Citibank N.A. v. Jennings, L.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 24, 2025
• Docket: 3161 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A25030-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

CITIBANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE WACHOVIA LOAN TRUST, 2005- : PENNSYLVANIA SD1 ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, : SERIES 2005-SD1 C/O WELLS : FARGO BANK, N.A. : : : v. : : No. 3161 EDA 2024 : LAWANDA A. JENNINGS A/K/A : LAWANDA JENNINGS : : : APPEAL OF: FRANKLIN A. BENNETT, : III :

Appeal from the Order Entered October 18, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-03862-RC

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 24, 2025

Franklin A. Bennett, III (“Bennett”) appeals from the order granting the

motion to assess damages filed by Citibank, N.A., as trustee for the Wachovia

Loan Trust, 2005-SD1 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-SD1 c/o Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Citibank”). We affirm.

While this matter has a lengthy procedural history, based on the issues

asserted on appeal, we offer a truncated recitation of the background. In

2016, Citibank, as assignee to a mortgage note executed between Lawanda

A. Jennings (“Jennings”) and TMS Mortgage, Inc., d/b/a The Money Store, ____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A25030-25

filed the underlying foreclosure action against Jennings. In the complaint,

Citibank alleged that she had failed to pay on the mortgage for the secured

real property since 2008, identifying in ¶ 9 a total amount due and owing of

$173,862.34. In its prayer for relief, Citibank requested an in rem judgment

in mortgage foreclosure for that amount, plus interest and additional costs

associated with the sale of the mortgaged premises.

Several months after the complaint was filed, Jennings deeded the

property in question to Bennett for $10,000. Bennett, then licensed to

practice law in Pennsylvania, thereafter began to represent Jennings in the

foreclosure action. However, at some point in the proceedings, Bennett was

granted leave to intervene in his individual capacity, and Jennings represented

herself from that point onward.

In November 2020, Citibank filed a motion for summary judgment.

Within, it contended that it “established its right to summary judgment” as a

matter of law in the foreclosure action, as well as judgment in its favor as to

several claims raised by Bennett in a separate quiet title action that was

consolidated with this case. See Motion for Summary Judgment, 11/12/20,

at 10. The motion specifically averred that Citibank had proven damages, the

amount of which were not contested by Jennings or Bennett. Instead, their

primary defense in the foreclosure action was to assert their belief that a

previously recorded satisfaction piece discharged the mortgage in question.

Citibank’s summary judgment motion did not include a proposed order or

restate a specific sum as to the judgment.

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In February 2021, the court granted the motion for summary judgment

as follows: “An in rem judgment is entered in favor of Citibank and against

Jennings and Bennett for the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property”

identified in the foreclosure action. See Order, 2/3/21. Critically, the order

did not specify a monetary award. A docket entry was created on the same

day, indicating “JUDGMENT STATUS DOCKET OPINION AND/OR ORDER

Amount: 0.00.” Docket Chester County Case No. 2016-03862-RC.

Bennett appealed the court’s order. Upon review, this Court determined

that the issues raised by Bennett were waived because he failed to clearly

delineate them in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement or

adequately develop any arguments in his brief. See Citibank, N.A. v.

Jennings, 279 A.3d 1255, 2022 WL 1554859 at *2-3 (Pa.Super. 2022) (non-

precedential decision). We therefore affirmed the summary judgment order.

Our High Court denied Bennett’s petition for allowance of appeal in November

of 2022.

On September 24, 2024, Citibank filed with the trial court the underlying

motion to assess damages, noting that no judicial sale of the property could

be completed because of the lack of a specified monetary sum in the

judgment. Bennett lodged a written response in opposition, and the court

granted Citibank’s motion without a hearing. Specifically, it stated that the in

rem judgment “is amended to include a sum certain of $291,192.63, plus

interest from September 4, 2024, at the rate of $21.08 per diem and other

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costs and charges collectible under the mortgage, foreclosure, and sale of the

mortgaged property[.]” Order, 10/18/24.

This timely appeal followed. Both Bennett and the trial court complied

with the strictures of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Bennett raises two issues for our

consideration:

1. Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction to amend a judgment [1,353] days after its entry?

2. Did the trial court violate Pennsylvania law, the Pa.R.C[iv].P., and [Bennett’]s due process rights in entering its 10/18/24 order amending a judgment [1,353] days after its entry?

Bennett’s brief at 4 (some capitalization altered).

In his first claim, Appellant alleges that the trial court lacked jurisdiction

in 2024 to amend the summary judgment entered in 2021. Our High Court

has stated:

[A]s a pure question of law, the standard of review in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action is a fundamental issue of law which may be raised at any time in the course of the proceedings, including by a reviewing court sua sponte.

Mazur v. Trinity Area School District, 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008) (citation

omitted). Despite this issue not being listed in Bennett’s Rule 1925(b)

statement of errors, it is not waived, as it concerns the jurisdiction of the trial

court. See, e.g., Schluth v. Krishvatar, Inc., 302 A.3d 96, 103 (Pa.Super.

2023) (noting that “jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first

time on appeal”).

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Bennett’s argument is premised upon the application of 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 5505, which provides, regarding the modification of orders, “[e]xcept as

otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties

may modify or rescind any order within [thirty] days after its entry,

notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from

such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Bennett contends

that since he appealed the summary judgment order in question in 2021, it

has long been deemed “final.” See Bennett’s brief at 5-6 (discussing that

Citibank did not file its motion to assess damages until “almost two years after

the order became finalized[.]”). As such, he opines that the trial court did not

have the ability to amend the order by way of granting Citibank’s motion to

assess damages. Id. at 10-15.

In contrast, Citibank maintains that the trial court had jurisdiction to

amend through the exceptions to § 5505 established by caselaw, namely the

court’s inherent ability to fix clear mistakes or to amend orders based on

“extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.” See Citibank’s brief

at 20-25. We note that since Appellant newly raised this jurisdictional issue

in his brief to this Court, the trial court did not address it in its Rule 1925(a)

opinion.1

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1 Nonetheless, in defending the adequacy of its order assessing damages, the

trial court highlighted that Citibank attached an affidavit to the motion that confirmed pertinent information, such as the loan history, mortgage, and note. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/21/25, at 5. It further indicated that when Bennett (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Based on our review, we conclude that that parties’ discussion of § 5505

and its exceptions misses the mark as it relates to the specific facts of this

case. As discussed, the court here did not amend any prior order, final or

otherwise. Instead, it assessed damages at the request of Citibank, and in so

doing, modified the judgment previously entered in Citibank’s favor.

This Court has observed as follows with respect to a court’s ability to

enforce its judgments:

The trial court has the power to modify a judgment upon the proper application to the court for amendment. . . .; see also [Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp. v. ]Grillo, 827 A.2d [489,] 493 [(Pa.Super. 2003)] (mortgagee “had every right to petition the court to amend the writ of execution to include additional interests and costs prior to” satisfaction.); PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs, 929 A.2d 219, 227 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2007) (a motion to reassess damages “invokes a trial court’s equitable power to enforce the underlying judgment and to grant relief until the judgment is discharged or satisfied.”). We review the trial court’s entry of a modified judgment for an abuse of discretion.

Based upon the foregoing legal principles, we conclude that the trial court enjoys the inherent power to amend a judgment until the judgment is discharged or satisfied.

EMC Mortg., LLC v. Biddle, 114 A.3d 1057, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2015) (cleaned

up). In EMC Mortg., LLC, this Court determined that the trial court had the

ability to amend a default foreclosure judgment at the request of the

mortgagee some six months after entry of the judgment, since the request

was made before discharge or satisfaction. Id.

answered Citibank’s motion, he did not deny “the amount due at the time of the complaint was filed or the additional sums due since the complaint was filed.” Id. at 6.

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Here, despite having a judgment award in hand, Citibank has been

unable to proceed with a judicial sale of the property due to the lack of a

specified sum. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Pautenis, 118 A.3d 386, 394

(Pa.Super. 2015) (stating that “[t]he precise amount due on a mortgage is

. . . essential [in a foreclosure action], as a sheriff could not possibly distribute

the proceeds of a foreclosure sale among the various parties in interest

without knowing the exact extent of the claim of the foreclosing mortgagee”

(cleaned up)). Accordingly, the judgment in this matter plainly has not been

“discharged or satisfied.” EMC Mortg., LLC, 114 A.3d at 1064. As in EMC

Mortg., LLC, Citibank properly filed a motion to reassess damages so that it

could proceed with the judicial sale. The trial court therefore had the equitable

power to modify the previously entered judgment when it did.

In short, Bennett’s discussion of § 5505, and the caselaw interpreting

it, does not apply to this situation. The entire underpinning of his contention

on appeal, that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce a judgment through

modification, is unsupported by the certified record. Therefore, no relief is

due.2

In his remaining issue, Bennett argues that the trial court violated his

due process rights by granting Citibank’s motion to assess damages.

2 Both Bennett and Citibank also devote significant portions of their respective

briefs to discussing the role of harmless error when a court acts outside of its jurisdiction. Since we have concluded that the trial court did not lack such jurisdiction to enter the order assessing damages, we do not consider these arguments.

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However, he proffers a single conclusory sentence in support thereof:

“Alternatively, the trial court violated defendants [sic] right to due process

under both the state and federal constitutions by failing to give proper notice

and a hearing and failed to implement the proper standard of review giving

notice to all parties of what the court was doing.” Bennett’s brief at 19.

Appellant failed to include a separate argument section in his brief as to

this claim, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Moreover, and more importantly,

this fallback contention was woefully underdeveloped. Bennett does not

discuss any legal authority relating to due process rights, how the court failed

“to give proper notice,” especially in light of the fact that he filed a response,

or why he was entitled to a hearing on Citibank’s motion to assess damages.

This is especially true when, as Citibank highlights, Bennett’s defense at the

summary judgment stage was not to contest the amount of damages, but

rather to argue that a recorded satisfaction piece eradicated the mortgage.

Nothing Bennett has presented on appeal provides us with a basis for

overturning the court’s decision. See, e.g., Bert Company v. Turk, 257

A.3d 93, 113 n.7 (Pa.Super. 2021) (stating that “[w]hen an appellant’s

argument is underdeveloped, we may not supply it with a better one. In such

situations, we shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we

scour the record to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will

deem the issue to be waived.”).

Based on the above, we affirm the court’s order granting Citibank’s

motion to assess damages.

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Order affirmed.

Date: 12/24/2025

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