Citicorp, N.A. v. Henderson (In Re Henderson)

426 B.R. 526, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 922, 2010 WL 1330305
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 6, 2010
Docket19-20736
StatusPublished

This text of 426 B.R. 526 (Citicorp, N.A. v. Henderson (In Re Henderson)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Citicorp, N.A. v. Henderson (In Re Henderson), 426 B.R. 526, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 922, 2010 WL 1330305 (Pa. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ORDER

THOMAS P. AGRESTI, Chief Judge.

Presently before the Court is an Amended Motion for Payment of Unclaimed Funds (“Motion”), filed at Document No. 81 filed by a non-attorney, Kathleen S. Allen, Recovery and Escheat Manager, on behalf of Citicorp, N.A.

The Court has become aware of an increasing number of recent filings seeking the payment of funds that had previously been paid into court as “unclaimed property” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 347. See also 28 U.S.C.A § 204.1, et. seq. Many of these are being filed on behalf of the claimant(s) by individuals who are not licensed as attorneys in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The filers in these instances typically base their authority to do so on a “limited power of attorney” or similar document pursuant to which the claimant has authorized the filer to act as his, her or its attorney-in-fact for the purpose of pursuing the unclaimed funds.

For reasons explained below, the filing of motions for payment of unclaimed funds constitutes the practice of law and hence may generally only be done by a licensed attorney. 1 The Court has dismissed many of these filings with brief orders stating that the filing is being dismissed because the filing party is not authorized to practice law in the Western District of Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Collins, Case No. 03-22894-TPA at Document Nos. 50, 54. Recently, however, some of these filers have begun to “push back” a bit, informally notifying the Court that other bankruptcy courts in the federal system permit this kind of filing by non-attorneys and questioning why this Court will not allow them to do so. For that reason, the Court finds it necessary to issue this Memorandum, Order to set forth the basis for its conclusion in this matter.

As an initial point of reference, the Court notes that the Local Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania require that requests for disbursement of unclaimed funds be made by filing a motion and serving copies of it on all interested parties. See Local Rule 8011-1. These Local Rules have been approved by the District Court for the Western District of *528 Pennsylvania pursuant to the requirements of Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9029 2 and thus properly govern the practice and procedure before this Court. See also 28 U.S.C. § 165h (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein”).

With that understanding of the Local Rules in mind, the Court next notes that the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania prohibits the unauthorized practice of law. See 1$ Pa. C. S.A. § 252L See also Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9010(a) (party may “perform any act not constituting the practice of law, by an authorized agent, attorney in fact, or proxy”). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that attempting to set forth a precise definition of what constitutes the practice of law “would be more likely to invite criticism than to achieve clarity.” Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 84, 193 A. 20 (1937). The Shortz court went on, however, to identify “three principal domains” of professional activity that lawyers engage in: (1) providing legal advice; (2) preparing legal documents; and, (3) representing clients before tribunals. Id. It is this third domain that is most clearly implicated in the present matter. It is instructive to quote in full the description given by the Shortz court:

[A lawyer] appears for clients before public tribunals to whom is committed the function of determining rights of life, liberty, and property according to the law of the land, in order that he may assist the deciding official in the proper interpretation and enforcement of the law. Since, in order to determine such rights, it is necessary first to establish the pertinent facts, which are frequently uncertain, controverted, and best ascertainable, as experience has demonstrated, by the application of rules of evidence tested by centuries of usage, a lawyer, being technically fitted for the purpose, examines and cross-examines witnesses, and presents arguments to jurymen to guide them to a proper determination of the facts. As ancillary to participation in trials and in legal argumentation, he prepares pleadings and other documents incidental to the proceedings.

327 Pa. at 84-85.

Clearly, the filings at issue here involve “property” whose rightful ownership this Court is being asked to determine. This Court’s Local Rules also require the filings to be in the form of a motion, which, while not strictly speaking a “pleading” under the nomenclature of federal procedure, see Fed.R. Civ.P. 7(a), is nevertheless a formal document submitted to a court containing a request for relief in the form of an order. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 7(b). Under bankruptcy practice, the filing of such a motion initiates a contested matter which typically provides for an opportunity to file a response, which often results in such a filing, the need for discovery, and possibly, an adversarial evidentiary hearing. Fed. R.Bankr.P. 9014.

As such, the Court believes the preparation, filing and prosecution of a motion falls squarely within the third domain of professional activity constituting the practice of law as recognized by the court in Shortz. Many other courts in numerous jurisdictions have held that the filing of motions constitutes the practice of law. *529 See, e.g., Unalachtigo Band of Nanticoke-Lenni Lenape Nation v. New Jersey, 2007 WL 4547501 (D.N.J.2007); In re J.L.R., 2009 WL 3634403 (Ohio App. 4th Dist. 2009); In re Conduct of Paulson, 346 Or. 676, 216 P.3d 859 (2009); Word v. Boyd, 2007 WL 4180602 (W.D.Ky.2007); Roberts v. LaConey, 375 S.C. 97, 650 S.E.2d 474 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm’n. v. Hekyong Pak, 400 Md. 567, 929 A.2d 546 (2007); Davenport v. Lee, 348 Ark.

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Related

In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of Paulson
216 P.3d 859 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2009)
Roberts v. LaConey
650 S.E.2d 474 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 2007)
In Re Powell
266 B.R. 450 (N.D. California, 2001)
Davenport v. Lee
72 S.W.3d 85 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2002)
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Pak
929 A.2d 546 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2007)
Van De Berg v. Commissioner IRS
175 F. App'x 539 (Third Circuit, 2006)
Shortz v. Farrell
193 A. 20 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1937)

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Bluebook (online)
426 B.R. 526, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 922, 2010 WL 1330305, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/citicorp-na-v-henderson-in-re-henderson-pawb-2010.