Cincinnati College v. Yeatman

30 Ohio St. (N.S.) 276
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 15, 1876
StatusPublished

This text of 30 Ohio St. (N.S.) 276 (Cincinnati College v. Yeatman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cincinnati College v. Yeatman, 30 Ohio St. (N.S.) 276 (Ohio 1876).

Opinion

Johnson, J.

A former application for this purpose was considered by the supreme court in Cincinnati College v. La Rue, 22 Ohio St. 469.

[280]*280It was there held, that the application, was premature ; that under the statute, and before the auditor can be compelled to make a transfer, evidence of the title of the person or party to whom it is to he made, must be presented, and that if the transfer sought is only of part of such property, satisfactory proof must, also be made of the value of such part, as compared with the value of the whole as charged on the duplicate.

The defects of the former application having now been supplied by the proper showing as to title and comparative value of the'part sought to be transferred, the question again presented is, whether the relator is entitled to a peremptory mandamus.

This depends upon the nature of the estate conveyed, and the intention of the parties, as evidenced in the indenture.

1. ■ As to the transfer of a second story to the name of a purchaser or lessee, where the whole lot and building stands in the name of the vendor or lessor for purposes of taxation.

The statute under which transfers are to be made (67 O. L. 105) is as follows:

“ Sec. 1st. The county auditor shall, on application and presentation of title, with such affidavits as may be required by law, or the proper order of a court, transfer any land, or town lot, or part thereof, charged with taxes on the duplicate, from the name in which it may stand into the name of the owner whenever rendered necessary by any conveyance, partition, devise, descent, or otherwise, and, if, by reason of the conveyance, or otherwise, a part only of any tract or lot, as charged on the duplicate, is to he transferred, the party or parties desiring the transfer shall make satisfactory proof of the value of such part, as compared with the valuation of the whole, as charged on the duplicate, before the transfer shall be made, etc.”

This section also prohibits the recording of any absolute conveyance without such transfer.

[281]*281By the act in relation to permanent leasehold estates (2 S. & C. 1142), it is declared that:

“ Permanent leasehold estates, renewable forever, shall be subjeci to the same law of descent and distribution as estates in fee; ” and provides that “ sales thereof . . . shall be governed by the same laws that now, or may hereafter govern . . . sales of estates in fee.”

Again, by section 20 of the act relating to descents and distribution (1 S. & C. 505), it is declared that:

“ Permanent leasehold estates renewable forever, shall be subject to the same law of descent and distribution as estates in fee, etc.”

By section 2 of the tax law (2 S. & C. 1489): “ The terms ‘ real property’ and ‘laud,’ wherever used in this act, shall be held to mean and include not only the land itself, whether laid out in town lots or otherwise, but also all buildings, structures, and improvements, and other fixtures of whatever kind thereon, and all rights and privileges belonging or in any way appertaining thereto.”

This comprehensive definition for purposes of taxation is applicable as well to the statute governing transfers.

The constitution provides for the taxation of all property, where not exempted as therein authorized by a uniform rule, according to its value, and requires that laws shall be passed for that purpose.

By section 70 of the tax law (2 S. & 0.1468): “ It is the duty of every person seized of or holding lands not before listed, to list the same for taxation with the county auditor on or before the third Monday in May, after the same shall be subject to taxation, and imposes a penalty for a failure to do so.”

By section 71 it is provided that: “ It shall be the duty of each and every person holding lands as aforesaid, to pay the tax which may be assessed thereon, each and every year.”

These citations, and others that might be made, show that while the taxes are levied and assessed upon property, they are also a personal obligation of the owner of that [282]*282property, which it is his duty to pay. The general rule then is, that whoever owns the property should pay the taxes assessed on it.

But it is said that said section 18 only makes if the duty of the auditor to make such transfer of land or town lot or part thereof, and that the transfer demanded is not of a lot, nor part of it, but of a part of a building, bounded by horizontal lines. In short, that no transfer can be made of part of real property, not divided by vertical lines.

We apprehend, that the building, whenever it isapermanent improvement, is land within the meaning of the law, for the purposes of taxation, and that the words “ part thereof” may be applied to it, as well as the lot on which it stands, and may consist of a part, by metes and bounds, or definite description of a separate part, or of an individual aliquot part of the whole, provided the conveyance in terms conveys a title and ownership in the estate which is liable t© be assessed. ‘

The question therefore remains, whether the Mercantile Library Association held such an estate as should be listed by it, and upon which it should pay taxes ?

It was in form a lease in perpetuity of a room of specified dimensions, in the second story of the building, with right of ingress and egress, and with perpetual covenants by the lessor to heat and to rebuild.

There is a limitation on tire power of alienation by the lessee, which may affect the value of the estate, rather than its character as real property within the meaning of the tax laws.

That there may be distinct and separate estates in land and structures thereon by other than vertical lines, has long been well settled. Coke on Littleton, 48 b.

Thus, if the owner of land grants the trees growing thereon to another and his heirs, with the right to cut and carry them away at his pleasure, forever, the. grantee acquires an estate in fee in the trees, with an interest in the soil sufficient for their growth, while the fee in the soil re[283]*283mains in the grantor. Clap v. Draper, 4 Mass. 34 ; Knotts v. Hydrick, 12 Rich. 314.

So, in eases of mines, quarries, and the like, there may be a double ownership, one of the mines, the other of the soil, each held by distinct and independent titles. 1 Wash-burn on Real Property, Ch. 1, secs. 11 and 12, and cases cited.

So a dwelling-house may be the subject of ownership in fee, although its owner may have no further interest in the land on which it stands than a right to have it remain there ; and one may hold such an estate in a single chamber in such house. Doe v. Burt, 1 Tenn. 701; Proprietors v. Lowell, 1 Met. 538, 541; Cheeseborough v. Green, 10 Conn. 318; Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575. 1 Washburn on Real Property, [5] sees. 11 and 12.

The case of the Proprietors v. Lowell, supra, is in point. It was an action by a church to recover back, taxes claimed to be illegally assessed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 Ohio St. (N.S.) 276, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cincinnati-college-v-yeatman-ohio-1876.