Citizens State Bank v. State Banking Board

602 S.W.2d 895, 1980 Mo. App. LEXIS 2766
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 25, 1980
DocketNo. 11090
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 602 S.W.2d 895 (Citizens State Bank v. State Banking Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Citizens State Bank v. State Banking Board, 602 S.W.2d 895, 1980 Mo. App. LEXIS 2766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

PREWITT, Judge.

This appeal is from a circuit court judgment affirming an order of the State Banking Board granting a charter to the Webster County Bank.

An application for a certificate of incorporation for the Webster County bank was filed with the Commissioner of Finance. Pursuant to § '362.030, RSMo 1969, the Commissioner investigated, determined that the “statutory criteria have been met”, and granted the charter. It was “conditioned” upon a commitment of the Federal Deposit Insurance to insure the bank’s deposits pri- or to opening, the employment of a “qualified lending officer” prior to opening and the bank being open for business in “permanent quarters” within eighteen months or [897]*897such further period as extended by the Commissioner.

Appellants appealed to the State Banking Board, contending that the charter should not have been granted. Following a hearing, a majority of the Board “upheld” the granting of the charter “with the conditions imposed thereon for the reason that proponents have met all of the statutory requirements of Chapter 362, RSMo 1969.”1 Paragraph 14 of the Board’s Findings of Fact states that “all statutory criteria have been met by the applicants for the charter except those conditions previously set forth herein as imposed by the Commissioner”.

As no question is raised regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the issuance of the charter, we see no purpose in lengthening this opinion by attempting to summarize the extensive testimony.

Appellants contend: (I) that the proposed charter is void because the State Banking Board acted in excess of its authority and jurisdiction in granting the charter: (a) when it found in paragraph 14 of its Findings that the statutory criteria had not been met, and (b) granted the charter upon the conditions set forth by the Commissioner; (II) that the granting of the charter was void because of those conditions and because of “vagueness and lack of self-enforcement”; (III) that the Board erred in not specifically finding: (a) the amount of deposits to be gained by the proposed bank during its first three years or more of operation; (b) the amount of income to be generated from the deposits; (c) the amount of expenses to be incurred; and (d) the amount of profit or loss for the proposed bank at the end of three years or more; as these findings were necessary to support the Board’s conclusions that the probable volume of business in the locality is sufficient to insure and maintain the solvency of the proposed bank.

We consider first the appellants’ contentions under Point I. It is premised on the contention that the Board did not find that all statutory criteria have been met because of the conditions and the language stated in paragraph 14 of the Findings of Fact quoted above.

The Board specifically found in its Findings of Fact and concluded in its Conclusions of Law, in language similar to the statute, that all requirements of § 362.030 had been met. In their order they recite that “proponents have met all the statutory requirements of Chapter 362, RSMo 1969”. Paragraph 14 recites that the “statutory criteria” have been met, but then adds “except those conditions previously set forth herein as imposed by the Commissioner of Finance.” None of those conditions are statutory and they could not be an exception to the Board’s determination that the criteria were met. The conditions could not have been met at that time as they could only be fulfilled after the charter was granted. We conclude, in view of the specific findings made, that the conditions were mistakenly included in a reference to the statutory requirements. How or why this occurred, we cannot tell from the record before us. While this confusing language is not what we would have preferred, we cannot require from such a board the “precise terminology courts strive for”. State ex rel. Weinhardt v. Ladue Professional Building, Inc., 395 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Mo.App.1965). Reading the Board’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as a whole, we believe that the Board found the required criteria. They stated generally and specifically that they did. The inconsistent language in paragraph 14 does not require us to find otherwise.

In oral discussion, questions regarding certain statutory requirements were raised by Board members. Appellants contend that this and the conditions show that Board members “recognized that the conditions imposed were necessary in meeting the statutory criteria”. We do not believe it can be implied that the Board found [898]*898that future conditions upon the bank were necessary for the incorporators to comply with § 362.030 where the Board expressly found the required statutory findings. Trying to predict what may happen in the future is a highly speculative task, particularly when concerned with financial matters. There likely could be doubts in the minds of Board members no matter which decision was made. It appears that the Board made a decision that the statutory criteria were met and perhaps because they thought that these conditions would give further assurance that the proposed bank will be solvent, retained the conditions. If the Board exceeded its authority and jurisdiction in imposing the conditions, only the proposed bank on whom the conditions are imposed can complain. If the statutory criteria were met, granting the charter was proper. Appellants can only complain if they were not met. We believe the Board found they were met. Point I is denied.

We next consider Point II. Appellants liken the Board’s order to a conditional judgment or decree condemned by such holdings as Beck v. Hoel-Steffen Construction Company, 586 S.W.2d 818 (Mo.App.1979), Phelps County Bank v. Modern Security Life Insurance Company, 586 S.W.2d 746 (Mo.App.1979), and Wallace v. Hankins, 541 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.App.1976). We are not convinced that such holdings have any application here, as judgments are required to be “the final determination of the rights of the parties in the action”. Rule 74.01, V.A. M.R. However, even if the requirements applicable to judgments apply to the order before us, those cases do not aid appellants. These conditions cannot be conditions precedent to the granting of the charter as they cannot be complied with until the charter is granted. The order here was not like the conditional judgments condemned in the cases cited as the charter sought was to be granted before the conditions could be met, and it was not an order which would “become operative” upon the occurrence of the conditions. See Beck v. Hoel-Steffen Construction Company, supra, 586 S.W.2d 818; Phelps County Bank v. Modern Security Life Insurance Company, supra, 586 S.W.2d at 747; Wallace v. Hankins, supra, 541 S.W.2d at 84.

We also do not think that adding these conditions makes the order void. It may be that the Commissioner or the Board have authority to do this separate and apart from granting the charter, but we see no point in discussing that question as the party on whom the conditions are imposed does not complain.

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Bluebook (online)
602 S.W.2d 895, 1980 Mo. App. LEXIS 2766, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/citizens-state-bank-v-state-banking-board-moctapp-1980.