Citizens for Equity v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Citizens for Equity v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

599 A.2d 507, 126 N.J. 391, 1991 N.J. LEXIS 823

CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey

DecidedNovember 19, 1991

StatusPublished

Cited by24 cases

This text of 599 A.2d 507 (Citizens for Equity v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Citizens for Equity v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 599 A.2d 507, 126 N.J. 391, 1991 N.J. LEXIS 823 (N.J. 1991).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons set forth in the majority opinion below. 252 N.J.Super. 62, 599 A.2d 516 (1990). We add these observations to address two of appellants’ contentions: (1) that the revised regulations^adopted by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) are unauthorized, arbitrary, and unfair, and (2) that the regulations cannot be applied to claims filed prior to their adoption because DEP failed to *394 disclose that it had stopped processing claims while it considered revising the regulations.

It is undisputed that approximately 180 claimants, whose property was in the vicinity of the Gloucester Environmental Management Services (GEMS) landfill, have already received compensation for diminution in real property value pursuant to DEP’s original regulations. Appellants observe that the new regulations, which require claimants to attempt to sell their homes as a prerequisite to compensation, are significantly more restrictive than the regulations originally promulgated, and are unfair to those property owners whose claims will be processed under the revised regulations. Appellants correctly assert that inevitable unfairness arises when a governmental agency applies standards to certain claimants that are more restrictive than standards it had previously applied to similarly-situated claimants. Acknowledging that unfairness, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency action is nevertheless authorized, reasonable, and supported by sufficient evidence. A.A. Mastrangelo, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 90 N.J. 666, 687, 449 A.2d 516 (1982); New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 562-64, 384 A.2d 795 (1978).

The enabling legislation, the Sanitary Landfill Facility Closure and Contingency Fund Act, N.J.S.A. 13:1E-100 to -116 (the Act), strongly supports the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the revised regulations are authorized. Moreover, our reading of the Act suggests that DEP’s initial regulations regarding reimbursement for loss of property value may have been too permissive. Thus, the issues raised by this case implicate the power of a governmental agency to change regulations that are unsound.

The Act’s purpose is to provide compensation for damages from the operation and closure of landfills. The Act taxes owners and operators of sanitary landfills and directs the revenue into a contingency fund administered by DEP. *395 N.J.S.A. 13:1E-104 to -105. The contingency fund is strictly liable “for all direct and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained, proximately resulting from the operations or closure of any sanitary landfill.” N.J.S.A. 13:1E-106.

Compensable damages under the Act include but are not limited to

(1) The cost of restoring, repairing or replacing any real or personal property damaged or destroyed;

(2) The cost of restoration and replacement, where possible, of any natural resource damaged or destroyed, including any potable water supply;

(3) The cost of any personal injuries, including medical expenses incurred and income lost as a result thereof; and

(4) The costs of the design, construction, installation, operation and maintenance of any device or action deemed necessary by the department to clean up, remedy, mitigate, monitor or analyze any threat to the public health, safety or welfare of the citizens of the State, including the installation and maintenance of methane gas monitors and vents and leachate monitoring wells and collection systems, and the sampling and analysis of any public or private potable water supply. [N.J.S.A. 13:1E-106.]

Thus, the Legislature specifically designated as compensable the costs incurred from specific damage to property or natural resources, personal injuries, or the need to monitor or remediate damages created by the landfill. Although diminution of real-property value is qualitatively different from the kinds of damages enumerated by the Legislature, DEP's initial regulations specifically authorized compensation therefor by defining damages to include

(1) The cost of restoring, repairing or replacing any real or personal property damaged or destroyed, and the diminution in fair market value of any real property. [N.J.A.C. 7:1T-1.5 (emphasis added).]

Those regulations also required that claimants “produce substantial evidence” of damage. N.J.A.C. 7:1I-1.7(a).

As evidenced by the certification of the administrator of the Sanitary Landfill Contingency Fund (Fund), approximately eighty percent of all claims filed against the Fund through September 30, 1988, were filed by persons owning property in the vicinity of the GEMS landfill. DEP asserts that of the approximately $5.1 million in claims paid by the Fund as of that date, it awarded about $4.8 million to claimants alleging diminu *396 tion of property value based on proximity of their homes to the GEMS landfill. That experience, combined with the Fund’s potential statewide liability for damages attributable to diminution of property value because of proximity to GEMS and other landfills, prompted DEP to consider revising its regulations. The administrator observed:

Since the potential liability of the Fund is so enormous, we wanted to make sure that the Fund was administered equitably to ensure the continued availability of monies for people who could satisfy the requirements for compensation. In attempting to address these adverse effects, it was decided that the regulations should be revised. One of the changes was to require that a claimant make a good faith attempt to sell his property. It did not appear that to require sales would depress the local real estate market and escalate damages paid by the Fund. Moreover, we felt the sales requirement, which became N.J.A.C. 7:11-3.3, would be a reasonable way to provide us with additional evidence of actual damage caused by landfill operations and provide the information needed to continuously monitor the claims process.

The requirement that a property owner attempt to sell his or her home as a condition of compensation represents an attempt to verify that diminution of value attributable to the landfill has occurred. We have no doubt that DEP’s delegated authority under the Act authorizes such a requirement, particularly in view of the Legislature’s apparent intention to sanction compensation for specific and discernible damages. We also concur in the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the sale requirement in the revised regulations is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, considering DEP’s experience with its original regulations.

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PER CURIAM.

We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons set forth in the majority opinion below. 252 N.J.Super. 62, 599 A.2d 516 (1990). We add these observations to address two of appellants’ contentions: (1) that the revised regulations^adopted by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) are unauthorized, arbitrary, and unfair, and (2) that the regulations cannot be applied to claims filed prior to their adoption because DEP failed to *394 disclose that it had stopped processing claims while it considered revising the regulations.

It is undisputed that approximately 180 claimants, whose property was in the vicinity of the Gloucester Environmental Management Services (GEMS) landfill, have already received compensation for diminution in real property value pursuant to DEP’s original regulations. Appellants observe that the new regulations, which require claimants to attempt to sell their homes as a prerequisite to compensation, are significantly more restrictive than the regulations originally promulgated, and are unfair to those property owners whose claims will be processed under the revised regulations. Appellants correctly assert that inevitable unfairness arises when a governmental agency applies standards to certain claimants that are more restrictive than standards it had previously applied to similarly-situated claimants. Acknowledging that unfairness, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency action is nevertheless authorized, reasonable, and supported by sufficient evidence. A.A. Mastrangelo, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 90 N.J. 666, 687, 449 A.2d 516 (1982); New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 562-64, 384 A.2d 795 (1978).

The enabling legislation, the Sanitary Landfill Facility Closure and Contingency Fund Act, N.J.S.A. 13:1E-100 to -116 (the Act), strongly supports the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the revised regulations are authorized. Moreover, our reading of the Act suggests that DEP’s initial regulations regarding reimbursement for loss of property value may have been too permissive. Thus, the issues raised by this case implicate the power of a governmental agency to change regulations that are unsound.

The Act’s purpose is to provide compensation for damages from the operation and closure of landfills. The Act taxes owners and operators of sanitary landfills and directs the revenue into a contingency fund administered by DEP. *395 N.J.S.A. 13:1E-104 to -105. The contingency fund is strictly liable “for all direct and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained, proximately resulting from the operations or closure of any sanitary landfill.” N.J.S.A. 13:1E-106.

Compensable damages under the Act include but are not limited to

(1) The cost of restoring, repairing or replacing any real or personal property damaged or destroyed;

(2) The cost of restoration and replacement, where possible, of any natural resource damaged or destroyed, including any potable water supply;

(3) The cost of any personal injuries, including medical expenses incurred and income lost as a result thereof; and

(4) The costs of the design, construction, installation, operation and maintenance of any device or action deemed necessary by the department to clean up, remedy, mitigate, monitor or analyze any threat to the public health, safety or welfare of the citizens of the State, including the installation and maintenance of methane gas monitors and vents and leachate monitoring wells and collection systems, and the sampling and analysis of any public or private potable water supply. [N.J.S.A. 13:1E-106.]

Thus, the Legislature specifically designated as compensable the costs incurred from specific damage to property or natural resources, personal injuries, or the need to monitor or remediate damages created by the landfill. Although diminution of real-property value is qualitatively different from the kinds of damages enumerated by the Legislature, DEP's initial regulations specifically authorized compensation therefor by defining damages to include

(1) The cost of restoring, repairing or replacing any real or personal property damaged or destroyed, and the diminution in fair market value of any real property. [N.J.A.C. 7:1T-1.5 (emphasis added).]

Those regulations also required that claimants “produce substantial evidence” of damage. N.J.A.C. 7:1I-1.7(a).

As evidenced by the certification of the administrator of the Sanitary Landfill Contingency Fund (Fund), approximately eighty percent of all claims filed against the Fund through September 30, 1988, were filed by persons owning property in the vicinity of the GEMS landfill. DEP asserts that of the approximately $5.1 million in claims paid by the Fund as of that date, it awarded about $4.8 million to claimants alleging diminu *396 tion of property value based on proximity of their homes to the GEMS landfill. That experience, combined with the Fund’s potential statewide liability for damages attributable to diminution of property value because of proximity to GEMS and other landfills, prompted DEP to consider revising its regulations. The administrator observed:

Since the potential liability of the Fund is so enormous, we wanted to make sure that the Fund was administered equitably to ensure the continued availability of monies for people who could satisfy the requirements for compensation. In attempting to address these adverse effects, it was decided that the regulations should be revised. One of the changes was to require that a claimant make a good faith attempt to sell his property. It did not appear that to require sales would depress the local real estate market and escalate damages paid by the Fund. Moreover, we felt the sales requirement, which became N.J.A.C. 7:11-3.3, would be a reasonable way to provide us with additional evidence of actual damage caused by landfill operations and provide the information needed to continuously monitor the claims process.

The requirement that a property owner attempt to sell his or her home as a condition of compensation represents an attempt to verify that diminution of value attributable to the landfill has occurred. We have no doubt that DEP’s delegated authority under the Act authorizes such a requirement, particularly in view of the Legislature’s apparent intention to sanction compensation for specific and discernible damages. We also concur in the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the sale requirement in the revised regulations is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, considering DEP’s experience with its original regulations. Government has a duty to correct itself, and courts should not stand in the way when a governmental agency, acting in the public interest, attempts to improve its procedures.

We also agree with the Appellate Division’s determination, 262 N.J.Super. at 77-79, 599 A.2d at 525-526 that the DEP’s informal suspension of claims processing pending adoption of new regulations was an intra-agency statement, see N.J.S.A. 52:14B-2(e), and accordingly exempt from the “notice and hearing” requirements, see N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4, of the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15. In analo *397 gous circumstances, several federal courts have concluded that an agency’s decision to suspend the processing of applications pending adoption of revised regulations does not require compliance with the “notice and hearing” requirements of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-59 (1991). See Kessler v. F.C.C., 326 F.2d 673, 682 (D.C.Cir.1963); Waste Management Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 669 F.Supp. 536, 539-40 (D.D.C.1987).

Although we agree with the Appellate Division that the law did not require public notice or hearing before DEP could suspend the processing of claims for compensation under the Act, neither did the law prohibit the agency from disclosing to claimants what it was doing. The due-process standards incorporated in the New Jersey Administrative Procedure Act provide a minimum standard for agency conduct, but do not preclude an agency from acting fairly and candidly in respect of those whose interests may be affected by agency action. In other contexts we have noted that “government has an overriding obligation to deal forthrightly and fairly with property owners,” F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 426, 495 A.2d 1313 (1985), and have insisted that “government must ‘turn square corners’ rather than exploit litigational or bargaining advantages * * *.” W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp., 116 N.J. 543, 561, 562 A.2d 222 (1989) (quoting F.M.C. Stores Co., supra, 100 N.J. at 426, 495 A.2d 1313).

Federal courts have recognized “that many merely internal agency practices affect parties outside the agency — often in significant ways.” Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C.Cir.1980). Moreover, the federal Administrative Procedure Act mandates that an agency publish in the Federal Register “statements of the general course and method by which its functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures *398 available.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(B). Thus, a federal agency that adopts a “freeze order” suspending the processing of applications or permits ordinarily is required to notify the public. See Kessler, supra, 326 F.2d at 682. The policy objective of enhancing public awareness advanced by the federal law is compelling.

We are persuaded that in these circumstances DEP, irrespective of its statutory exemption, should have notified all claimants that the processing of claims was being temporarily suspended while the agency considered the adoption of the new regulations. Affording claimants such notice is a matter of fairness. Instead, the record suggests that some DEP personnel did not respond forthrightly to inquiries about pending claims until DEP was prepared to publish the revised regulations. The statutory exemption from the requirement of public notice and hearing does not relieve DEP of its duty of candor to the public.

Claimants insist that DEP’s failure to be forthright about its decision to stop processing claims while it considered revising the original regulations should estop DEP from applying the new regulations to the pending claims. Our view of the record is that the absence of notice caused no substantial prejudice to claimants other than to delay their awareness that their claims would be governed by new rules. Moreover, in adopting revised regulations, DEP intended to apply them to claims previously filed but not processed. The absence of substantial prejudice to claimants and the likelihood that an estoppel against DEP would interfere with an otherwise valid and significant governmental objective impel our adherence to the general rule that “[ejquitable estoppel is rarely invoked against a governmental entity * * *.” O’Malley v. Department of Energy, 109 N.J. 309, 316, 537 A.2d 647 (1987); Cipriano v. Department of Civil Serv., 151 N.J.Super. 86, 91, 376 A.2d 571 (App.Div.1977). We are fully in agreement with the Appellate Division’s conclusion, 252 N.J.Super. at 79, 80, *399 599 A. 2d at 526, 527, that DEP should not be estopped from applying the revised regulations to pending claims.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.

For reversal — None.

APPENDIX

STEVEN L. AND ANNE ACKERMAN

JOHN AND MARIA ALEXANDER

PAUL M. ALEXANDER

ROBERT F. AND DIANNE K. ANDREOTTA

DENNIS E. AND PATRICIA A. APICE

MARY ANN ASTORE

FRANK A. AVERSA

ERNEST H. AND DOROTHY H. BAALS

DOUGLAS J. AND LAURIE J. BAILEY

ARTHUR A. AND KIMBERLY M. BARILOTTI

JOSEPH W. JR. AND JANE M. BARTH

ERNEST J. AND RAYLENE BASILE

DONATO AND HARRY BASS

JOSEPH AND KATHLEEN BAYBA

RONALD D. BERGMAN

JOSEPH AND MARIA BISIRRI

DAVID L. AND PATRICIA A. BLANCHARD

CHARLES JR. AND RUTH ANN BOEHMER

MARGARET BOEHMER

DENISE BONGIORNO

GEORGE T. BOVA

*400 W.R. AND MARIANNE R. BRITTON

JOHN E. SR. AND GAIL L. BROOME

FRANK R. AND ELAINE H. BUCKMAN

BRIAN AND CATHY BURNS

HUBERT E. CAMP, DDS, PA

LESLIE AND LEE ANNE CAPELLA

PAUL AND LINDA CARDAMONE

CHARLES J. CARR AND MARIE A. ROWSON

GEORGE AND ANNA CARR

FRANK AND MARYBETH CHASLONG

THEODORE M. AND FRANCES CIANFRANI

GERALD AND PATRICIA CLARK

WARREN A. JR. AND QUEN S. COLEMAN

DAVID G. AND LYNN G. CONNOLLY

JAMES AND CAROLE CONNOR

SHARON A. AND MICHAEL W. CONTE

ADELAIDE F. COOK (FILED UNDER RUTH CAMPANA,

DECEASED)

ROBERT H. AND HELEN COOK'

RICHARD A. AND PATRICIA A. CORATOLO

PATRICIA AND PAUL COSSABOON

JOHN J. AND JEANETTE M. COTTONE

WILLIAM L. AND CHRISTINE CRAWFORD

THOMAS AND JOANNE CRESONG

DONNA CROCE

ROBERT C. AND DEBORAH A. CURREY

JOHN F. AND KAREN J. CUSACK

RICHARD W. AND CAROLE E. DAHL

ELIZABETH F. DAVENPORT

*401 DEBRA A. DAVIS

WILLIAM AND ANNA DAVIS

JOSEPH B. AND SANDRA F. DEA

EDWARD M. AND MARGARET M. DELLORCO

SAMUEL A. JR. AND EDITH C. DeMAIO

ROBERT J. AND ROCCHINA E. DESMARTES

DIANE AND JOHN G. DiFILLIPO

ANTHONY AND MARGENE DiLALLO

JOANNE AND “TONY” DiMAURO

RICHARD AND THELMA DONLEY

PHILLIP R. AND LINDA S. DORN

LAURENCE J. AND ANDREA L. DOUGHERTY

ROBERT E. AND HELEN DOUGHERTY

LORRAINE L. AND THOMAS DOWNEY

JAMES AND CATHERINE DURNING

HAROLD AND MARGARET FARLOW

ALVIN AND JACQUELIN FERRIGNO

GEORGE J. AND KAREN K. FLINN

RICHARD M. AND JUDY FOGEL

JOSEPH AND LORETTA FORTUNA

EDWARD AND PATRICIA FOSTER

JOHN AND CAROLYN FREDERICKS

JOHN J. AND REGINA M. FRIEL

RICHARD AND MAUREEN FRISCH

CLEMENT A. FUSCELLARO, SR.

STANLEY G. AND MICHALINE L. GALIK

CHARLES T. AND BEVERLY A. GALLOWAY

JOSEPH AND IRENE GARRAMONE

JOHN AND KATHLEEN GARRISON

*402 JOSEPH AND PATRICIA GENTILE

JOSEPH J. AND PAT A. GEORGE

CHARLES W. AND DELORES J. GIBBONS

LOUIS E. AND DELORES GILBERT

ROBERT J. AND CAROL ANN GILLETTI

DAVID AND MARY GIORDANO

GREGORY AND SUSANNE GLEASON

RICHARD A. AND DENISE P. GRENDA

JAMES AND MAUREEN HAMER

CHARLES J. AND DIANA M. HAMMOND

THOMAS J. AND LORELIEI HANS

EUGENE M. AND CYNTHIA A. HARDY (FILED UNDER

CYNTHIA SPAULDING)

LAURA HARWANKO

GREGORY AND BARBARA HAWRYLIW

ROBERT AND GLORIA HENDERSON

SANDRA HENGSTEBECK

MICHAEL A. AND MARG. M.R. HENWOOD

CHARLES AND GEORGIA HERR

THOMAS AND ALICE HINDERLITER

ORVILLE R. AND RUTH C. HOFFMAN

MARIA B. HOUCK

RONALD AND ROSEMARIE IACOVELLI

CHARLES J. AND B. HENKEL IGNAS

ARTHUR AND LINDA INTERLANTE

FRANK AND DEBORAH IZZI

RONALD AND CATHERINE JACOVINI

RONALD J. AND MADELYN A. JANKOWSKI

ANDREW J. JR. AND KATHLEEN A. JERECKI

*403 SHERRON E. AND ROSEMARY C. JOHNSON

ROY E. JONES AND GENEVIEVE JONES

LINDA G. KANE

THOMAS T. AND KAREN M. KEATING

MARY KESSLER

JAMES H. AND LYNN KING

WALTER KING

JANET KITSIOS

EDWARD C. AND BERNICE R. KRAMER

GARY KULICK

PHYLLIS LaFRANCE

LYNN LARSON

TRUEPHENIA LAWRENCE

MARK AND KAREN LEAHEY AND ERNEST REED

WILLIAM AND JOANNE LEMAN

MICHAEL AND ARLEEN LIBERI

RICK AND KAREN L. LIBERTI

JAMES E. AND PATRICIA E. LOGAN

THOMAS W. AND KAREN A. LONGACRE

SAMUEL A. AND MARY ANN LUCCI

ARLENE AND AMIN MAHRAN

CHARLES B. AND ROSE E. MAILAHN

TOM AND RANDI MANACO

ROBERT AND DONNA MARRAMA

KAREN AND ROBERT MAULL

ROBERT AND DELORES MeBRIDE

WILLIAM H. AND SHIRLEY McCALLEY

GEORGE H. AND EMMA McCAUGHIN

DOMINIC AND YOLANDA McDOWELL

*404 JOSEPHINE AND WALTER McFARLAND

DANIEL AND LINDA McGOVERN

PATRICK AND DOROTHY McGUIRE

STEPHEN AND DAWN McKILLOP

KATHLEEN M. AND JOSEPH M. MEGARA, JR.

KENNETH AND TERRY MEGARA

CARLYLE AND BARBARA JO MELLEBY

DORIS L. AND JOSEPH B. MENCHACA

W.A. MENEWISCH OR C.A. PORRECA

THOMAS III AND HOLLY MICHEL

MICHAEL J. AND MARILYN M. MIDUSKI

JAMES MILANO

ROBERT AND ROSEMARY MILLER

LARRY E. AND JOSEPHINE G. MILLNER

GEORGE R. AND DONNA MILLS

PAUL AND JANE MITCHELL

KATHLEEN AND PLACIDO MOFFA

ANTHONY C. AND CATHERINE MOORE

DONALD L. AND CORAZON M. MOORE

ARTHUR J. AND ROSELIE F. MORIN

FRED J. AND KATHLEEN J. MULLER

MICHAEL AND DIANNE T. MUNDIE

GREGORY AND JO-ANNE MURPHY

JOHN H. AND CHRISTINE MURRAY

MARTIN AND JAMIE I. MURRAY

ROBERT A. AND LINDA M. NAGE

WILLIAM AND RITA NATOLI

JAMES AND CYNTHIA NILAN

CLEMENT J. AND NANCY C. ORACZEWSKI

*405 THEODORE AND LUCY ORBACZEWSKI

VINCENT ORR

DENNIS O’SHAUGHNESSY

CRAIG AND MARLENE PALMA

NICHOLAS AND LINDA PALMA

JOSE T. AND DEBRA PANTOJA

BABU C. AND MADHY B. PATEL

CHARLES R. AND MARY E. PAYLOR

JOHN W. AND PATRICIA A. PEEPLES

THOMAS AND MAUREEN PEYTON

ALFRED AND NANCY A. PIERSON

CAROL AND WILLIAM PINDER

S.D.B. PODUFALY AND C.P. BARRACLIFF, SR.

DAVID AND CHERYL POMIANEK

NICK F. AND SUSAN M. POMPONIO

FREDERICK J. AND BARBARA POPIOLEK

RICHARD E. AND SUSAN PRINZ

RAYMOND G. AND BEVERLY A. PROTICH

DAVID B. AND SARA A. PYNE

JOSEPH J. AND MARYANN QUINN

DANIEL A. RADCLIFFE

JOHN A. AND LINDA B. RAYMOND

DOROTHY READ

STEVEN AND JO-ANN M. RECH

HARRY R. AND ELIZABETH M. REDMAN

GARY L. AND DEBBIE REED

ELIZABETH AND HARRY RESCIGNO

LYNN RICEVUTO

DEBORAH ROBINSON, n/k/a PYSZ

*406 LARRY AND ARLENE ROSSI

STEVEN P. ROTELLA

SALVATORE D. AND ROSE ANNA RUSSO

ROBERT AND MADELINE SALERNO

FRANK W. JR. AND MARIE C. SARNE

ROBERT W. AND LAURA F. SAWYER

CAROL A. SCHMITZ

ELEANORE AND WILLIAM SCHOLES

EUGENE J. AND JACQUELYN SCHOOLS

SHEILA B. SEGAL

SUSAN SHANKO

RICHARD H. AND DONNA L. SHANNON

TIMOTHY G. AND BARBARA D. SHARPLEY

JOSEPH J. AND MARIE C. SHERIDAN

MARK E. SHERMAN

HARRY S. AND JOANNA N. SHUTE

JOSEPH G. AND HELEN SHWALUK

MICHAEL AND SHARON SILVER

JOHN A. AND MARTHA C. SIMON

WILLIAM III AND MARLENE SIMON

JANELLE AND HARRY SMITH

STANLEY AND DOROTHY STEPHENS

KATHLEEN STERN

HARRY C. AND JOAN E. STRICKLER

ROY M. AND DEBORAH L. STROUSE

MELANIE J. SULLIVAN

JOHN C. AND JOANN P. SYLVESTER

THOMAS AND LORRAINE TAFT

SCOTT AND JOAN TANENBAUM

*407 WILLIAM AND CHARLENE TAYLOR

ROBERT J. AND CAROLEE TEE

EDWARD J. AND GEORGINE M. THOMPSON

WILLIAM AND ETHEL TOLMAN

IRENE TOPALIDIS

ELAINE AND JOSEPH TRACY

EDMUND AND ELEANOR TRYKOWSKI

JAMES E. AND ARLENE G. TWILLEY

MARGARET ULERICK

ANNA URGO

LOUIS VIZOCO

ROBERT AND MILDRED WAGNER

WATSON AND PHYLLIS J. WALDELL

HARRY AND KAREN WALLACE

CAROL J. WASHINGTON

RUSSELL V. AND PATRICIA A. WATKINS

MARTIN E. WAY

ROBERT AND CHRISTINE WILD

WILLIAM H. AND BEVERLY J. WILLIAMS

JEFFREY AND LÍNDA WILSON

MARTIN T. AND PATRICIA A. WILT

JOSEPHINE A. WOODS

MARK A. AND DENISE WRAY

JOHN AND MARGARET YEACKEL

CAROL A. ZUCCARELLI

JOHN AND JANE DOE

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