Cianchette Family v. Kargar

Superior Court of Maine·Decided June 15, 2009·No. CUMre-07-45·Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. RE-07-45

ZOOq .)UN 15 P 2: 35

CIANCHETTE FAMILY LLC., Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

SHAMAYEL KARGAR and MOHAMMED KARGAR,

Defendants.

Before the court are Defendants' Motion to Implement Settlement Agreement and Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt.

Defendants' motion presents the court with the parties' second dispute regarding the meaning of the parties' settlement agreement l - viz., whether the term "agricultural activities" in paragraph 4 of Exhibit C to the settlement documents drafted by Plaintiff's counsel ("Proposed Settlement Documents"i includes the right to dump, store or stockpile materials or waste, such as manure, on Lots 1, 2 and 12, as shown on the plan of a residential subdivision known as the Sherwood Forest Subdivision ("Subdivision") in Falmouth, Maine. See Defendants' Exh. 1. In 1 The first dispute centered on Plaintiffs challenge to Defendants' claim that the settlement agreement

reserved to Defendants the right to use the an open space area for "passive and active recreation uses." In an Order, dated April 6, 2009 the court concluded that it did not. 2 A copy of the Proposed Settlement Documents is attached to Plaintiffs Response And Objection To The

Kargar's Motion To Implement Settlement Agreement. Paragraph 4 of Exhibit C to the proposed settlement documents provides, as follows:

Former Lots 1, 2 and 12 shown on the Plan shall be for residential use only, and any house built thereon shall have a total square footage of heated space of at least 2,800 square feet.

Grantor, however, retains the right to conduct agricultural activities upon each of Lots 1, 2 and 12.

Id. (emphasis added)

opposition, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' motion seeks declaratory relief and this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.

Plaintiff s motion for contempt seeks sanctions against Defendants for failing to execute the Proposed Settlement Documents and an order directing that Defendants sign them.

A testimonial hearing on the motions was held on June 2, 2009. At the hearing, the parties stipulated that (1) the specific language of the Proposed Settlement Documents is consistent with their settlement agreement and is agreed upon by the parties, and (2) Defendants have declined to sign the documents pending resolution of the issues raised by their motion. The remaining facts hereafter recited are based on the evidence this court finds credible.

BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2005 Plaintiff purchased the Subdivision from Davis Land Development, LLC ("Davis"). Mary Alice Davis was a member of that LLC. The Subdivision was subject to a Declaration of Protective Covenants, Reservations, Restrictions and Easements ("Declaration"). Previously, on August 20,2004, Defendants had purchased Lot 11 in the Subdivision from Davis and built their residence on it. See Defendants' Exh. 1. Lot 12 in the Subdivision is adjacent to Defendants' lot. !d. Lots 1 and 2 are literally "across the street" from Defendants' lot on the opposite side of a 50-foot wide private road or access way known as "Howard's End Drive." Id.

In February 2007, Plaintiff initiated this action alleging that Defendants were in violation of provisions of the Declaration. The parties reached an accord on all issues following a judicially assisted settlement conference on August 11, 2008. In general, the terms of the settlement included Defendants' agreement to cooperate with Plaintiffs attempts to terminate the Subdivision. It was also agreed that Plaintiff would reserve an open space area to the rear of Defendants' residence ("New Open Space"), subject to rights and restrictions, including "agricultural uses", described in the Declaration, and that Plaintiff would retain Lots 1, 2 and 12

shown on the Subdivision Plan for residential use only and would retain the right to conduct "agricultural activities" upon each of those lots until they were built upon.

The agreement, which contemplated the drafting and execution of various documents for its implementation, was recited on the record. See Transcript filed on February 9, 2009 (Tr.). Among other things, the parties agreed that this court "shall retain jurisdiction over this matter including disputes regarding the implementation and drafting of the settlement documentation." Tr. at 6.

Over time, following the settlement conference, the parties worked out most of their difficulties regarding the language of the documentation. However, in late 2008 they both called upon the court to resolve a disagreement regarding the meaning of certain language relevant to the implementation of the settlement agreement. 3 On February 10, 2009 Defendant Shamayel Kargar was subpoenaed by Mary Alice Davis to testify at court in a case brought by Plaintiff Cianchette Family, LLC against Ms. Davis. While at the courthouse that day, Mrs. Kargar received a call from her husband who told her that trucks were dumping loads of manure on Lot 2 across Howard's End Drive from Defendants' home. More manure was dumped the next day forming a large pile along the wood line to the rear of Lot 2 approximately 500 feet from Defendants' property line. 4 Mrs. Kargar opined that the pile was approximately 200 cubic yards in size, that it could be seen from her home, and that

3 In November 2008 the parties reported to the court an impasse regarding the meaning of the term "restrictions and rights" in the following language of their settlement agreement:

"The open space covenant for the new open space will have the same restrictions and rights as the covenants in the declaration that have been terminated by agreement of the party [sic]".

Tr. at 5 (emphasis added). Defendants urged that the term accorded them the right to use the New Open Space for "passive and active recreation." In an order, dated April 6,2009, this court concluded that this language did not give them that right. 4 As of the date of this hearing, 3 or 4 loads of manure have been removed to fertilize hay fields on other

parts of Plaintiff's land.

the stench was unbearable. 5 Plaintiff does not deny that it caused the manure to be dumped and piled on Lot 2.

This incident was the first time that manure or any other materials were dumped, stored or stockpiled on Lot 2 - at least since Defendants purchased Lot 11 in 2004. Within that same time frame, no manure or other materials has ever been dumped, stored or stockpiled on Lots 1 or 12. Plaintiff owns approximately 150 acres of land, mostly farmland, surrounding Lots 1, 2, 12 and Defendants' property and, in prior years, Plaintiff has stored or stockpiled manure on some of its land to the northwest of Defendants' property.

DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Motion to Implement Settlement Agreement As described by Defendants, this dispute concerns the meaning of the term "agricultural activities" in paragraph 4 of Exhibit C to the Proposed Settlement Documents. This dispute is relevant to the implementation of the agreement. Paragraph 4 provides as follows:

Former Lots 1, 2 and 12 shown on the Plan shall be for residential use only, and any house built thereon shall have a total square footage of heated space of at least 2,000 square feet. Grantor, however, retains the right to conduct agricultural activities upon each of Lots 1,2 and 12."

According to Defendants, Plaintiff s recent dumping of manure on Lot 2 does not constitute an "agricultural activity" within the meaning of the settlement agreement or the Proposed Settlement Documents.

1. The Court's Jurisdiction Plaintiff asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Defendants' motion because it inappropriately seeks declaratory relief that should be pursued under Maine's Uniform

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