Citizens Bank v. Crisman, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 9, 2026
• Docket: 2984 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Panella

Opinion

J-S17012-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

CITIZENS BANK, N.A. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTOPHER JOHN CRISMAN : : Appellant : No. 2984 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered October 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s): 2024-20296

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 9, 2026

Christopher John Crisman appeals from the order of the Montgomery

County Court of Common Pleas denying Crisman’s petition to strike and/or

open default judgment, thereby allowing the default judgment in favor of

Citizens Bank, N.A. (the “Bank”) to stand. Regarding the petition to open,

Crisman argues the trial court abused its discretion by finding Crisman (1) had

not proffered a meritorious defense to the underlying claim, and (2) failed to

assert a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing to file a responsive

pleading. After careful review, we affirm.

On December 6, 2017, Chris Crisman Photography LLC (the

“Borrower”), signed a Promissory Note (the “Note”) with the Bank for an

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S17012-26

original principal loan amount of $250,000, which was later modified by a

Change in Terms Agreement dated November 25, 2019, increasing the credit

limit to $380,000. Also on December 6, 2017, Crisman signed a Commercial

Guaranty Agreement (the “Guaranty”), thereby guaranteeing payment and

performance of the Borrower’s obligations under the Note. Both the Borrower

and Crisman’s address is listed as 652 Broad Acres Road, Penn Valley, PA

18072 (“652”) in the Note and the Guaranty respectively.

On August 21, 2024, the Bank filed a complaint against Crisman,

alleging the Borrower and Crisman, as guarantor, had defaulted by failing to

make payments in accordance with the Note and the Guaranty. See

Complaint, at ¶ 9. The Bank asserted that the Borrower and Crisman had failed

to repay the Bank after the Bank sent them a Demand Letter on August 8,

2024. See id. at ¶¶ 8, 10. The complaint sought judgment against Crisman

in the amount of $393,132.48, which included the principal amount of

$379,999.44, interest of $7,811.10, late charges of $321.94, and legal fees

and costs of $5,000. See id. at ¶¶ 11-12. The sheriff’s affidavit of personal

service stated that Crisman was personally served with the complaint on

September 5, 2024, at 652. On November 11, 2024, Crisman filed preliminary

objections to the complaint.

On November 20, 2024, the Bank filed an amended complaint, updating

the requested judgment amount, as of November 15, 2024, to $402,619.89,

which included the principal amount of $379,999.44, interest of $16,780.67,

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late charges of $639.40, and legal fees and costs of $5,200. See Amended

Complaint, at ¶ 11. The Bank also attached a copy of the payment history of

the loan from inception to November 12, 2024. See id. at Exhibit “D.” The

Amended Complaint maintained 652 as Crisman’s address. However, the

certificate of service noted that the amended complaint was served upon

William C. Katz, Esquire (“Counsel”).

On December 20, 2024, Counsel filed preliminary objections to the

amended complaint on Crisman’s behalf. The Bank, after being given

extensions of time, by agreement of the parties, filed an answer to the

preliminary objections on March 11, 2025.

On March 28, 2025, the trial court entered an order overruling Crisman’s

preliminary objections. See Order, 3/28/25. The court directed Crisman to file

an answer to the amended complaint within 20 days of the date of the order.

See id. The order and the certified docket entry contain a notation that notice

of this order was provided under Pa.R.Civ.P. 236 on March 28, 2025, to “all

parties of record.”

On May 5, 2025, the Bank filed and served a praecipe for entry of default

judgment, and the prothonotary entered default judgment that same day,

with notice sent to Crisman at 652. In the praecipe, the Bank certified that a

10-day notice of intent to enter default judgment was sent to Crisman

pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237.1. The attached copies of the 10-day notice, and

the United States Postal Service Certificates of Mailing, indicate the notice was

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sent to both Crisman at 652 and Counsel on April 22, 2025. Notably, Counsel

did not formally enter his appearance until June 2, 2025.

On June 4, 2025, Counsel filed a petition to strike or open judgment

entered by default. Counsel stated that the Bank also had a separate pending

action against the Borrower based on the underlying default. Counsel asserted

that on May 29, 2025, he received a ten-day notice from the Bank related to

the action against the Borrower. Counsel claimed that upon investigating, he

“learned for the first time that [Crisman]’s objections in the case against

Borrower had been overruled on May 1, 2025, and further discovered that

[Counsel] had not received notice of that Order … because, despite filing

multiple pleadings in the case, an appearance had not been formally entered.”

Petition to Strike or Open Default Judgment, 6/4/25, at ¶ 11.

Counsel only then investigated the status of the instant action, and

“learned for the first time that [Crisman]’s preliminary objections had been

overruled on March 28, 2025, and, more troublingly, that [the Bank] had

taken a default judgment on May 5, 2025.” See id. at ¶ 13. Counsel argued

that no certificate of service was filed with the May 5, 2025 praecipe for default

judgment, and that he had not received a ten-day notice following the court’s

overruling Crisman’s preliminary objections. Counsel argued that neither he

nor Crisman had “any record or recollection whatsoever of receiving the

alleged ten-day notice …” despite the electronic filing system noting that the

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Bank had purported to serve Crisman and Counsel with a ten-day notice on

April 22, 2025. See id. at ¶¶ 17-18.

Counsel argued that because neither Crisman nor he received the ten-

day notice, nor was the praecipe for entry of a default judgment served upon

Counsel, the default judgment should be stricken. See id. at ¶ 30.

Alternatively, Counsel argued the judgment should be opened because

Crisman promptly moved to open the judgment after learning of the entry of

default judgment, proffered a reasonable justification for the failure to timely

respond, and had a meritorious defense, which was included in a proposed

answer attached to the petition. See id. at ¶¶ 31-36.

Finally, Counsel argued that, “as a mere guarantor, [Crisman]’s liability

to [the Bank] is conditioned upon [the] Borrower being found liable to [the

Bank].” Id. at ¶ 37. Counsel argued that this had not happened in the separate

pending action, as the Borrower had filed a timely answer to that complaint.

See id. Accordingly, Counsel argued “[u]nless and until [the Bank] obtains a

judgment against [the] Borrower, [Crisman] is not liable to [the Bank].” Id.

at ¶ 38. Counsel also contended that the Bank had no grounds to demand

repayment of the loan, as it had not identified an actual default and that the

Bank’s calculations are erroneous. See id. at ¶ 40.

After consideration of the Bank’s response to the petition to open/strike

judgment, the court denied the petition on October 15, 2025, reasoning as

follows:

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The [default j]udgment cannot be opened since there is no meritorious defense. According to the [Note], the [Bank] can sue [Crisman] or the [B]orrower. There is no requirement that the [Bank] succeed on the claim against the [B]orrower first, before proceeding against the guarantor/[Crisman] stated in case law or in the agreement. Lastly, a Certificate of Mailing was attached to the default judgment, which indicates that the ten-day notice was mailed to [Crisman] and [Crisman]’s Counsel mailing address that is listed on the docket. Under the mailbox rule, there is a presumption that a properly timestamped mailing is received by the recipient. There was no argument or indication that the address was incorrect.

Order, 10/15/25, at FN1 (citations omitted). This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Crisman focuses on the court’s denial of his request to open

the default judgment. “Unlike a petition to strike a judgment, a petition to

open a judgment is an appeal to the equitable powers of the court.” Roy by

& through Roy v. Rue, 273 A.3d 1174, 1186 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). It is well settled:

The decision to grant or deny a petition to open a default judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn that decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion or error of law.... An abuse of discretion is not a mere error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

Id. at 1186-87 (citation omitted).

“Generally speaking, [under Pennsylvania law,] a default judgment may

be opened if the moving party has (1) promptly filed a petition to open the

default judgment, (2) provided a reasonable excuse or explanation for failing

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to file a responsive pleading, and (3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the

allegations contained in the complaint.” Id. at 1187 (citation omitted).

In his appellate brief, Crisman asserts the trial court did not contest the

timeliness of the petition, see Appellant’s Brief, at FN3, and therefore only

provides argument sections discussing the final two prongs. See id. at 17, 20.

Due to our disposition, we assume arguendo that Crisman is correct that the

timeliness of his petition is undisputed. Further, as we find it dispositive, we

first address the reasonable excuse prong.

Crisman argues that the trial court should have opened the default

judgment because he had a reasonable excuse for failing to respond.

Specifically, Crisman argues that “due to an innocent oversite by counsel,

[i.e., Counsel not entering his appearance on the record,] counsel did not

receive electronic notice of the trial court’s order overruling [] Crisman’s

preliminary objections, thereby setting in motion the need to file an answer.”

Appellant’s Brief, at 20. Similarly, Crisman claims that neither Crisman nor

Counsel received the ten-day notice of intent to enter default judgment,

asserting “some irregularity occurred” with both the 10-day notice and service

of the entry of default judgment. Id.

The trial court denied relief, finding, in part, that Crisman failed to

establish a reasonable excuse for failing to file a responsive pleading. The trial

court explained:

[T]he Court found that [Crisman] lacked a reasonable excuse due to [Crisman]’s counsel[’s] failure to enter [his] appearance on the

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docket. Due to this administrative oversight, [Crisman]’s counsel had no notice of what was being filed on the docket. Even though [Crisman]’s counsel blames the [Bank] for lack of notice, [the Bank] noted that they are not required to give notice since [counsel was] not yet the attorney of record.

Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2) requires the Prothonotary to mail notices of court filings to attorney of record or, if unrepresented, to each party. Failure of [Crisman]’s counsel to enter [his] appearance is not grounds to grant relief.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/25, at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization and footnote

omitted).

Under these circumstances, the trial court did not override or misapply

the law in denying the petition to open default judgment. See Roy, 273 A.3d

at 1187. Even assuming arguendo that Crisman promptly filed his petition

upon learning of the default judgment, he failed to satisfy the second prong

of the three-part test governing petitions to open—that he provide a

reasonable excuse or explanation for his failure to respond to the complaint.

See id. Crisman received personal service of the complaint and amended

complaint. Despite having actual notice that litigation was pending, and hiring

counsel, neither Crisman nor Counsel monitored the docket.

While a petition to open invokes the trial court’s equitable powers,

Crisman has not shown that the Bank or the court engaged in wrongful

conduct or acted in bad faith in relying on the address Crisman provided to

the court, prior to Counsel formally entering his appearance.

In any event, even though the court’s order overruling preliminary

objections was only served on Crisman personally, due to there being no

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counsel of record at that time, the subsequent notices provided by the Bank

were sent to both Crisman and Counsel. Crisman provides no explanation for

why he or Counsel somehow did not receive the ten-day notice or notice of

the default judgment, despite both of them previously receiving service of

prior filings at the addresses on the record. Neither Crisman nor Counsel have

asserted that their docketed addresses are incorrect or have changed.

In light of these circumstances, we conclude the trial court acted within

its discretion in finding that Crisman failed to demonstrate a reasonable

excuse for his failure to respond. Because Crisman did not satisfy the

reasonable excuse prong, we need not examine whether he established a

meritorious defense. See Roy, 273 A.3d at 1188–89. Accordingly, Crisman is

due no relief. We therefore affirm the order denying Crisman’s petition to

strike and/or open default judgment.

Order affirmed.

Date: 7/9/2026

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