Citizens Bank of Morehead v. Hunt

Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)

Citizens Bank of Morehead v. Hunt

154 S.W.2d 730, 287 Ky. 646, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 603

CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)

DecidedOctober 3, 1941

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 154 S.W.2d 730 (Citizens Bank of Morehead v. Hunt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Citizens Bank of Morehead v. Hunt, 154 S.W.2d 730, 287 Ky. 646, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 603 (Ky. 1941).

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Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Sims, Commissioner

— Reversing.

This is a second appeal and as the issues raised in the pleadings and the proof heard thereon are set out in detail in the former opinion reported in Citizens Bank of Morehead v. Nickell, 277 Ky. 424, 126 S. W. (2d) 820, we will not repeat them. The verdict on the first trial in favor of the sureties, Nickell and Caudill, amounted to a finding by the jury that the note sued on had been ■fraudulently raised by the principal maker, Hunt, from $600 to $3,600 after the sureties had signed it. In reversing that judgment the former opinion recited the ■verdict was so flagrantly against the evidence as to indicate it was the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. As what was there said is now the law of the case, the judgment entered on the second verdict in favor of the sureties must be reversed for the same reason, unless the evidence on the second trial differed ■materially from that given on the first.

We have read with care the evidence adduced on both trials and there is no material difference in the two bills of evidence, except on the second trial the defendants introduced six witnesses in an attempt to impeach Hunt for truth and veracity. Three of these witnesses, ■Custer Ramsey, Melvin Hamm and Jack Helwig, testified they had never heard Hunt’s reputation discussed within two years before the trial, hence the trial judge [held they did not qualify as character witnesses.

*648 Oscar Jackson testified Hunt’s reputation was bad, but on cross-examination it developed be bad never beard anybody discuss it, and tbe witness based bis testimony largely on tbe fact that be paid a surety debt for Hunt. Therefore, tbe trial judge correctly excluded Jackson’s testimony.

While tbe court did not exclude tbe testimony of Mrs. Beulah Williams as to Hunt’s reputation, be should have. On cross-examination she stated she bad testified Hunt’s reputation for truth and veracity was bad because be did not pay her a note and bad not told her tbe truth. One’s general reputation is not what another person may know or think about him, but it is tbe estimate in which be is held by tbe people generally with whom be associates and comes in contact with in everyday life. Davenport v. Com., 285 Ky. 628, 148 S. W. (2d) 1054, and authorities therein cited.

Robert Bishop testified be bad beard Hunt’s reputation discussed and it was bad for truth and veracity. But on cross-examination it developed that this witness bad only beard bis reputation discussed as to payment of debts; be could not name one person whom be bad beard discuss Hunt’s reputation for veracity. That a person’s general reputation for morality or veracity is bad may be shown only by positive testimony that bis neighbors and associates have so spoken of him until such has become a part of bis general reputation. It must be proved by affirmative testimony, but one may prove bis general reputation for morality and veracity is good by showing that it has never been brought into question. Davenport v. Com., supra.

Tbe defendants failed in their efforts to impeach Hunt and no attack was made upon Davis’ reputation. As this is tbe only particular in which tbe testimony is different from that beard on the first trial, it is apparent that under tbe law of tbe case rule we must again say that tbe verdict is so flagrantly against tbe evidence as to indicate that it was tbe result of passion and prejudice on tbe part of tbe jury. Tbe first opinion reversing tbe judgment for tbe reason indicated was written March 17, 1939. On January 12, 1940, Nugent et al. v. Nugent’s Ex’r, 281 Ky. 263, 135 S. W. (2d) 877, was decided wherein tbe scintilla rule was abolished and it was there held that where a verdict must be set aside as being palpably and flagrantly *649 against the evidence the court should not submit the case but should direct a verdict. Under the rule enunciated in this Nugent case, if the evidence is not materially different on another trial, the court should direct a verdict for the plaintiff.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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Opinion op the Court by

Sims, Commissioner

— Reversing.

This is a second appeal and as the issues raised in the pleadings and the proof heard thereon are set out in detail in the former opinion reported in Citizens Bank of Morehead v. Nickell, 277 Ky. 424, 126 S. W. (2d) 820, we will not repeat them. The verdict on the first trial in favor of the sureties, Nickell and Caudill, amounted to a finding by the jury that the note sued on had been ■fraudulently raised by the principal maker, Hunt, from $600 to $3,600 after the sureties had signed it. In reversing that judgment the former opinion recited the ■verdict was so flagrantly against the evidence as to indicate it was the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. As what was there said is now the law of the case, the judgment entered on the second verdict in favor of the sureties must be reversed for the same reason, unless the evidence on the second trial differed ■materially from that given on the first.

We have read with care the evidence adduced on both trials and there is no material difference in the two bills of evidence, except on the second trial the defendants introduced six witnesses in an attempt to impeach Hunt for truth and veracity. Three of these witnesses, ■Custer Ramsey, Melvin Hamm and Jack Helwig, testified they had never heard Hunt’s reputation discussed within two years before the trial, hence the trial judge [held they did not qualify as character witnesses.

*648 Oscar Jackson testified Hunt’s reputation was bad, but on cross-examination it developed be bad never beard anybody discuss it, and tbe witness based bis testimony largely on tbe fact that be paid a surety debt for Hunt. Therefore, tbe trial judge correctly excluded Jackson’s testimony.

While tbe court did not exclude tbe testimony of Mrs. Beulah Williams as to Hunt’s reputation, be should have. On cross-examination she stated she bad testified Hunt’s reputation for truth and veracity was bad because be did not pay her a note and bad not told her tbe truth. One’s general reputation is not what another person may know or think about him, but it is tbe estimate in which be is held by tbe people generally with whom be associates and comes in contact with in everyday life. Davenport v. Com., 285 Ky. 628, 148 S. W. (2d) 1054, and authorities therein cited.

Robert Bishop testified be bad beard Hunt’s reputation discussed and it was bad for truth and veracity. But on cross-examination it developed that this witness bad only beard bis reputation discussed as to payment of debts; be could not name one person whom be bad beard discuss Hunt’s reputation for veracity. That a person’s general reputation for morality or veracity is bad may be shown only by positive testimony that bis neighbors and associates have so spoken of him until such has become a part of bis general reputation. It must be proved by affirmative testimony, but one may prove bis general reputation for morality and veracity is good by showing that it has never been brought into question. Davenport v. Com., supra.

Tbe defendants failed in their efforts to impeach Hunt and no attack was made upon Davis’ reputation. As this is tbe only particular in which tbe testimony is different from that beard on the first trial, it is apparent that under tbe law of tbe case rule we must again say that tbe verdict is so flagrantly against tbe evidence as to indicate that it was tbe result of passion and prejudice on tbe part of tbe jury. Tbe first opinion reversing tbe judgment for tbe reason indicated was written March 17, 1939. On January 12, 1940, Nugent et al. v. Nugent’s Ex’r, 281 Ky. 263, 135 S. W. (2d) 877, was decided wherein tbe scintilla rule was abolished and it was there held that where a verdict must be set aside as being palpably and flagrantly *649 against the evidence the court should not submit the case but should direct a verdict. Under the rule enunciated in this Nugent case, if the evidence is not materially different on another trial, the court should direct a verdict for the plaintiff.

The judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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154 S.W.2d 730, 287 Ky. 646, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 603, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/citizens-bank-of-morehead-v-hunt-kyctapphigh-1941.

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