Stacy, C. J.
Fe have here a second contest involving provisions of the will of M. J. Corl, late of Cabarrus County. For first controversy, see
Corl v. Corl,
209 N. C., 7, 182 S. E., 725.
The question presently presented is whether the interest of Olive Rogers Corl in the trust estate has been cut short by the happening of events which brings into play other and later provisions of the will. The trial court answered in the affirmative. We are inclined to a different view.
The testator evidently wished his agreement with Olive Rogers Corl to be carried out according to its terms. He had enjoyed the satisfaction and peace of mind which it afforded during his lifetime, and had faithfully performed his engagements thereunder until his death. Notwithstanding the provision in the contract that it should be binding on “his heirs, executors, or administrators,” he "did not leave it as an open charge against his estate. Provision was made in his will for its observance as the first claim against the income from the trust created “for his (son’s) support and for the support of his family,” after payment of current expenses incident to the maintenance of the property.
The situation calls to mind a case within the experience of the writer, which is not reported, as it was concluded in the trial court: A father had become guaranty for his son’s debts in order to relieve the immediate demands of pressing creditors. Later it was discovered that the son’s liabilities were much larger than originally thought. The father was unable to meet the increased demands. Suit was brought to recover on the guaranty contract. When the father was being examined by his counsel, he was asked whether there had been any overreaching or misrepresentation in the creditors’ meeting at the time he signed the agreement. His reply was: “I see where you are driving, but let me say this: When I signed that contract I intended to stand by my boy, and I am standing by him yet.” Thus the father lost his fortune, but he saved something more important.
So here, M. J. Corl, speaking through his will, says to the court: “Regardless of the enforceability of the contract of 5 December, 1922, when I signed that agreement I intended to stand by my boy and daughter-in-law, and I am standing by them yet.” He evidently remembered that performance is the fulfillment of every promise.
True, in the third clause of Item Eight it is provided that upon the happening of a double contingency, which has occurred, “all profits, incomes and proceeds,” together with the
corpus
of the trust estate, shall go to the legitimate children of J. Banks Corl, as they may attain their majority, but the testator was here making ultimate disposition of the property after the other provisions contained in this Item had been met. The primary object of the trust was to provide for his son’s support “and for the support of his family.” The testator regarded his son’s first wife as a member of his family.
When originally drawn it was not contemplated that any conflict would arise between the second and third clauses in Item Eight of the will. Subsequent events seemingly have caused them to clash in letter, if not in spirit. Hence, the present request for interpretation and guidance in the administration of the trust. G. S., 1-255.
It is a cardinal principle in the interpretation of wills that inconsistencies are to be reconciled, if reasonably accomplishable, so as to give effect to each in accordance with the general purpose of the will.
Holland v. Smith,
224 N. C., 255, 29 S. E. (2d), 888. “Every part of a will is to be considered in its construction, and no words ought to be rejected if any meaning can possibly be put upon them. Every string should give its sound.”
Edens v. Williams,
7 N. C., 31.
The intention of the testator is his will. This intention is to be gathered from the general purpose of the will and the significance of the expressions, enlarged or restricted according to their real intent. In interpreting a will, the courts are not confined to the literal meaning of the words. A thing within the intention is regarded within the will though not within the letter. A thing within the letter is not within the will if not also within the intention.
Trust Co. v. Miller,
223 N. C., 1, 25 S. E. (2d), 171;
Williams v. Rand,
223 N. C., 734, 28 S. E. (2d), 247;
Heyer v. Bulluck,
210 N. C., 321, 186 S. E., 356;
Carroll v. Herring,
180 N. C., 369, 104 S. E., 892;
Herring v. Williams,
153 N. C., 231, 69 S. E., 140.
There can be no debate as to the
corpus
of the trust estate. It is to be held for the life of J. Banks Corl, with remainder to his legitimate children in fee. The problem here presented concerns itself with the disposition of the income and the duration of the trust. By the provisions of the third clause in Item Eight “the remainder of the net income” is to be paid to J. Banks Oorl during his natural life; and upon his death, which occurred 22 August, 1942, “the net income” is to be paid to Maude Smith Corl until she remarries, which she did on 18 October, 1943, then “all profits, incomes and proceeds” are to be paid to the legitimate children of J. Banks Corl until they attain the age of twenty-one years, when the trust is to be terminated.
It is the contention of the testator’s grandchildren that upon the remarriage of their mother a repugnancy resulted between the second and third clauses in Item Eight of their grandfather’s will, and that the latter provision must therefor prevail in accordance with the general rule of construction.
Ledbetter v. Culberson,
184 N. C., 488, 114 S. E., 753;
Haywood v. Trust Co.,
149 N. C., 208, 62 S. E., 915. Compare
McGuire v. Evans,
40 N. C., 269, and
Field v. Eaton,
16 N. C., 283. It is conceded that to produce this effect, however, the two clauses must be wholly inconsistent and incapable of reconciliation.
Taylor v. Brown,
165 N. C., 157, 81 S. E., 137;
Baird v. Baird,
42 N. C., 269. The rule is, that “the intent as embodied in the entire instrument must prevail, and each and every part must be given effect if it can be done by fair and reasonable intendment before one clause may be construed as repugnant to or irreconcilable with another.”
Smith v. Lumber Co.,
155
N. C., 389, 71 S. E., 445;
Davis v. Frazier,
150 N. C., 447, 64 S. E., 200.
In
short,
the
object of all interpretation is
to arrive at the
intent and purpose expressed in the writing, looking at the instrument from its four corners, and to effectuate this intent and purpose unless at variance with some rule of law or contrary to public policy.
Krites v. Plott,
222 N. C., 679, 24 S. E. (2d), 531.
We think the provisions of the instant will are adjustable to the various wishes of the testator when considered in the light of the situation as it appeared to him.
Holt v. Holt,
114 N. C., 241, 18 S. E., 967.
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Stacy, C. J.
Fe have here a second contest involving provisions of the will of M. J. Corl, late of Cabarrus County. For first controversy, see
Corl v. Corl,
209 N. C., 7, 182 S. E., 725.
The question presently presented is whether the interest of Olive Rogers Corl in the trust estate has been cut short by the happening of events which brings into play other and later provisions of the will. The trial court answered in the affirmative. We are inclined to a different view.
The testator evidently wished his agreement with Olive Rogers Corl to be carried out according to its terms. He had enjoyed the satisfaction and peace of mind which it afforded during his lifetime, and had faithfully performed his engagements thereunder until his death. Notwithstanding the provision in the contract that it should be binding on “his heirs, executors, or administrators,” he "did not leave it as an open charge against his estate. Provision was made in his will for its observance as the first claim against the income from the trust created “for his (son’s) support and for the support of his family,” after payment of current expenses incident to the maintenance of the property.
The situation calls to mind a case within the experience of the writer, which is not reported, as it was concluded in the trial court: A father had become guaranty for his son’s debts in order to relieve the immediate demands of pressing creditors. Later it was discovered that the son’s liabilities were much larger than originally thought. The father was unable to meet the increased demands. Suit was brought to recover on the guaranty contract. When the father was being examined by his counsel, he was asked whether there had been any overreaching or misrepresentation in the creditors’ meeting at the time he signed the agreement. His reply was: “I see where you are driving, but let me say this: When I signed that contract I intended to stand by my boy, and I am standing by him yet.” Thus the father lost his fortune, but he saved something more important.
So here, M. J. Corl, speaking through his will, says to the court: “Regardless of the enforceability of the contract of 5 December, 1922, when I signed that agreement I intended to stand by my boy and daughter-in-law, and I am standing by them yet.” He evidently remembered that performance is the fulfillment of every promise.
True, in the third clause of Item Eight it is provided that upon the happening of a double contingency, which has occurred, “all profits, incomes and proceeds,” together with the
corpus
of the trust estate, shall go to the legitimate children of J. Banks Corl, as they may attain their majority, but the testator was here making ultimate disposition of the property after the other provisions contained in this Item had been met. The primary object of the trust was to provide for his son’s support “and for the support of his family.” The testator regarded his son’s first wife as a member of his family.
When originally drawn it was not contemplated that any conflict would arise between the second and third clauses in Item Eight of the will. Subsequent events seemingly have caused them to clash in letter, if not in spirit. Hence, the present request for interpretation and guidance in the administration of the trust. G. S., 1-255.
It is a cardinal principle in the interpretation of wills that inconsistencies are to be reconciled, if reasonably accomplishable, so as to give effect to each in accordance with the general purpose of the will.
Holland v. Smith,
224 N. C., 255, 29 S. E. (2d), 888. “Every part of a will is to be considered in its construction, and no words ought to be rejected if any meaning can possibly be put upon them. Every string should give its sound.”
Edens v. Williams,
7 N. C., 31.
The intention of the testator is his will. This intention is to be gathered from the general purpose of the will and the significance of the expressions, enlarged or restricted according to their real intent. In interpreting a will, the courts are not confined to the literal meaning of the words. A thing within the intention is regarded within the will though not within the letter. A thing within the letter is not within the will if not also within the intention.
Trust Co. v. Miller,
223 N. C., 1, 25 S. E. (2d), 171;
Williams v. Rand,
223 N. C., 734, 28 S. E. (2d), 247;
Heyer v. Bulluck,
210 N. C., 321, 186 S. E., 356;
Carroll v. Herring,
180 N. C., 369, 104 S. E., 892;
Herring v. Williams,
153 N. C., 231, 69 S. E., 140.
There can be no debate as to the
corpus
of the trust estate. It is to be held for the life of J. Banks Corl, with remainder to his legitimate children in fee. The problem here presented concerns itself with the disposition of the income and the duration of the trust. By the provisions of the third clause in Item Eight “the remainder of the net income” is to be paid to J. Banks Oorl during his natural life; and upon his death, which occurred 22 August, 1942, “the net income” is to be paid to Maude Smith Corl until she remarries, which she did on 18 October, 1943, then “all profits, incomes and proceeds” are to be paid to the legitimate children of J. Banks Corl until they attain the age of twenty-one years, when the trust is to be terminated.
It is the contention of the testator’s grandchildren that upon the remarriage of their mother a repugnancy resulted between the second and third clauses in Item Eight of their grandfather’s will, and that the latter provision must therefor prevail in accordance with the general rule of construction.
Ledbetter v. Culberson,
184 N. C., 488, 114 S. E., 753;
Haywood v. Trust Co.,
149 N. C., 208, 62 S. E., 915. Compare
McGuire v. Evans,
40 N. C., 269, and
Field v. Eaton,
16 N. C., 283. It is conceded that to produce this effect, however, the two clauses must be wholly inconsistent and incapable of reconciliation.
Taylor v. Brown,
165 N. C., 157, 81 S. E., 137;
Baird v. Baird,
42 N. C., 269. The rule is, that “the intent as embodied in the entire instrument must prevail, and each and every part must be given effect if it can be done by fair and reasonable intendment before one clause may be construed as repugnant to or irreconcilable with another.”
Smith v. Lumber Co.,
155
N. C., 389, 71 S. E., 445;
Davis v. Frazier,
150 N. C., 447, 64 S. E., 200.
In
short,
the
object of all interpretation is
to arrive at the
intent and purpose expressed in the writing, looking at the instrument from its four corners, and to effectuate this intent and purpose unless at variance with some rule of law or contrary to public policy.
Krites v. Plott,
222 N. C., 679, 24 S. E. (2d), 531.
We think the provisions of the instant will are adjustable to the various wishes of the testator when considered in the light of the situation as it appeared to him.
Holt v. Holt,
114 N. C., 241, 18 S. E., 967. If the phrase “all profits, incomes and proceeds” be construed contextually and compared with the expressions, “the remainder of the net income” and “the net income,” with which it stands connected, in accordance with the rule of
noscitur a sociis,
the apparent conflict between the second and third clauses of Item Eight of the will may be obviated during the existence of the trust. Indeed, the word “profits” usually signifies the gain realized from a business or investment over and above expenditures.
Samet v. Klaff,
181 N. C., 502, 107 S. E., 2. All current expenses needed to care for the trust property would
ex necessitate
take precedence over disbursements to the ultimate beneficiaries, and it would seem that the payments called for in clause “2nd” were likewise intended to take precedence over disbursements to the ultimate beneficiaries. They are even preferred over payments to J. Banks Corl and his second wife. Also accordant with this construction are the two judgments of the Superior Court of Cabarrus County awarding Olive Rogers Corl recovery for her monthly allowance.
On the other hand, it may be conceded the testator did not foresee that his son’s second wife would survive him and remarry, while his first wife continued unmarried. Even so, the trust was created for the benefit of all who come within its terms, with none excluded except in the event of remarriage on the part- of the first wife or the widow.
Williams v. Thacher,
186 Mass., 293, 71 N. E., 567;
Odescalchi v. Martin,
96 Col., 156, 40 P. (2d), 241;
Dunn v. Hines,
164 N. C., 113, 80 S. E., 410;
Heyer v. Bulluck, supra.
It follows, therefore, as a necessary conclusion from the foregoing interpretation, that the interest of Olive Rogers Corl in the trust estate still subsists. Judgment accordingly.
The allowances made in the declaratory judgment will await further orders of the Superior Court.
Error and remanded.