entry into a home by peace officers, acting without a warrant, is "reasonable" requires a careful analysis of the sequential and consequential events leading up to and including the entry. An entry can never be found "reasonable" based solely upon the fact that criminal conduct, or contraband, was discovered within the residence. SeeState v. Williams (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 82, 86. The question is whether the government agents acted reasonably at each step of the process that led from the first contact (inquiry or notice) to ultimate entry and seizure. See, e.g., State v. Ramey (1971),30 Ohio Misc. 89, 94-95. In Ramey, the court invalidated a stop and frisk search saying, "In the instant case, the search having commenced prior to the move to the pocket, said move to the pocket cannot justify the illegal search. * * * In other words, a search (or frisk) cannot be justified by after the fact circumstances or factors." Id.

Not only are the sequence of steps taken by the officers determinable, but the roles the officers are playing at each step bears upon reasonableness. Police officers are not simply criminal law enforcers, charged with investigating criminal conduct and developing and maintaining evidence of crime. They wear other hats, one of which is their community health, safety, and protection role. Police officers are charged with the duty to prevent crime, preserve the peace, and protect persons and property. State v. Hyde (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 32, 33; R.C.737.11.

An additional component of the reasonableness analysis is the question of whether the test is subjective or objective, i.e., did the officer think he or she was acting reasonably or, would a reasonably prudent officer believe he or she was acting reasonably? Courts have uniformly held that the test is an objective, not subjective one. State v. Andrews (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 86,87; State v. Edwards (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 319, 322.

The issue then becomes:

Considering the role that the government officer was executing, would a reasonably prudent officer, in the same or similar circumstances, have taken each step that was, in fact, taken by these officers from initial contact through entry and seizure within the home of the defendants?

The chronological, sequential analysis of the evidence in this case is measured against three basic principles of constitutional law:

Warrantless search and entry upon property by police are perse unreasonable. Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357,19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585.

Entry and search, however, can be justified where there exists "an emergency situation, demanding urgent police action."U.S. v. Radka (C.A. 6, 1990), 904 F.2d 357, 361.

The warrantless entry must be "`strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.'" State v. Applegate (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350, quoting Terry v. Ohio (1968),392 U.S. 1, 26, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908.

The most frequently cited rationale for warrantless entry is that the government is acting in something other than a traditional law enforcement capacity, and confronting "risk of danger." U.S. v. Rohrig (C.A. 6, 1996), 98 F.3d 1506, 1516.

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Related

Katz v. United States
389 U.S. 347 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Ornelas v. United States
517 U.S. 690 (Supreme Court, 1996)
United States v. Alan Radka
904 F.2d 357 (Sixth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Donald P. Rohrig
98 F.3d 1506 (Sixth Circuit, 1996)
State v. Edwards
609 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1992)
State v. Hyde
268 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1971)
State v. Williams
377 N.E.2d 1013 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1978)
State v. Andrews
565 N.E.2d 1271 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)
State v. Applegate
626 N.E.2d 942 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)

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City of Akron v. Russell, Unpublished Decision (4-29-1998), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-akron-v-russell-unpublished-decision-4-29-1998-ohioctapp-1998.