Cisneros v. Vangilder

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DANIEL CISNEROS, Case No. 16-cv-00735-HSG 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE ORDER DENYING 9 v. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 10 J.VANGILDER, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 233 11 Defendants. 12 13 Pending before the Court is a motion to vacate the Court’s February 3, 2021 Attorneys’ 14 Fees Order, filed by counsel for Plaintiff Daniel Cisneros. Dkt. No. 233. 15 I. DISCUSSION 16 The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, so the Court only briefly addresses them 17 here. On June 21, 2019, the jury returned a verdict in favor of both Plaintiff Cisneros and Plaintiff 18 Daniel Manriquez in the related case Manriquez v. Vangilder, 16-cv-01320-HSG. See Dkt. No. 19 206. Final judgment was subsequently entered in favor of each Plaintiff against Defendants 20 Vangilder (in the amount of $1,000) and Vasquez (in the amount of $1,500). See Dkt. No. 220, 21 221. On February 3, 2021, the Court granted in part Plaintiff Manriquez’s motion for attorneys’ 22 fees, awarding $259,237.50 in attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff Manriquez as a prevailing party under 23 California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. See Dkt. No. 230. In its discretion, the Court denied 24 Plaintiff Cisneros’ motion for attorneys’ fees. Id. Reed Smith LLP, Counsel for Plaintiff 25 Cisneros, appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 21-15363, and now asks the Court to 26 reconsider its order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Dkt. No. 233. 27 Counsel contends that the Court “made a mistake of law when it denied Cisneros’s motion 1 id. at 4. In short, counsel suggests that having found that Plaintiff Cisneros was a successful party 2 under § 1021.5, the Court must award fees of $259,237.50, just as it did for Plaintiff Manriquez. 3 Counsel cites to a California Court of Appeal case, Rogel v. Lynwood Redevelopment 4 Agency, which rejected the application of a negative multiplier in setting the lodestar for an 5 attorneys’ fees award for pro bono counsel against a local government agency under § 1021.5. 6 194 Cal. App. 4th 1319, 1332 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). In Rogel, the agency had argued that it could 7 not afford to pay the requested attorneys’ fees as doing so would “harm[] its affordable housing 8 mission . . . .” Id. at 1326. The trial court agreed with the agency, reasoning that “it would be 9 ‘better’ for less money to be paid to the prevailing parties for their attorneys’ fees so as to leave 10 the agency with more money for its ongoing governmental operations.” Id. at 1321. The court 11 further explained that the agency’s “financial condition ‘was the most compelling reason for 12 reducing the fees,’” and that “[i]t seem[ed] as though the money should be spent in [the city] and 13 not on the lawyers.” Id. at 1328. The Court also “noted the pro bono nature of the lawyers’ work 14 as a factor for applying a negative multiplier,” finding “an award of millions of dollars of in 15 attorneys’ fees unreasonable and excessive when most of the work . . . by Plaintiffs’ counsel was 16 pro bono.” Id. The court thus reduced the attorneys’ lodestar from approximately $2.7 million to 17 $540,000. Id. In reversing the order, the Court of Appeal explained that the court erred, inter alia, 18 in reducing the attorneys’ lodestar based on their pro bono status because “public interest litigation 19 should not have to rely on the charity of counsel . . . .” Id. at 1332–33. 20 Here, the Court did not conclude that counsel could not recover fees because it represented 21 Plaintiff on a pro bono basis. See Dkt. No. 230 at 12. To the contrary, the Court explicitly stated 22 that “representing a party pro bono does not, on its own, preclude counsel from recouping 23 attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 13 (citing General Order No. 25). Rather, the Court considered the totality 24 of the circumstances “to balance the interests of fairness and proportionality” in deciding whether 25 and how to exercise its discretion to award attorneys’ fees. See id. at 13. This included (1) the 26 modest jury verdict and scale of the public benefit derived from this case1; (2) the risk counsel 27 1 took representing Plaintiff Cisneros in this action, including the risk to its work for existing 2 clients, the development of new work, and the profitability of the large, nationwide firm; and 3 (3) counsel’s performance throughout the litigation. Id. at 13–14. 4 In its analysis, the Court of Appeal in Rogel acknowledged that the California Supreme 5 Court has upheld consideration of similar factors in setting an attorneys’ fees award. See Rogel, 6 194 Cal. App. 4th at 1329 (citing Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48–49 (1977) (en banc)). In 7 Serrano v. Priest, the California Supreme Court identified the following factors: 8 (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill 9 displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the 10 contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing 11 eligibility for an award; (4) the fact that an award against the state would ultimately fall upon the taxpayers; [and] (5) the fact that the 12 attorneys in question received public and charitable funding for the purpose of bringing law suits of the character here involved . . . . 13 14 Serrano, 20 Cal. 3d at 49. The California Supreme Court found that consideration of these 15 factors—as considered here—was not an abuse of discretion, and upheld the attorneys’ fee award. 16 Id. at 50. 17 The Court understands that Reed Smith also believes that it received disparate treatment as 18 compared to the Singleton Law Firm, A.P.C. See Dkt. No. 233 at 5–7. That Reed Smith may 19 have spent approximately 95 more hours on this case than the Singleton Law Firm, see id. at 6, 20 however, says nothing about the relative risks incurred by the firms. The Court further notes that 21 attorney Brody McBride from the Singleton Law Firm performed exceptionally during the trial, 22 particularly during Plaintiffs’ closing argument. 23 The Court reiterates its appreciation for Reed Smith’s willingness to represent Plaintiff 24 the plaintiff must be a successful party in an action resulting in the enforcement of an important 25 right affecting the public interest. See Vasquez v. State of California, 45 Cal. 4th 243, 250–51 (Cal. 2008), as modified (Dec. 17, 2008). And here, the cases arose from the negligent discharge 26 of a T-16 oleoresin capsicum (“OC”) chemical grenade in the control booth of a housing unit at Pelican Bay State Prison. Although the use of chemical agents like OC is not uncommon in 27 CDCR facilities, there was no evidence in the record that the accidental discharge of such 1 Cisneros pro bono in this case, but again declines to award attorneys’ fees given the totality of the 2 circumstances. The Court hopes that counsel will nonetheless continue to provide high-quality 3 pro bono legal representation in future cases. 4 II CONCLUSION 5 The Court DENIES the motion. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: 5/4/2021 8 . □ aes S. GILLIAM, JR. / ! 9 United States District Judge 10 11 a 12

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