[Cite as Ciganik v. York, 2013-Ohio-5834.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO
EARLEENE CIGANIK, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 2013-P-0018 - vs - :
ROBERT YORK, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Civil Appeal from the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2011 CV 01458.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
Joel A. Holt and James E.J. Ickes, Williams, Welser, Kratcoski & Can, L.L.C., 11 South River Street, Suite A, Kent, OH 44240 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Martha L. Allee and Carolyn M. Cappel, Weston Hurd LLP, The Tower at Erieview, 1301 E. 9th Street, Suite 1900, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Defendant-Appellee).
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Earleene Ciganik (“Mrs. Ciganik”), appeals from the February 4,
2013 judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, granting appellee,
Robert York’s (“Pastor York”), motion for summary judgment.
{¶2} Mrs. Ciganik, a woman in her eighties, was a 50-year member of First
Baptist Church of Streetsboro. In 2010, Pastor York was hired as the new church
pastor. Mrs. Ciganik began to disagree with the direction of the church. She communicated her disagreement over various matters, including church doctrine,
governance, and finances, with other church members, administrative staff, and Pastor
York.
{¶3} As a result, on April 10, 2011, Pastor York gave Mrs. Ciganik a letter
maintaining that she had committed offenses against him and the church, including a
statement that she had attempted to steal church property, specifically a picture of the
former pastor. Mrs. Ciganik was informed that a disciplinary meeting would be held the
following week, in accordance with church policy. According to Mrs. Ciganik, Pastor
York advised her that her membership would be taken away and that she would not be
permitted back in the church.
{¶4} Nevertheless, on April 17, 2011, Mrs. Ciganik went to First Baptist Church
for Sunday worship. However, at the direction of Pastor York, police removed Mrs.
Ciganik from church property. Pastor York later read the April 10, 2011 letter to the
congregation, which contained the charges against Mrs. Ciganik, including the fact that
she had attempted to steal church property. Two days later, Pastor York sent Mrs.
Ciganik a letter, indicating that a vote was conducted and that her church membership
was revoked.
{¶5} On November 8, 2011, Mrs. Ciganik filed a complaint against Pastor York
alleging defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pastor York
filed an answer the next month.
{¶6} Pastor York later indicated in his deposition that Mrs. Ciganik’s claims
against him stem from her church membership and that his alleged unkind acts relate to
ecclesiastical matters, outside of the court’s jurisdiction. On August 21, 2012, Pastor
2 York filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative,
for summary judgment.
{¶7} Thereafter, Mrs. Ciganik filed a brief in opposition on November 14, 2012.
Mrs. Ciganik maintained that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear her claims, and
because there are genuine issues of material fact remaining for a jury to decide, she
requested that Pastor York’s motion be denied in its entirety.
{¶8} In her affidavit attached to her brief in opposition, Mrs. Ciganik averred
she was intimidated and harassed by Pastor York and by other church members at his
direction. As a result of the harassment, Mrs. Ciganik stated: “I can’t sleep, am nervous
and anxious, have been sick to my stomach and feel isolated. I have felt depressed
and sad.” She denied stealing the picture of the former pastor from a church wall.
Rather, Mrs. Ciganik indicated she only wished to move the picture from its new
“hidden” spot, back to its original, more visible location.
{¶9} Also attached to Mrs. Ciganik’s brief in opposition was an affidavit from
her daughter, Linda Smith (“Smith”). Smith averred that she witnessed her mother
being intimidated and harassed by Pastor York and other church members. Since then,
Smith stated her mother has become withdrawn, isolated, sad, anxious, and nervous.
On one occasion, Smith saw a church member accuse her mother of trying to steal the
picture of the former pastor. Smith said she and her mother told various members to
stop the harassment.
{¶10} On December 6, 2012, Pastor York filed a reply brief in support of his
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. Later that month, Mrs. Ciganik filed a sur-reply brief in opposition.
3 {¶11} On February 4, 2013, the trial court granted Pastor York’s motion for
summary judgment. The court held that it has no jurisdiction to determine the claims of
defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress because the actions
qualify as ecclesiastical matters. Mrs. Ciganik filed an appeal and raises the following
assignments of error:
{¶12} “[1.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law when it determined that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine Mrs. Ciganik’s purely secular defamation per
se and IIED claims in contravention of existing Ohio precedent.
{¶13} “[2.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law when it improperly found that
York possessed a qualified privilege despite finding a lack of jurisdiction and when the
record is replete with issues of fact concerning whether York was entitled to the defense
of qualified privilege and whether York acted with actual malice.
{¶14} “[3.] The Trial Court, by abdicating its jurisdiction, violated Mrs. Ciganik’s
right to a meaningful remedy under Ohio’s Constitution and her right to due process of
law [under] the Fourteenth Amendment.”
{¶15} We are called upon to determine whether the nature of Mrs. Ciganik’s
claims for defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress is
ecclesiastical or secular. Upon review, we find her first assignment of error dispositive
of this appeal.
{¶16} This case involves the granting of a motion for summary judgment. This
court recently stated in Meloy v. Circle K Store, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2012-P-0158,
2013-Ohio-2837, ¶5-6:
4 {¶17} “Summary judgment is a procedural tool that terminates litigation and thus
should be entered with circumspection. Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d
64, 66 * * * (1993). Summary judgment is proper where (1) there is no genuine issue of
material fact remaining to be litigated; (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion, and, viewing the evidence in the non-moving party’s favor, that conclusion
favors the movant. See, e.g., Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶18} “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may not
weigh the evidence or select among reasonable inferences. Dupler v. Mansfield
Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 121 * * * (1980). Rather, all doubts and questions must
be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d
356, 359 * * * (1992). Hence, a trial court is required to overrule a motion for summary
judgment where conflicting evidence exists and alternative reasonable inferences can
be drawn. Pierson v. Norfork Southern Corp., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2002-A-0061,
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[Cite as Ciganik v. York, 2013-Ohio-5834.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO
EARLEENE CIGANIK, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 2013-P-0018 - vs - :
ROBERT YORK, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
Civil Appeal from the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2011 CV 01458.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded.
Joel A. Holt and James E.J. Ickes, Williams, Welser, Kratcoski & Can, L.L.C., 11 South River Street, Suite A, Kent, OH 44240 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Martha L. Allee and Carolyn M. Cappel, Weston Hurd LLP, The Tower at Erieview, 1301 E. 9th Street, Suite 1900, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Defendant-Appellee).
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Earleene Ciganik (“Mrs. Ciganik”), appeals from the February 4,
2013 judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, granting appellee,
Robert York’s (“Pastor York”), motion for summary judgment.
{¶2} Mrs. Ciganik, a woman in her eighties, was a 50-year member of First
Baptist Church of Streetsboro. In 2010, Pastor York was hired as the new church
pastor. Mrs. Ciganik began to disagree with the direction of the church. She communicated her disagreement over various matters, including church doctrine,
governance, and finances, with other church members, administrative staff, and Pastor
York.
{¶3} As a result, on April 10, 2011, Pastor York gave Mrs. Ciganik a letter
maintaining that she had committed offenses against him and the church, including a
statement that she had attempted to steal church property, specifically a picture of the
former pastor. Mrs. Ciganik was informed that a disciplinary meeting would be held the
following week, in accordance with church policy. According to Mrs. Ciganik, Pastor
York advised her that her membership would be taken away and that she would not be
permitted back in the church.
{¶4} Nevertheless, on April 17, 2011, Mrs. Ciganik went to First Baptist Church
for Sunday worship. However, at the direction of Pastor York, police removed Mrs.
Ciganik from church property. Pastor York later read the April 10, 2011 letter to the
congregation, which contained the charges against Mrs. Ciganik, including the fact that
she had attempted to steal church property. Two days later, Pastor York sent Mrs.
Ciganik a letter, indicating that a vote was conducted and that her church membership
was revoked.
{¶5} On November 8, 2011, Mrs. Ciganik filed a complaint against Pastor York
alleging defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Pastor York
filed an answer the next month.
{¶6} Pastor York later indicated in his deposition that Mrs. Ciganik’s claims
against him stem from her church membership and that his alleged unkind acts relate to
ecclesiastical matters, outside of the court’s jurisdiction. On August 21, 2012, Pastor
2 York filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative,
for summary judgment.
{¶7} Thereafter, Mrs. Ciganik filed a brief in opposition on November 14, 2012.
Mrs. Ciganik maintained that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear her claims, and
because there are genuine issues of material fact remaining for a jury to decide, she
requested that Pastor York’s motion be denied in its entirety.
{¶8} In her affidavit attached to her brief in opposition, Mrs. Ciganik averred
she was intimidated and harassed by Pastor York and by other church members at his
direction. As a result of the harassment, Mrs. Ciganik stated: “I can’t sleep, am nervous
and anxious, have been sick to my stomach and feel isolated. I have felt depressed
and sad.” She denied stealing the picture of the former pastor from a church wall.
Rather, Mrs. Ciganik indicated she only wished to move the picture from its new
“hidden” spot, back to its original, more visible location.
{¶9} Also attached to Mrs. Ciganik’s brief in opposition was an affidavit from
her daughter, Linda Smith (“Smith”). Smith averred that she witnessed her mother
being intimidated and harassed by Pastor York and other church members. Since then,
Smith stated her mother has become withdrawn, isolated, sad, anxious, and nervous.
On one occasion, Smith saw a church member accuse her mother of trying to steal the
picture of the former pastor. Smith said she and her mother told various members to
stop the harassment.
{¶10} On December 6, 2012, Pastor York filed a reply brief in support of his
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. Later that month, Mrs. Ciganik filed a sur-reply brief in opposition.
3 {¶11} On February 4, 2013, the trial court granted Pastor York’s motion for
summary judgment. The court held that it has no jurisdiction to determine the claims of
defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress because the actions
qualify as ecclesiastical matters. Mrs. Ciganik filed an appeal and raises the following
assignments of error:
{¶12} “[1.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law when it determined that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine Mrs. Ciganik’s purely secular defamation per
se and IIED claims in contravention of existing Ohio precedent.
{¶13} “[2.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law when it improperly found that
York possessed a qualified privilege despite finding a lack of jurisdiction and when the
record is replete with issues of fact concerning whether York was entitled to the defense
of qualified privilege and whether York acted with actual malice.
{¶14} “[3.] The Trial Court, by abdicating its jurisdiction, violated Mrs. Ciganik’s
right to a meaningful remedy under Ohio’s Constitution and her right to due process of
law [under] the Fourteenth Amendment.”
{¶15} We are called upon to determine whether the nature of Mrs. Ciganik’s
claims for defamation per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress is
ecclesiastical or secular. Upon review, we find her first assignment of error dispositive
of this appeal.
{¶16} This case involves the granting of a motion for summary judgment. This
court recently stated in Meloy v. Circle K Store, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2012-P-0158,
2013-Ohio-2837, ¶5-6:
4 {¶17} “Summary judgment is a procedural tool that terminates litigation and thus
should be entered with circumspection. Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d
64, 66 * * * (1993). Summary judgment is proper where (1) there is no genuine issue of
material fact remaining to be litigated; (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion, and, viewing the evidence in the non-moving party’s favor, that conclusion
favors the movant. See, e.g., Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶18} “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may not
weigh the evidence or select among reasonable inferences. Dupler v. Mansfield
Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 121 * * * (1980). Rather, all doubts and questions must
be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d
356, 359 * * * (1992). Hence, a trial court is required to overrule a motion for summary
judgment where conflicting evidence exists and alternative reasonable inferences can
be drawn. Pierson v. Norfork Southern Corp., 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2002-A-0061,
2003-Ohio-6682, ¶36. In short, the central issue on summary judgment is, ‘whether the
evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it
is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 * * * (1986). On appeal, we review a trial court’s
entry of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102,
105 * * * (1996).” (Parallel citations omitted.)
{¶19} “‘It is well-settled that American courts will steadfastly decline to interfere
in church disputes over doctrinal or spiritual matters.’” Hudson Presbyterian Church v.
Eastminster Presbytery, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24279, 2009-Ohio-446, ¶10, quoting
5 Winston v. Second Baptist Missionary Church of Lorain, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
96CA006588, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4129, *5 (Sept. 10, 1997). “A court may decide a
church dispute, however, if it does not require that the court ‘delve into areas of church
dogma’ or interpret doctrinal beliefs.” Id. “A court may exercise its jurisdiction over a
church dispute if it is able to resolve the dispute by employing neutral principles of law.”
See Id.; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979); State ex rel. Morrow v. Hill, 51
Ohio St.2d 74, 80 (1977); Serbian Orthodox Church of Congregation of St. Demetrius of
Akron v. Kelemen, 21 Ohio St.2d 154, 158 (1970). “The fact that a trial court’s decision
will have implications for a religious entity is not a per se indication that the trial court
lacks jurisdiction over the matter.” Hudson Presbyterian at ¶11, citing Winston at *2.
{¶20} “Generally, civil courts lack jurisdiction to hear ecclesiastical disputes
within a church, although courts may hear church disputes that are secular in nature.”
Slavic Full Gospel Church, Inc. v. Vernyuk, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97158, 2012-Ohio-
3943, ¶16, citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
{¶21} In determining whether courts have jurisdiction over church disputes,
courts must first look at whether the church is hierarchical or congregational. Slavic Full
Gospel, supra, at ¶17. Civil courts generally lack jurisdiction to hear church disputes if
the church is hierarchical. Id., citing Tibbs v. Kendrick, 93 Ohio App.3d 35, 42 (8th
Dist.1994). However, civil courts have jurisdiction over certain matters if the church is
congregational. Id. Thus, if the church is congregational, courts must next determine
whether the nature of the dispute is ecclesiastical or secular. Slavic Full Gospel at ¶18,
citing Tibbs at 43.
6 {¶22} In this case, First Baptist Church of Streetsboro is an Ohio non-profit
corporation. Therefore, the church is congregational, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of
the trial court over certain matters. See Slavic Full Gospel at ¶17, citing Tibbs at 42.
{¶23} Next, we must review Mrs. Ciganik’s complaint to determine whether her
claims require determination of ecclesiastical or secular issues. See Slavic Full Gospel
at ¶18, citing Tibbs at 43.
{¶24} Courts properly decline jurisdiction on “purely ecclesiastical” grounds such
as appointing or removing pastors and inquiring into church finances. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Freedom Faith Missionary Baptist Church, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20232,
2004-Ohio-2607; McDaniel v. Phelps, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010744, 2003-Ohio-41;
Tibbs, supra. “[T]he First Amendment has been generally interpreted to mean that
courts are barred from inquiring into purely ecclesiastical questions and from resolving
disputes over church doctrines and practices.” Potts v. Catholic Diocese, 159 Ohio
App.3d 315, 2004-Ohio-6816, ¶21 (7th Dist.), citing Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
{¶25} On the other hand, courts retain jurisdiction on “purely secular” matters,
i.e., non-doctrinal disputes which can be resolved by employing neutral principles of
law. Hudson Presbyterian, supra, at ¶10. Defamation per se is a legal issue that is
purely secular in nature and can be resolved by applying neutral principles of law. See
McWreath v. Cortland Bank, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2010-T-0023, 2012-Ohio-3013,
¶42-43 (holding that defamation per se occurs when a statement is defamatory on its
face, consisting of words which import an indictable criminal offense involving moral
turpitude or infamous punishment, impute some loathsome or contagious disease which
7 excludes one from society or tend to injure one in his trade or occupation.) Thus,
defamation per se is a clearly delineated set of statements that secular courts have
determined are intrinsically defamatory.
{¶26} Upon review, we find Mrs. Ciganik’s two claims, defamation per se (based
upon an indictable criminal offense involving moral turpitude) and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (based upon the defamation), are secular. Therefore, basic tort
principles apply. See, e.g., Bennett v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America,
Southern Ohio Synod, 97 Ohio App.3d 786, 791 (10th Dist.1994). Simply because one
of the parties includes a religious figure does not necessarily make the matter
ecclesiastical. Id., citing Fairborn Church of God and Salzgaber v. First Christian
Church, 65 Ohio App.3d 368 (4th Dist.1989).
{¶27} The record in this case establishes that Mrs. Ciganik’s claims are
governed by clearly defined principles of secular law and do not require an
interpretation or decision involving church doctrinal matters. Accordingly, Mrs. Ciganik’s
claims are not “purely ecclesiastical” and are within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Therefore, since the issues here are secular, the trial court erred in granting Pastor
York’s motion for summary judgment after determining that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear this case.
{¶28} Mrs. Ciganik’s first assignment of error has merit.
{¶29} Given the disposition of her first assignment of error, we find the remaining
assignments of error moot. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
8 {¶30} The judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is reversed
and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is
ordered that appellee is assessed costs herein taxed. The court finds there were
reasonable grounds for this appeal.
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J.,
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.,
concur.