Citizens & Marine Bank v. Southern Railway Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Citizens & Marine Bank v. Southern Railway Co.

69 S.E. 261, 153 N.C. 346, 1910 N.C. LEXIS 84

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedNovember 10, 1910

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 69 S.E. 261 (Citizens & Marine Bank v. Southern Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Citizens & Marine Bank v. Southern Railway Co., 69 S.E. 261, 153 N.C. 346, 1910 N.C. LEXIS 84 (N.C. 1910).

Pincite

Opinion

Walker, J.,

after stating tbe case. Tbe jury have found that the plaintiff is tbe bolder for value and tbe owner of the draft and bill of lading, and we do not see why it is necessary that it should be a bolder in due course, as contended by counsel, to entitle it to recover damages for injury to tbe corn caused by tbe negligence of the defendant. Hutchinson on Carriers (3 Ed.), secs. 197, 198 and 1320; Hale on Bailments and Carriers, secs. 123, 124. Tbe carrier asserted no equity or other bind of defense against tbe brokerage company which required that the plaintiff should be a bolder in due course in order to be protected against it, nor can tbe fact that plaintiff took a note from tbe brokerage company for tbe amount of its indebtedness, and retained tbe draft and bill of lading as collateral, affect its right to recover, as it is still tbe owner for value of both papers, having acquired title thereto by virtue of its purchase and tbe endorsement to it. Tyson v. Joyner, 139 N. C., 69; Bank v. Drug Company, 152 N. C., 142; Thompson v. Osborne, ibid, 408. In *350 Young v. R. R., 80 Ala., 100, it was Held that where a vendor and shipper of goods takes the bill of lading in his own name or it is drawn to his order, he thereby retains the title in himself, and the carrier cannot rightfully deliver the goods to any other person, except on his order or by transfer of the bill of lading. In this case it appears that the title and property in the corn could not pass to the roller mills until the draft was paid and the bill of lading surrendered, and the draft has not been paid.

The decisive question in the case is whether the railway company had relieved itself of liability as carrier by giving due notice of the arrival of the goods. "We held in Poythress v. R. R., 148 N. C., 391, that the liability of a common carrier continues until notice of the arrival of the goods at their destination is given and a reasonable time to remove them has elapsed, and that when the carrier has complied with its duty in this respect, its liability thereafter is that of a warehouseman. The notice, as we further held in that case,- need not be served personally in order to relieve the railway company of liability as carrier, but it must be in writing and delivered personally or by leaving it at the place of business of the party entitled to the notice, or by depositing it in the post-office, as required by the rule of the Corporation Commission. The subject is ably and exhaustively discussed by Justice Brown in the case just cited, with a full citation of the authorities, and no elaboration of the matter is now required. There was evidence in this ease that the defendant’s agent had deposited a postal card, or what is sometimes called an “advice-note,” in the post-office, informing the roller mills of the arrival of the corn, and there was also evidence to the contrary, and some to the effect that after the goods had, in fact, arrived, an agent of the roller mills telephoned to the defendant’s office in Durham and inquired about the corn and was informed that it had not arrived. Some time afterwards the goods were found by mere chance in a closed car of the defendant by an agent of the roller mills, on a side track, in a damaged condition and unfit for use. The question as to the defendant’s negligence was fairly submitted to the jury by the court, upon the conflicting evidence and under proper in *351 structions. It was largely a question of fact wbieb the jury have decided against the carrier.

It is not necessary that we should consider whether the defendant is liable as warehouseman, under the facts and circumstances of this case, if it had discharged its duty as carrier or its liability as such had been converted into tha.t of a warehouseman.

We have examined the other exceptions and find no reversible error in the rulings to which they were taken.

No error.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Walker, J.,

after stating tbe case. Tbe jury have found that the plaintiff is tbe bolder for value and tbe owner of the draft and bill of lading, and we do not see why it is necessary that it should be a bolder in due course, as contended by counsel, to entitle it to recover damages for injury to tbe corn caused by tbe negligence of the defendant. Hutchinson on Carriers (3 Ed.), secs. 197, 198 and 1320; Hale on Bailments and Carriers, secs. 123, 124. Tbe carrier asserted no equity or other bind of defense against tbe brokerage company which required that the plaintiff should be a bolder in due course in order to be protected against it, nor can tbe fact that plaintiff took a note from tbe brokerage company for tbe amount of its indebtedness, and retained tbe draft and bill of lading as collateral, affect its right to recover, as it is still tbe owner for value of both papers, having acquired title thereto by virtue of its purchase and tbe endorsement to it. Tyson v. Joyner, 139 N. C., 69; Bank v. Drug Company, 152 N. C., 142; Thompson v. Osborne, ibid, 408. In *350 Young v. R. R., 80 Ala., 100, it was Held that where a vendor and shipper of goods takes the bill of lading in his own name or it is drawn to his order, he thereby retains the title in himself, and the carrier cannot rightfully deliver the goods to any other person, except on his order or by transfer of the bill of lading. In this case it appears that the title and property in the corn could not pass to the roller mills until the draft was paid and the bill of lading surrendered, and the draft has not been paid.

The decisive question in the case is whether the railway company had relieved itself of liability as carrier by giving due notice of the arrival of the goods. "We held in Poythress v. R. R., 148 N. C., 391, that the liability of a common carrier continues until notice of the arrival of the goods at their destination is given and a reasonable time to remove them has elapsed, and that when the carrier has complied with its duty in this respect, its liability thereafter is that of a warehouseman. The notice, as we further held in that case,- need not be served personally in order to relieve the railway company of liability as carrier, but it must be in writing and delivered personally or by leaving it at the place of business of the party entitled to the notice, or by depositing it in the post-office, as required by the rule of the Corporation Commission. The subject is ably and exhaustively discussed by Justice Brown in the case just cited, with a full citation of the authorities, and no elaboration of the matter is now required. There was evidence in this ease that the defendant’s agent had deposited a postal card, or what is sometimes called an “advice-note,” in the post-office, informing the roller mills of the arrival of the corn, and there was also evidence to the contrary, and some to the effect that after the goods had, in fact, arrived, an agent of the roller mills telephoned to the defendant’s office in Durham and inquired about the corn and was informed that it had not arrived. Some time afterwards the goods were found by mere chance in a closed car of the defendant by an agent of the roller mills, on a side track, in a damaged condition and unfit for use. The question as to the defendant’s negligence was fairly submitted to the jury by the court, upon the conflicting evidence and under proper in *351 structions. It was largely a question of fact wbieb the jury have decided against the carrier.

It is not necessary that we should consider whether the defendant is liable as warehouseman, under the facts and circumstances of this case, if it had discharged its duty as carrier or its liability as such had been converted into tha.t of a warehouseman.

We have examined the other exceptions and find no reversible error in the rulings to which they were taken.

No error.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

69 S.E. 261, 153 N.C. 346, 1910 N.C. LEXIS 84, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/citizens-marine-bank-v-southern-railway-co-nc-1910.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack