MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED court except for the purpose of establishing Aug 21 2018, 8:55 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK Indiana Supreme Court estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jennifer A. Washburn Derek R. Molter Margo Tucker Kay E. Pashos Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Ice Miller LLP Inc. Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Kelley A. Karn Melanie D. Price Duke Energy Business Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Citizens Action Coalition of August 21, 2018 Indiana, Inc., Court of Appeals Case No. Appellant-Intervenor, 18A-EX-141 Appeal from the Indiana Utility v. Regulatory Commission The Honorable Sarah E. Freeman, Duke Energy Indiana, LLC, Commissioner Appellee-Petitioner. The Honorable David E. Veleta, Senior Administrative Law Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 1 of 16 IURC Cause No. 43955 DSM-4
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Appellant-Intervenor Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. (“CAC”)
appeals from the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission’s (“the Commission”)
order approving an energy efficiency (“EE”) plan filed by Appellee-Petitioner
Duke Energy Indiana, LLC’s (“Duke”) in accordance with Indiana Code
section 8-1-8.5-10 for the years 2017 through 2019. Specifically, CAC contends
that the Commission abused its discretion in finding Duke’s proposed EE goals
and lost revenue recovery rate to be reasonable. Concluding otherwise, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Duke is an electricity supplier servicing both individuals and businesses in
Indiana. In 2015, the General Assembly passed a statute requiring electricity
suppliers to file EE plans and goals for approval by the Commission beginning
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 2 of 16 no later than 2017. As an incentive for participation, the General Assembly
included provisions allowing electricity suppliers to recover certain costs
associated with their EE plans, including lost revenues. This case stems from
the Commission’s approval of Duke’s EE plan for the three-year term running
from 2017 to 2019 (“Duke’s proposed EE Plan”).
[3] On May 28, 2015, Duke sought approval of an EE plan for the three-year term
running from 2016–2018. In this plan, Duke proposed a lost revenue rate that
allowed for recovery of lost revenues over the measure’s life or until the utility’s
next basic rate case, whichever was shorter. The Commission rejected Duke’s
plan, finding, in part, that the recovery of lost revenues should be limited to a
four-year term. Shortly thereafter, we found that a nearly identical provision in
a case involving a different energy provider was unreasonable. See S. Ind. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n, 2017 WL 899947, at *7 (March 7,
2017).
[4] On November 22, 2016, Duke filed a petition seeking approval of Duke’s
proposed EE Plan. Duke proposed EE goals that are expected to result in an
energy savings of approximately 1.1% of eligible retail sales for each year of the
plan. It again proposed a lost revenue rate that allowed for recovery of lost
revenues over the measure’s life or until the utility’s next basic rate case,
whichever was shorter. Pursuant to Duke’s proposed EE Plan, Duke’s recovery
of forecasted lost revenues would be reconciled with actual losses following an
independent evaluation. The total cost of Duke’s proposed EE Plan equaled
$110,233,151.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 3 of 16 [5] On November 28, November 30, 2016, and February 6, 2017, respectively,
Nucor-Steel-Indiana, a division of Nucor Corporation, CAC, and the Duke
Industrial Group (collectively, “the Intervenors”) filed petitions to intervene in
the proceeding. The Commission subsequently granted those petitions. Duke
and the Intervenors filed extensive evidence prior to an August 17, 2017
evidentiary hearing. On December 28, 2017, the Commission approved Duke’s
EE Plan.
Discussion and Decision I. Standard of Review [6] “The General Assembly created [the Commission] primarily as a fact-finding
body with the technical expertise to administer the regulatory scheme devised
by the legislature.” Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Ind. Fin. Auth., 999 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ind.
2013). “The Commission’s assignment is to insure that public utilities provide
constant, reliable, and efficient service to the citizens of Indiana.” N. Ind. Pub.
Serv. Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 907 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (Ind. 2009). “Because the
complicated process of ratemaking is a legislative rather than judicial function,
it is more properly left to the experienced and expert opinion present in the
Commission.” Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 76
N.E.3d 144, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).
[7] An order from the Commission is presumed valid unless the contrary is clearly
apparent. Id. “More specifically, on matters within its jurisdiction, [the
Commission] enjoys wide discretion and its findings and decision will not be Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 4 of 16 lightly overridden simply because we might reach a different decision on the
same evidence.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation omitted). “Essentially, so
long as there is any substantial evidence to support the rates as fixed by the
Commission as reasonable, the judicial branch of the government will not
interfere with such legislative functions and has no power or authority to
substitute its personal judgment for what it might think is fair or reasonable in
lieu of [the Commission’s] administrative judgment.” Id. (brackets, emphasis,
and internal quotations omitted).
[8] Commission orders are subject to a multi-tier review. Ind. Gas, 999 N.E.2d at
66.
First, the order must contain specific findings on all the factual determinations material to its ultimate conclusions. We review the conclusions of ultimate facts, or mixed questions of fact and law, for their reasonableness, with greater deference to matters within [the Commission’s] expertise and jurisdiction. Second, the findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence most favorable to [the Commission’s] findings. Finally, we review whether IURC action is contrary to law, but this constitutionally preserved review is limited to whether the Commission stayed within its jurisdiction and conformed to the statutory standards and legal principles involved in producing its decision, ruling, or order.
Id. (internal citations and quotation omitted).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 5 of 16 II. General Overview of the Relevant Statutory Authority [9] Indiana Code section 8-1-8.5-10(h) provides that beginning not later than 2017,
and not less than one time every three years, “an electricity supplier shall
petition the [C]ommission for approval of a plan that includes: (1) energy
efficiency goals; (2) energy efficiency programs to achieve the energy efficiency
goals; (3) program budgets and program costs; and (4) evaluation,
measurement, and verification [(“EM&V”)] procedures that must include
independent [EM&V].” In determining whether a plan submitted under
subsection (h) is reasonable, the [C]ommission shall consider the following:
(1) Projected changes in customer consumption of electricity resulting from the implementation of the plan.
(2) A cost and benefit analysis of the plan, including the likelihood of achieving the goals of the energy efficiency programs included in the plan.
(3) Whether the plan is consistent with the following:
(A) The state energy analysis developed by the commission under section 3 of this chapter.
(B) The electricity supplier’s most recent long range integrated resource plan submitted to the commission.
(4) The inclusion and reasonableness of procedures to evaluate, measure, and verify the results of the energy efficiency programs included in the plan, including the alignment of the procedures with applicable environmental regulations, including federal regulations concerning credits for emission reductions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 6 of 16 (5) Any undue or unreasonable preference to any customer class resulting, or potentially resulting, from the implementation of an energy efficiency program or from the overall design of a plan.
(6) Comments provided by customers, customer representatives, the office of utility consumer counselor, and other stakeholders concerning the adequacy and reasonableness of the plan, including alternative or additional means to achieve energy efficiency in the electricity supplier’s service territory.
(7) The effect, or potential effect, in both the long term and the short term, of the plan on the electric rates and bills of customers that participate in energy efficiency programs compared to the electric rates and bills of customers that do not participate in energy efficiency programs.
(8) The lost revenues and financial incentives associated with the plan and sought to be recovered or received by the electricity supplier.
(9) The electricity supplier’s current integrated resource plan and the underlying resource assessment.
(10) Any other information the [C]ommission considers necessary.
Ind. Code § 8-1-8.5-10(j).
III. Approval of Duke’s Proposed EE Goals [10] “‘Energy efficiency goals’ means all energy efficiency produced by cost effective
plans that are: (1) reasonably achievable; (2) consistent with an electricity
supplier’s integrated resource plan; and (3) designed to achieve an optimal
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 7 of 16 balance of energy resources in an electricity supplier’s service territory.” Ind.
Code § 8-1-8.5-10(c). Review of the record reveals that Duke and each of the
Intervenors submitted extensive evidence relating to the reasonableness of
Duke’s proposed EE goals both prior to and during the evidentiary hearing.
The Commission noted that it considered all of the evidence, including CAC’s
asserted discrediting evidence.
[11] In its order, the Commission noted that Duke “proposes EE goals to be
achieved through its 2017-2019 Plan that are expected to result in energy
savings of approximately 1.1% of eligible retail sales for each year of the three-
year Plan.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 45. The Commission determined that
Duke’s “EE goals meet the requirement that it is reasonably achievable,
designed to achieve an optimal balance of energy resources and consistent with
[Duke’s] 2015 IRP.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 47.
[12] In challenging the Commission’s determination that Duke’s proposed EE goals
were reasonable, CAC does not challenge any of the Commission’s factual
findings. It merely argues that this court should re-evaluate and reweigh the
evidence, giving its evidence greater weight. Again, in reviewing the
Commission’s determination that a plan is reasonable, we will neither reweigh
the evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Ind. Gas, 999 N.E.2d at 66. As
such, because the record contains evidence supporting the Commission’s
determination, we will not override the Commission’s determination that
Duke’s EE goals were reasonable. See Citizens Action Coal., 76 N.E.3d at 151
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 8 of 16 (providing that the Commission’s decision will not be overridden simply
because we might have reached a different decision on the same evidence).
IV. Approval of Duke’s Proposed Lost Revenue Rate [13] It is undisputed that rates charged by a utility company must be just and
reasonable. In challenging the Commission’s approval of Duke’s EE Plan,
CAC argues that the rate of lost revenue funds recoverable by Duke was both
unjust and unreasonable. For its part, Duke argues the opposite.
[14] Indiana Code section 8-1-8.5-10(h) requires an energy provider to obtain
approval of an EE plan independent of its required rate plans. Once the
Commission has found a proposed EE plan to be reasonable, it “shall allow the
electricity supplier to recover or receive …[r]easonable lost revenues.” Ind.
Code § 8-1-8.5-10(o). “‘Lost revenues’ means the difference, if any, between:
(1) revenues lost; and (2) the variable operating and maintenance costs saved;
by an electricity supplier as a result of implementing energy efficiency
programs.” Ind. Code § 8-1-8.5-10(e).
A retail rate adjustment mechanism proposed by an electricity supplier … to implement the timely recovery of program costs (including reasonable lost revenues) may be based on a reasonable forecast, with consideration given to the electricity supplier’s historical lost revenue forecasting accuracy. If forecasted data is used, the retail rate adjustment mechanism must include a reconciliation mechanism to correct for any variance between the forecasted program costs (including reasonable lost revenues and financial incentives) and the actual program costs (including reasonable lost revenues and financial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 9 of 16 incentives based on the [EM&V] of the [EE] programs under the plan).
Ind. Code § 8-1-8.5-10(o).
A. Whether the Approved Rate is Unreasonably High [15] CAC notes that Indiana Code section 8-1-8.5-10 only allows for the recovery of
reasonable lost revenues and asserts that the Commission exceeded its
discretion by allowing the recovery of up to $63,448,839 in lost revenues for EE
programs projected to cost $110,233,151 to administer. Specifically, CAC
claims that “[t]his lost revenue guaranteed rate is outside the zone of
reasonableness in light of the legal framework, ratemaking policy, regulatory
history, objective of the required cost-effectiveness in the statute, and the
appropriate degree of reliability in forecasting estimated savings out beyond a
few immediate years.” Appellant’s Br. p. 27.
[16] Duke correctly asserts, however, that in making this claim, CAC “does not
identify any legal basis for imposing any particular limit regarding a ration
between recoverable lost revenues and other program costs,” nor does it “make
any showing that the ration in this particular case renders rates ‘artificially
high.’” Appellee’s Br. p. 29. The Commission heard extensive evidence
regarding lost revenues and how such revenues would be calculated. In
approving Duke’s EE Plan, the Commission required independent EM&V to
reconcile proposed costs, including lost revenues, to those actually incurred in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 10 of 16 order to ensure that the lost revenue rate applied in connection to the EE Plan
was not too high.
[17] The Commission considered the extensive evidence presented both by Duke
and the Intervenors and determined that Duke’s rate for the recovery of lost
revenues was reasonable. CAC does not challenge any of the Commission’s
specific findings. Rather, its challenge on appeal effectively amounts to a
request for this court to reweigh the evidence submitted before the Commission,
which we will not do. Ind. Gas, 999 N.E.2d at 66. Based on our review of the
record, we conclude that the Commission’s order is consistent with the
requirements of Indiana Code section 8-1-8.5-10(o).
B. Whether the Commission Impermissibly Deviated from Past Precedent [18] CAC argues that the Commission impermissibly deviated from the approach it
adopted in its decision relating to Duke’s petition relating to its plan for the
years 2016 through 2018. With respect to lost revenues, the Commission’s
order in that case reads as follows:
Although we have previously approved lost revenues over a measure’s life or until a utility’s next base rate case, whichever is shorter, … the other parties’ concerns with pancaking and the increased length of time between base rate cases for utilities in Indiana raise a valid concern. Clearly, pancaking of lost revenue is much less of an issue in an environment where a utility comes in regularly, i.e., every three to five years, for a base rate case.… Because we believe the parties raise a valid concern, we find that Petitioner’s lost revenue recovery should be limited to: (1) four years or the life of the measure, whichever is less, or (2) until Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 11 of 16 rates are implemented pursuant to a final order in Petitioner’s next base rate case, whichever occurs earlier.
In re Duke Energy Ind., Inc., Cause No. 43955 DSM 3, 2016 WL 943945, at *53
(Mar. 9, 2016).
[19] The Commission included a nearly identical provision in its order issued in In re
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co., Cause No. 44645, 2016 WL 1179962, at
*28–29 (March 23, 2016). On appeal from that order, we reversed the portion
of the Commission’s order relating to the four-year cap. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co.,
2017 WL 899947, at *7 (“the Vectren South case”). We remanded the matter to
the Commission with instructions that the Commission could either
(1) issue specific factual findings to justify its implicit determination that Vectren South’s lost revenue recovery proposals are unreasonable, determine that the Plan is not reasonable in its entirety pursuant to Section 10(m), and allow Vectren South to submit a modified plan within a reasonable time; or (2) issue specific factual findings to justify a determination that the Plan is in fact reasonable in its entirety pursuant to Section 10(k) and allow Vectren South to recover reasonable lost revenues in accordance with the Plan.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 12 of 16 Id. On remand, the Commission rejected CAC’s preferred four-year recovery
period and found that Vectren South’s plan was reasonable. 1 In re S. Ind. Gas &
Elec. Co., Cause No. 44645, 2017 WL 6618867, at *12 (December 20, 2017).
[20] CAC acknowledges our decision in the Vectren South case, but nonetheless
argues that because our decision did not explicitly rule out a four-year recovery
period, the Commission should have adopted that approach. CAC claims that
such an approach would be justifiable so long as the Commission made
appropriate factual findings in support thereof. Here, however, the
Commission made no such findings, and CAC does not point to sufficient
evidence in the record on which the Commission could have relied. Instead,
CAC merely points to alleged deficiencies in the approach adopted by the
Commission.
[21] It is undisputed that the Commission has previously approved the recovery of
lost revenues over a measure’s life or until a utility’s next base rate case,
whichever is shorter. The Commission adopted this approach in this case and
the Commission’s determination is supported by the evidence. Given that CAC
failed to point to adequate evidence to support its favored four-year approach
and in light of our memorandum decision issued in the Vectren South case, we
conclude that the Commission did not unjustifiably deviate from CAC’s
1 Vectren South’s plan is, in relevant part, similar to Duke’s proposed EE Plan as it allows for recovery over the measure’s life or until the utility’s next base rate case, whichever is shorter, and requires reconciliation through EM&V.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 13 of 16 favored precedent.2 CAC’s challenge to the evidence supporting this approach
amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not
do.3 Ind. Gas, 999 N.E.2d at 66.
C. Whether the Evidence is Sufficient to Support the Commission’s Order [22] In arguing that the Commission’s order was not supported by adequate
substantial evidence, CAC does not point to any particular finding which it
claims was not supported by the evidence. CAC merely claims that “there is no
credible evidence that [Duke] experienced its claimed level of lost revenues or
that the rate was established based on other financial aspects of the utility.”
Appellant’s Br. pp. 34–35. It is expected that Duke’s petition would not include
actual losses as it was a petition seeking pre-approval of a three-year EE plan.
The evidence indicated that the losses detailed in the petition were forecasted
losses which would later be reconciled through EM&V with Duke’s actual
losses. The Commission’s order accurately reflects this point and requires
reconciliation. CAC also argues that the Commission failed to give appropriate
weight to the evidence submitted by the Intervenors. As we have stated
2 In addition, contrary to CAC’s claim, the record reveals that the Commission did not ignore the evidence relating to the so-called “pancaking effect” argued by CAC. 3 We are further unpersuaded by CAC’s argument that the Commission erroneously relied on EM&V as part of the methodology for determining lost revenues given that Indiana Code section 8-1-8.5-10(o) explicitly provides that this method should be used during the reconciliation process.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 14 of 16 numerous times above, we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness
credibility on appeal. See Ind. Gas, 999 N.E.2d at 66.
D. Whether the Rate is Consistent with Indiana Code Section 8-1-8.5-10 [23] CAC last argues that the lost revenue rate was not consistent with Indiana Code
section 8-1-8.5-10. In making this claim, CAC notes that the Commission did
not reference or apply the procedures used in general rate-making cases.
However, as we have noted, the requirement that electricity providers file a
three-year EE plan was adopted by our General Assembly in 2015 as a separate
requirement that is in addition to long-standing requirements regarding general
rate-making. CAC points to no relevant authority indicating that the
Commission was required to consider or apply procedures adopted in
connection to general rate-making cases when considering a petition filed in
accordance with Indiana Code section 8-1-8.5-10. Instead, we think the
Commission acted within its discretion by applying the factors and
considerations listed in Indiana Code section 8-1-8.5-10 when considering
Duke’s proposed EE Plan. CAC fails to establish that the Commission’s order
is not consistent with Indiana Code section 8-1-8.5-10.
Conclusion [24] In sum, we conclude that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in finding
both Duke’s proposed EE goals and lost revenue rate to be reasonable. As
such, we affirm the Commission’s approval of Duke’s proposed EE Plan.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 15 of 16 [25] The judgment of the Commission is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-EX-141 | August 21, 2018 Page 16 of 16