Cities Service Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.

541 F. Supp. 1220, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedJune 16, 1982
DocketCiv. A. 82-327
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 541 F. Supp. 1220 (Cities Service Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cities Service Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 541 F. Supp. 1220, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204 (D. Del. 1982).

Opinion

OPINION

STAPLETON, District Judge:

Each of the two principals in this Williams Act case seeks to acquire control of the other through a tender offer and to *1221 fend off the hostile tender for its own stock. The principal plaintiff is Cities Service Company, a Delaware corporation, which, together with its wholly owned subsidiary, Cities Acquisition Company, is referred to herein as “Cities”. The principal defendant is Mesa Petroleum Co., also a Delaware corporation, (“Mesa”).

Cities is currently seeking a preliminary injunction in connection with Mesa’s June 7, 1982 tender for “up to” 15% of Cities Service’s outstanding common stock at $45 per share (hereinafter “Mesa’s 15% $45 offer”). Specifically, Cities seeks a preliminary injunction requiring Mesa:

(a) to postpone the expiration of the proration period for Mesa’s partial tender offer for Cities’ shares (currently scheduled for 12:00 Midnight, New York City time, on Wednesday, June 16, 1982) until the withdrawal deadline of such offer (currently stated to be 12:00 Midnight, New York City time, on Friday, June 25, 1982),
(b) to make appropriate corrective disclosures with regard to certain alleged Mesa misrepresentations,
(c) to permit plaintiffs to disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the investing public certain evidence adduced in discovery, and
(d) for such other relief as to this Court appears just and proper.

Although Cities alleges an array of unlawful activities under the federal securities laws, * the thrust of plaintiffs’ claims charges that Mesa violated Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 through false statements and manipulative activities in connection with Mesa’s offers for Cities’ stock. Cities’ claims arise in the context of three Mesa transactions: its “friendly 46% $50 offer”, its “15% $45 offer”, and its “By-law Amendment”.

While the war between Cities and Mesa has been going on for some time, the current battle was triggered by Cities’ announcement on May 28,1982 of its intention to make a cash tender offer for 51% of the outstanding common stock of Mesa at $17 per share. ** Cities states that its offer was in response to a “planned” offer by Mesa to purchase an amount of Cities’ stock at $42 per share which, when added to the 5% Mesa already held, would give it control of Cities. Mesa responded on May 31, 1982 by proposing to Cities’ management a “friendly” offer for 46% of Cities’ common stock at $50 per share. 1

Cities alleges that Mesa’s friendly 46% $50 offer was an effort to obstruct Cities’ offer until such time as Mesa could get the financing together to make its own hostile tender offer for a majority of Cities' shares. Cities further claims that Mesa did not have financing to support its friendly 46% $50 offer, but made statements to the press on June 1 and June 4, 1982 indicating that it did.

When it became apparent that Cities’ Board of Directors would not embrace Mesa’s “friendly” 46% $50 offer, Mesa made a tender offer to Cities’ stockholders on June 7, 1982, for “up to” 12,100,000 shares (15%) of Cities’ common stock at $45 per *1222 share. Here also, Cities claims that Mesa has made misrepresentations concerning the financing for this offer which are “designed to manipulate the market.” Cities further alleges that Mesa’s 15% $45 offer is a “tender now — finance later” scheme intended to “coerce” the tender of 46% of Cities’ stock and thereby to attract the financing, presently unavailable, which is necessary to purchase control of Cities.

Finally, Cities claims that the repeal of a Mesa by-law provision is further evidence of Mesa’s efforts to mislead the investing public. On June 6, 1982, Mesa’s Board of Directors voted to repeal a Mesa by-law provision permitting special meetings of the stockholders to be called “upon the written request of stockholders holding of record at least one-third of the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation entitled to vote at such meeting.” The alleged purpose of such a repeal was to bar Cities — even if it were to acquire 46% or more of Mesa’s stock — from calling a special meeting of Mesa’s shareholders to effectuate its control. Although Mesa’s Board rescinded the by-law amendment on June 10, 1982, Cities maintains that this is an insufficient cure.

The standard for preliminary injunctive relief in this Circuit is well-established:

[T]his Court has consistently identified four factors which must be examined in ascertaining the propriety of a preliminary injunction: . .. the moving party must generally show (1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation and (2) that the movant will be irreparably injured pendente lite if relief is not granted.... Moreover, while the burden rests upon the moving party to make these requisite showings, the district court “should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.”

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980), quoting Constructors Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1978) (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1980); Wright v. Columbia University, 520 F.Supp. 789 (E.D.Pa.1981); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F.Supp. 532 (D.Del.1975).

While these four factors set the bounds of the Court’s inquiry, “no one aspect will necessarily determine [the] outcome. Rather, a proper judgment entails a ‘delicate balancing’ of all elements.” Constructors Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 573 F.2d at 815 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Delaware River Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 920, 923-24 (3d Cir. 1974). Thus, the Court in Constructors Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps stated:

... in a situation where factors of irreparable harm, interests of third parties and public consideration strongly favor the moving party, an injunction might be appropriate even though plaintiffs did not demonstrate as strong a likelihood of ultimate success as would generally be required.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
541 F. Supp. 1220, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13204, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cities-service-co-v-mesa-petroleum-co-ded-1982.