Cincinnati Tract. Co. v. Cocoran

162 N.E. 791, 28 Ohio App. 453, 6 Ohio Law. Abs. 657, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 544
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 27, 1928
Docket3142
StatusPublished

This text of 162 N.E. 791 (Cincinnati Tract. Co. v. Cocoran) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cincinnati Tract. Co. v. Cocoran, 162 N.E. 791, 28 Ohio App. 453, 6 Ohio Law. Abs. 657, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 544 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928).

Opinion

MILLS, J.

We are of the opinion that the jury might reasonably conclude from all the evidence, that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the injury.

There is evidence that the injured eyie, besides being itself almost useless, actually interferes with the vision of the other eye. The eye was submitted to three surgical operations. The jury’ was justified in believing that the plaintiff suffered considerable pain from bQth the original cut and the subsequent surgical operations. We cannot'say that the damages assessed were excessive.

On cross-examination, John Corcoran, testifying for the plaintiff, was asked whether immediately after the accident he had not patted the motorman on the back and said: “When you make your report, you tell them you are not at fault. It is my fault.” He denied that he had ever made that statement, or any other statement to either the motorman or the conductor.

The defendant introduced the testimony of Dwyer, the conductor, and Steele, the motorman of the street car, to the effect that Mr. Corcoran had made the statement referred to in practically the words quoted above, immediately after the accident.

At the request of the plaintiff, the following special charge was read to the jury before the argument:

“Certain testimony by defendant’s witnesses has been introduced to the effect that John Corcoran, the driver of the automobile, made certain statements some time after the accident. This testimony is not proof of the truth of those statements, but can be considered solely for the purpose of impeaching John Cor-coran as a witness and affecting his credibility.”

Counsel for the defendant admit that, according to the weight of authority, the testimony as to the prior self-contradictions of Corcoran was admissible for the sole purpose of affecting Corcoran’s credibility as a witness. Wigmore on Evidence, Section 1018 and authorities there cited.

It is contended, however, that the special charge as given was prejudicial to the- defense, in that it contained the hint that the testimony of Steele and Dwyer did not tend to prove that Corcoran made the alleged statements.

We are of the opinion that the charge complained of was correct, and not - open to ’ the construction suggested by the defendant.

Finding no errors in the record that were prejudicial to the defendant, we affirm; the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.

(Hamilton, PJ., and Cushing, J., concur.)

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Related

Southern Railway Co. v. Gray
241 U.S. 333 (Supreme Court, 1916)

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Bluebook (online)
162 N.E. 791, 28 Ohio App. 453, 6 Ohio Law. Abs. 657, 1928 Ohio App. LEXIS 544, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cincinnati-tract-co-v-cocoran-ohioctapp-1928.