Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis & Chicago Railway Co. v. McLain

44 N.E. 306, 148 Ind. 188, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 316
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedJune 9, 1896
DocketNo. 17,191
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 44 N.E. 306 (Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis & Chicago Railway Co. v. McLain) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis & Chicago Railway Co. v. McLain, 44 N.E. 306, 148 Ind. 188, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 316 (Ind. 1896).

Opinion

Howard, J.

This was an action for. damages brought by the appellee for personal injuries, caused, as alleged, by the negligence of the appellant.

The accident occurred at a point on appellant’s line of road a little east of where the same crosses the Indianapolis Belt Railroad, and while appellant’s train was approaching the city from the east, between ten and eleven o’clock on the night of June 28, 1888.

Appellee was a passenger, and it appears that he [189]*189wished to leave the train at the crossing of the Belt road.

It is alleged in the, complaint that as the train neared the city, the appellee “inquired of the conductor in charge of said train whether or not he could get off safely at the crossing of the Belt railroad near the city of Indianapolis, and whether the train upon which he was riding would stop at said crossing; that he was informed by said conductor that the train would stop and he could get off without any danger, if he so desired; that the conductor directed him as soon as they should come to freight cars standing.on the side track, which he told the plaintiff would be the first freight cars that they would pass after the time the conductor and the plaintiff were talking, to go upon the platform and be ready .to get off as soon as the train came to a stop; that when the train came to the freight cars, the plaintiff, pursuant to the direction of the conductor of said train, went out upon the platform, and, as the train slowed up, he walked down to the lower step to be ready to get off, as directed by the conductor, so soon as the train should stop; that the train came nearly to a stop, but without entirely stopping, it was negligently started up with a sudden and violent jerk to go forward again, and whereby the plaintiff was thrown under the cars and so that the car wheels passed over and cut off both of his legs, and so injured him that both .of his legs had to be amputated above the said injury;” that by reason of said injury he has suffered and will always suffer, and has been incapacitated from work and labor, all to his damage in the sum of $10,000.00; “that the place where he was directed to get off of said cars by said conductor was not a safe and proper place for him to get off; that said injury occurred by reason of the negligence of the said railroad company, and without any [190]*190fault or negligence whatever on his part contributing thereto.”

The cause was submitted to a jury- who returned a verdict for appellee in the sum of $5,500.00, together with answers to interrogatories submitted by the appellant and by the appellee.

Numerous alleged errors are assigned and discussed by counsel; but the bill of exceptions does not appear to be in the record; and the only questions before us relate to the sufficiency of the complaint, and to the correctness of the court’s action in overruling appellant’s motion for judgment on answers to interrogatories, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury.

The answers to interrogatories show, that at the time of his injury, June 28, 1888, appellee was a passenger on appellant’s train, from Valley Junction to Indianapolis; that shortly before the train reached the Belt road he informed the conductor that he desired to get off at the crossing, and asked if he could do so; that the conductor gave the required permission, and informed appellee that he could get off without danger; that shortly before arriving at the crossing the conductor directed appellee that as soon as they reached certain freight cars standing beside the track he should get upon the platf orm and be ready to step off when the train should come to a stop; that the Belt road crossing was at the time a crossing of appellant’s main line, the Belt road being a railroad over which passengers might be transported; that at and prior to the time of the accident the appellant was accustomed to stop its trains' at the Belt and permit passengers to alight; that appellee knew that there was no passenger station or platform at or near the crossing, and knew that the Belt road was not advertised as a stopping place for the receiving or discharge of passengers, and that the stop there was a short one; that there was [191]*191then a signal keeper on duty at night, and it was the practice to slow up the train as it approached the crossing, and if a white signal was given by the keeper, showing a clear track, the train would pass on to the city without coming to a full stop; that the appellee was familiar with the movement of westbound trains at the Belt crossing, having gotten off there before; that his reason for desiring to get off at the crossing was that he wished to visit a relative living near there; that after the point was reached where the freight cars stood along the side track, the appellee got up and went out upon the platform and down to the lower step, prepared to alight when the train should come to a stop; that he stood upon the lower step, holding on to the railing and waiting for the train to stop so that he might alight; that as the train approached the Belt road it began to slow up, the steam being shut off and the air brakes applied, until it was going at a speed of about four miles an hour; that after the train had slowed up until it was running about twelve or fourteen miles an hour, and while appellee was standing on the lower step waiting to alight, the air brakes were suddenly loosed and the train started on without having come to a stop, whereby appellee was thrown from the steps and injured as alleged in the complaint; that the conductor did not notify the engineer to stop at the crossing, and the engineer did not know that the appellee was on the step or intending to get off; that the injury was not caused by the failure of the train to come to a stop at the crossing, having occurred further east than the point where the train usually stops; that the fact that the train did not come to a full stop at the usual stopping place, after slowing up, but started up again, had no effect as to the injuries of appellee; that the appellee, by direction of the conductor, went out volun[192]*192tarily upon the platform and took the lower step while the car was in motion as it approached the Belt road; that the position taken by appellee on the lower step was a dangerous one, and known by him to be dangerous; that it was dark at the time, and between ten and eleven o’clock at night; that the conductor was in the car at the time the appellee went upon the platform, and had some conversation with him about getting off before that; that the engineer when about half or three-quarters of a mile from the crossing sounded his whistle and turned off steam; that when the train reached the switches, about 1,600 or 1,800 feet from the crossing, the air brakes were applied by the engineer, and after passing the switches the brakes were released; that after the engineer reached a point about 250 feet from the crossing the air brakes were again turned on, and the speed of the train reduced to three or four miles an hour; that the injury to appellee occurred about 1,600 feet east of the Belt road; that it was the practice of appellant, when the signal showed the Belt track not clear, to stop about 200 or 250 feet east of the crossing; that the appellee was injured several hundred feet east of the crossing and when the train was running twelve or fourteen miles per hour.

It is first contended by appellant that the facts, as found by the jury, do not make out a case, as stated in the complaint.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
44 N.E. 306, 148 Ind. 188, 1896 Ind. LEXIS 316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cincinnati-indianapolis-st-louis-chicago-railway-co-v-mclain-ind-1896.