City Commission of Springfield v. Bethel Township
This text of 399 N.E.2d 1237 (City Commission of Springfield v. Bethel Township) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellants contend that the board erred in excluding testimony allegedly relevant to the relative need of Clark County and its political subdivisions for the undivided local government fund because it was unrelated to the specific issue raised in Springfield’s notice of appeal. They allege that the scope of the hearing in an appeal from a decision of a county budget commission apportioning its local government fund is not limited to those issues specified in the notice of appeal, but is de novo.
Before December 20, 1971, the board unquestionably heard and determined the apportionment de novo in the place of, and as if it were, the budget commission. Brooklyn v. Cuyahoga County Budget Comm. (1965), 2 Ohio St. 2d 181, paragraph two of the syllabus. Then, however, the appeals were brought under R. C. 5739.25. On December 20, 1971, R. C. 5739.25 was replaced by R. C. 5747.55. The board believes that R. C. 5747.55 limits its authority to deciding only the specific issues raised in the notice of appeal. R. C. 5747.55, particularly the parts dealing with the contents of [134]*134the notice of appeal, however, is basically only a codification of former B.T.A. Rule 1-06.1 Thus, we cannot conclude that the General Assembly intended to limit the scope of the hearing by adopting R. C. 5747.55. The board, therefore, erred in excluding the testimony.
[135]*135Appellants also allege that the board erroneously decided that all of Springfield’s 2 percent income tax is an additional tax voted by its electorate within the meaning of R. C. 5747.51(E)(4). The statute excludes revenues from such taxes in determining a subdivision’s relative need.2 In Youngstown Pk. Bd. v. Budget Comm. (1971), 26 Ohio St. 2d 153, this court held that, where a 1 percent income tax had been levied by legislative authority and the electorate then approved a 1.5 percent tax, only the additional .5 percent is an additional tax voted by the electorate where the 1 percent tax would have continued if the electorate had failed to approve the increased rate. Here, Springfield had a 1 percent income tax levied by legislative authority, .6 percent of which continued when the electorate approved its reduction by .4 percent. Thus, we cannot conclude that the electorate’s decision to reduce the tax by .4 percent constitutes an entire repeal of the existing tax by the electorate. Therefore, only 70 percent of the 2 percent city income tax is an additional tax voted by the electorate.
Accordingly, the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, being unreasonable and unlawful, is, therefore, reversed.
Decision reversed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
399 N.E.2d 1237, 61 Ohio St. 2d 132, 15 Ohio Op. 3d 165, 1980 Ohio LEXIS 626, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-commission-of-springfield-v-bethel-township-ohio-1980.