Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Gilbert

2014 Ohio 522, 5 N.E.3d 632, 138 Ohio St. 3d 218
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 20, 2014
Docket2013-0575
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2014 Ohio 522 (Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Gilbert) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Gilbert, 2014 Ohio 522, 5 N.E.3d 632, 138 Ohio St. 3d 218 (Ohio 2014).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Jason Robert Gilbert of Fort Thomas, Kentucky, Attorney Registration No. 0074044, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2001.

*219 {¶ 2} Relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, charged Gilbert with professional misconduct for practicing law in Ohio while registered on inactive status and for neglecting three client matters. Gilbert stipulated to the charged misconduct, and the parties jointly recommended that he serve a one-year suspension. After a hearing, a three-member panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline determined that Gilbert had committed most of the charged misconduct and recommended that he serve a one-year suspension, stayed on conditions. The board adopted the panel’s findings and recommended sanction, and neither party has filed objections to the board’s report.

{¶ 3} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and suspend Gilbert for one year, with the suspension stayed in its entirety on conditions.

Misconduct

{¶ 4} Following graduation from law school in 2001, Gilbert took and passed the Ohio bar exam but became employed as a Kentucky public defender. 1 In 2002, Gilbert was admitted to the Kentucky bar, and in 2005, he registered for inactive status in Ohio because he worked exclusively in Kentucky state courts. After ten years as a public defender, Gilbert became dissatisfied with the work and resigned.

{¶ 5} In the autumn of 2011, Gilbert was contacted by the administrative assistant to Michelle Wenker, a Cincinnati attorney who was in a nursing home after suffering a stroke. Wenker’s assistant indicated that she needed clerical help in Wenker’s office. Although Gilbert started out assisting only with Wenker’s administrative matters, he eventually “drifted” into doing some legal work for her clients. However, Gilbert’s only legal experience was ten years of public-sector criminal-defense work, and he has since acknowledged that he was “grossly unprepared” for general private practice.

{¶ 6} In December 2011, Gilbert left Wenker’s office and became a tax advisor. He reactivated his Ohio license in February 2012, and at the time of the panel hearing, he was employed by a company in South Carolina reviewing documents for discovery.

{¶ 7} During the few months that Gilbert worked in Wenker’s office, he committed professional misconduct in four matters. First, Gilbert filed an answer and counterclaim on Wenker’s behalf in an Ohio civil proceeding against her, even though he had not yet reactivated his Ohio license. The parties stipulated and the board found that Gilbert violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) (prohibit *220 ing a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction). We agree with this conclusion.

{¶ 8} Second, Gilbert met with a former client of Wenker’s to discuss whether the client was entitled to money as a beneficiary of a life-insurance policy, and he agreed to represent the client. But Gilbert then failed to resolve the client’s question or return his phone calls. The parties stipulated and the board found that Gilbert violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), and 5.5(a). We agree with the conclusion.

{¶ 9} The third and fourth client matters are similar. In each case, Gilbert met with former clients of Wenker’s about divorce-related issues and collected a retainer to conduct further work, but he did not deposit the clients’ money into a client trust account. Although Gilbert did some work on each case, he failed to communicate with the clients, and they eventually terminated his services. Based on this conduct, the parties stipulated and the board found that Gilbert engaged in two violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 (requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own property) and two more violations each of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, and 5.5(a). We agree that the violations occurred.

{¶ 10} Relator also alleged that Gilbert violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 for charging an excessive fee in one of the divorce-related matters, but the board found that the evidence did not support a finding of a violation of this rule. We agree and hereby dismiss that charge.

Sanction

{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the actual injury caused, the existence of any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. We have already identified Gilbert’s ethical violations. Consideration of the remaining factors demonstrates that a one-year suspension, stayed in its entirety on conditions, is reasonable and appropriate in this case.

1. Aggravating and mitigating factors

{¶ 12} The board found, and we agree, that only one aggravating factor is present — Gilbert committed multiple offenses. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d). In contrast, the mitigating factors are the absence of a disciplinary record in Ohio or Kentucky, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, and full restitution to the two clients from whom *221 Gilbert accepted retainers. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (c), and (d). Gilbert also expressed significant remorse for his conduct, and he submitted two character letters, including one from a Kentucky trial court judge who stated that she had presided over cases involving Gilbert for five years and found his character to be “beyond reproach.” Finally, the board noted that it was unable to find evidence of a dishonest or selfish motive in Gilbert’s misconduct.

2. Applicable precedent

{¶ 13} As the board noted, we have not had many cases involving an attorney who practiced law while registered on inactive status — and even fewer involving an attorney on inactive status who practiced incompetently or neglected client matters. In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Bucciere, 121 Ohio St.3d 274, 2009-Ohio-1156, 903 N.E.2d 640, an attorney mistakenly believed that his assistant had arranged to register him for active status. He appeared in trial and appellate court proceedings, attended a deposition, and agreed to participate in mediation to resolve a dispute, all while his attorney-registration status was inactive. That attorney had no prior discipline, lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, and cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings, and we accordingly issued a public reprimand. Id. at ¶ 4-6.

{¶ 14} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Motylinski,

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Bluebook (online)
2014 Ohio 522, 5 N.E.3d 632, 138 Ohio St. 3d 218, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cincinnati-bar-assn-v-gilbert-ohio-2014.