Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed February 4, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-2271 Lower Tribunal No. 16-14003-CA-01 ________________
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Appellant,
vs.
Sandra Blanco and Carlos Luis Blanco, Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.
Lydecker LLP, and Michelle Diverio and Alejandro Sanchez Parraga, for appellant.
Neblett Law Group, and David A. Neblett and James M. Mahaffey III, and John A. Wynn, for appellees.
Before EMAS, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM. INTRODUCTION
Citizens Property Insurance Corp. appeals a final judgment entered by
the trial court following a jury trial and verdict in favor of the insureds, Carlos
and Sandra Blanco (collectively, “Blanco”) on their claim for breach of
contract in this first-party property insurance claim.
On appeal, Citizens asserts the trial court erred: (1) in denying Citizens’
motion for directed verdict (and subsequent motion for judgment in
accordance with its directed verdict motion) because the policy’s anti-
concurrent cause provision barred coverage for all damages; (2) by
permitting Blanco to introduce an estimate for repairs when she no longer
owned the property and had not incurred those expenses; (3) in the jury
instructions and verdict form provided to the jury on the issue of the anti-
concurrent clause; and (4) in denying Citizens’ motion for new trial based
upon improper closing by Blanco’s counsel. We find no error by the trial
court, and affirm. We write to address Citizens’ first claim on appeal—the
trial court’s denial of its motion for directed verdict and subsequent motion
for judgment in accordance with the motion for directed verdict.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Blancos owned a home in Miami-Dade County that was insured
by Citizens during the relevant timeframes. On November 16, 2015, the
2 home sustained water damage due to a leak, and Blanco filed an insurance
claim with Citizens.
On February 26, 2016 Citizens denied Blanco’s claim “due to the fact
that the cause of loss was not covered under the policy.”
In the operative complaint, Blanco asserted a claim for breach of
contract against Citizens. Citizens answered the complaint and raised
several affirmative defenses, including that the loss was excluded under the
policy’s anti-concurrent cause provision, which states:
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. ... n. Constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam, or in the presence of humidity, moisture or vapor, which occurs over a period of time, whether hidden or not and results in damage such as wet or dry rot, “fungi,” deterioration, rust, decay or other corrosion.
(Emphasis added).
Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Blanco for
$61,017.51. Citizens moved for entry of judgment in accordance with their
earlier motion for directed verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, asserting
there was no coverage under the policy because the undisputed evidence at
trial was that the leak occurred over a period of time and was a “constant or
3 repeated exposure to moisture over a period of months,” triggering the anti-
concurrent cause provision of the policy. After a hearing, the trial court
denied Citizen’s motion in its entirety, and entered final judgment in favor of
Blanco. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion for directed
verdict (and motion for judgment in accordance with motion for directed
verdict). People’s Tr. Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 400 So. 3d 744, 746 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2024). However, we “must evaluate the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference
flowing from the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, and ‘if there is
conflicting evidence or if different reasonable inferences may be drawn from
the evidence, then the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury
for resolution.’” Id. at 747 (citing Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Guyton, 388 So. 3d 50,
51-52 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)).
Citizens moved for a directed verdict during trial on the basis of an anti-
concurrent cause provision in Blanco’s policy. Specifically, Citizens argued
that the “undisputed evidence” at trial was that the leak occurred for some
period of time, that the loss and ensuing damage was the result of constant
or repeated exposure to moisture over a period of months, and that such loss
4 is not covered by the policy. Thus, Citizens contends, even if there was an
otherwise covered accidental discharge or overflow of water, the existence
of a concurring cause precluded coverage under the policy’s anti-concurrent
cause provision.
As this Court has previously explained, “‘when independent perils
converge and no single cause can be considered the sole or proximate
cause, it is appropriate to apply the concurring cause doctrine.’ However,
when the insurer explicitly avoids the application of the concurring-cause
doctrine with an anti-concurrent cause provision, the plain language of the
policy precludes recovery.” Sec. First Ins. Co. v. Czelusniak, 305 So. 3d 717,
718 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting Sebo v. Am. Home Assurance Co., Inc.,
208 So. 3d 694, 697 (Fla. 2016)).
It is undisputed that the policy contained an anti-concurrent cause
provision. In Czelusniak, the insured’s policy also had such a provision and
because the “undisputed evidence” at trial established that the “the loss was
caused by a combination of both excluded and covered perils,” and the jury
could not “legally or factually separate the damage caused by water coming
through the door from water coming through the walls and windows,” this
court held that the trial court should have directed a verdict in the insurer’s
favor. Id. at 719.
5 Citizens asserts that the same is true in this case: there was evidence
at trial that even if there was an accidental loss arguably covered under the
policy, there was also evidence that water leakage had been taking place for
months, and that loss by “constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water.
. . over a period of time” is excluded even if it occurs concurrently with a
cause that is not excluded under the policy. Citizens contends that, due to
the anti-concurrent loss provision, the trial court should have directed a
verdict in favor of Citizens.
Blanco asserts that the undisputed evidence at trial was that the loss
was caused only by the sudden, accidental loss, with its own unique
damages, and that there was no concurrent cause. On appeal, Blanco also
contends that we cannot reverse the court’s denial of Citizens’ directed
verdict motion because Citizens failed to provide the full trial transcript, and
thus, cannot show that this loss was not solely attributable to or caused by a
sudden accidental event on November 16, 2015. In response, Citizens
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed February 4, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-2271 Lower Tribunal No. 16-14003-CA-01 ________________
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, Appellant,
vs.
Sandra Blanco and Carlos Luis Blanco, Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna Sanchez-Llorens, Judge.
Lydecker LLP, and Michelle Diverio and Alejandro Sanchez Parraga, for appellant.
Neblett Law Group, and David A. Neblett and James M. Mahaffey III, and John A. Wynn, for appellees.
Before EMAS, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
PER CURIAM. INTRODUCTION
Citizens Property Insurance Corp. appeals a final judgment entered by
the trial court following a jury trial and verdict in favor of the insureds, Carlos
and Sandra Blanco (collectively, “Blanco”) on their claim for breach of
contract in this first-party property insurance claim.
On appeal, Citizens asserts the trial court erred: (1) in denying Citizens’
motion for directed verdict (and subsequent motion for judgment in
accordance with its directed verdict motion) because the policy’s anti-
concurrent cause provision barred coverage for all damages; (2) by
permitting Blanco to introduce an estimate for repairs when she no longer
owned the property and had not incurred those expenses; (3) in the jury
instructions and verdict form provided to the jury on the issue of the anti-
concurrent clause; and (4) in denying Citizens’ motion for new trial based
upon improper closing by Blanco’s counsel. We find no error by the trial
court, and affirm. We write to address Citizens’ first claim on appeal—the
trial court’s denial of its motion for directed verdict and subsequent motion
for judgment in accordance with the motion for directed verdict.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Blancos owned a home in Miami-Dade County that was insured
by Citizens during the relevant timeframes. On November 16, 2015, the
2 home sustained water damage due to a leak, and Blanco filed an insurance
claim with Citizens.
On February 26, 2016 Citizens denied Blanco’s claim “due to the fact
that the cause of loss was not covered under the policy.”
In the operative complaint, Blanco asserted a claim for breach of
contract against Citizens. Citizens answered the complaint and raised
several affirmative defenses, including that the loss was excluded under the
policy’s anti-concurrent cause provision, which states:
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS
1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. ... n. Constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water or steam, or in the presence of humidity, moisture or vapor, which occurs over a period of time, whether hidden or not and results in damage such as wet or dry rot, “fungi,” deterioration, rust, decay or other corrosion.
(Emphasis added).
Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Blanco for
$61,017.51. Citizens moved for entry of judgment in accordance with their
earlier motion for directed verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, asserting
there was no coverage under the policy because the undisputed evidence at
trial was that the leak occurred over a period of time and was a “constant or
3 repeated exposure to moisture over a period of months,” triggering the anti-
concurrent cause provision of the policy. After a hearing, the trial court
denied Citizen’s motion in its entirety, and entered final judgment in favor of
Blanco. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion for directed
verdict (and motion for judgment in accordance with motion for directed
verdict). People’s Tr. Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 400 So. 3d 744, 746 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2024). However, we “must evaluate the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, drawing every reasonable inference
flowing from the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, and ‘if there is
conflicting evidence or if different reasonable inferences may be drawn from
the evidence, then the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury
for resolution.’” Id. at 747 (citing Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Guyton, 388 So. 3d 50,
51-52 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)).
Citizens moved for a directed verdict during trial on the basis of an anti-
concurrent cause provision in Blanco’s policy. Specifically, Citizens argued
that the “undisputed evidence” at trial was that the leak occurred for some
period of time, that the loss and ensuing damage was the result of constant
or repeated exposure to moisture over a period of months, and that such loss
4 is not covered by the policy. Thus, Citizens contends, even if there was an
otherwise covered accidental discharge or overflow of water, the existence
of a concurring cause precluded coverage under the policy’s anti-concurrent
cause provision.
As this Court has previously explained, “‘when independent perils
converge and no single cause can be considered the sole or proximate
cause, it is appropriate to apply the concurring cause doctrine.’ However,
when the insurer explicitly avoids the application of the concurring-cause
doctrine with an anti-concurrent cause provision, the plain language of the
policy precludes recovery.” Sec. First Ins. Co. v. Czelusniak, 305 So. 3d 717,
718 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting Sebo v. Am. Home Assurance Co., Inc.,
208 So. 3d 694, 697 (Fla. 2016)).
It is undisputed that the policy contained an anti-concurrent cause
provision. In Czelusniak, the insured’s policy also had such a provision and
because the “undisputed evidence” at trial established that the “the loss was
caused by a combination of both excluded and covered perils,” and the jury
could not “legally or factually separate the damage caused by water coming
through the door from water coming through the walls and windows,” this
court held that the trial court should have directed a verdict in the insurer’s
favor. Id. at 719.
5 Citizens asserts that the same is true in this case: there was evidence
at trial that even if there was an accidental loss arguably covered under the
policy, there was also evidence that water leakage had been taking place for
months, and that loss by “constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water.
. . over a period of time” is excluded even if it occurs concurrently with a
cause that is not excluded under the policy. Citizens contends that, due to
the anti-concurrent loss provision, the trial court should have directed a
verdict in favor of Citizens.
Blanco asserts that the undisputed evidence at trial was that the loss
was caused only by the sudden, accidental loss, with its own unique
damages, and that there was no concurrent cause. On appeal, Blanco also
contends that we cannot reverse the court’s denial of Citizens’ directed
verdict motion because Citizens failed to provide the full trial transcript, and
thus, cannot show that this loss was not solely attributable to or caused by a
sudden accidental event on November 16, 2015. In response, Citizens
asserts that we have as much of the record as is needed to establish that
the property suffered a loss that was the result—at least in part—of an
excluded cause (constant repeated seepage or leakage of water over a
period of time) and that reversal of the order denying the directed verdict
6 (and motion for judgment in accordance with its directed verdict motion) is
warranted.
The primary dispute at trial was whether the damage to Blanco’s home
was caused solely by the November 16th water event (resulting in what
Blanco deemed a “flood” of water in her home) or whether it was caused, at
least in part, by constant or repeated water seepage or leakage (which loss
is excluded under the policy, even if it occurred in combination with a cause
covered by the policy).
We hold that the record provided is inadequate for this court to
conclude that the trial court erred in denying a motion for directed verdict
(and subsequent motion for judgment in accordance with its directed verdict
motion) on this issue. Of significance (for example), the record on appeal
contains only a portion of Blanco’s direct testimony at trial. In light of our
standard of review—which requires an appellate court to “evaluate the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing every
reasonable inference flowing from the evidence in the nonmoving party’s
favor,” Hernandez, 400 So. 3d at 747, we must affirm the trial court’s denial
of the motion for directed verdict “if there is conflicting evidence or if different
reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, [because] the issue
is factual and should be submitted to the jury for resolution.” Guyton, 388
7 So. 3d at 52. We find no merit in the remaining issues raised on appeal by
Citizens.
Affirmed.