Chyenne Marie Kimbrell v. State of Arkansas

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 390 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III

No. CR-25-398

CHYENNE MARIE KIMBRELL Opinion Delivered September 9, 2026 APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

V. [NO. 26CR-24-138]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE MEREDITH B.

APPELLEE SWITZER, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

Chyenne Marie Kimbrell appeals her conviction of one count of second-degree battery and two counts of aggravated assault upon a certified law enforcement officer. Additionally, she argues that the circuit court lacked the authority to sentence her on the second count of aggravated assault upon a certified law enforcement officer. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

On March 4, 2024, Kimbrell was charged by criminal information with one count of second-degree battery and two counts of aggravated assault on a certified law enforcement officer. On March 8, the information was amended and included the same charges. On February 20, 2025, the information was amended again; however, this time it omitted one of the counts of aggravated assault on a certified law enforcement officer.

The trial was held on February 24 and 25, and prior to voir dire, the court informed the jury that Kimbrell faced three charges: second-degree battery and two counts of aggravated assault on a certified law enforcement officer.

At trial, the following evidence was presented. On January 9, 2024, Deputy Claire Jones was working at the Garland County Detention Center. Kimbrell had been arrested and was awaiting placement in an in-house unit. Deputy Jones and Sergeant Barbara Falasca had moved Kimbrell to the “dress out” room and were helping Kimbrell put on her jail- issued clothing and shoes so she could be moved to the unit. Kimbrell resisted getting dressed and threatened to hit the officers with the rubber sandals she had been given to wear. Deputy Jones asked Deputy Javan Angel to help them move Kimbrell. The officers walked her out of the dress-out room into the hallway, and Kimbrell continued to resist by pulling against them, falling to her knees, and kicking Sergeant Falasca. At this time, Deputy Jones heard Sergeant Falasca exclaim that Kimbrell had bitten her. Sergeant Falasca recalled that Kimbrell latched on to her arm for around twenty seconds, and it “hurt pretty good.” According to Sergeant Falasca, the photographs taken of the bite mark and surrounding area did not accurately depict the severity of the bruising and swelling. Kimbrell then tried to run for the door, but Deputy Angel stopped her and held her against the wall. Kimbrell’s toe and nose were bleeding, and the officers explained to her that she had blood in her mouth from the nosebleed. Kimbrell’s injuries were treated, and she was placed in a restraint chair. As Deputy Angel was trying to calm Kimbrell down, she spat in his face and mouth. Kimbrell managed to get one arm out of the restraints, and Deputy Jones tried to put the restraint

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back on her. Kimbrell then spat in her face, and some of the saliva entered Deputy Jones’s mouth. Deputy Jones believed that the blood had cleared out of Kimbrell’s mouth by that time, and only saliva entered her mouth. After the incident, Deputy Jones and Deputy Angel went to a clinic to be tested and were informed that they should come back in six months to test for communicable diseases. Deputy Jones declined to do so because she was “not aware of anything that you can catch that are detrimental from spit in the mouth.” Deputy Angel could not remember if he returned to the clinic for further testing. Sergeant Falasca went to the hospital, where she underwent a blood test and received a tetanus shot. She returned in six weeks and again in six months to be tested for communicable diseases.

Kimbrell testified in her own defense; however, she had a difficult time remembering details from that day. Kimbrell recalled Deputy Angel hitting her in the face before she spat on him. She explained that she had a hair stuck in her throat, she was gagging, and she did not spit on anyone.

Kimbrell moved for a directed verdict on all charges, which was denied. She renewed her motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, and it was also denied.

During the discussion regarding jury instructions and verdict forms, defense counsel noted that the second amended information contained only one count of aggravated assault on a certified law enforcement officer. The court, defense counsel, and the State agreed to give the jury instructions on Count II with the note that it applied to Deputy Jones and on Count III with the note that it applied to Deputy Angel.

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The jury found Kimbrell guilty of second-degree battery and both counts of aggravated assault on a certified law enforcement officer. The jury recommended one year of imprisonment for the second-degree-battery conviction and five years’ probation for each aggravated-assault charge. The court imposed the jury’s sentencing recommendation.

Kimbrell timely filed her notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

On appeal from the denial of a directed-verdict motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, considering only the evidence that supports the verdict and determining whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. McDaniel v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 66, 571 S.W.3d 43. We will affirm the verdict if substantial evidence supports it. Gregory v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 164, at 4, 708 S.W.3d 844, 847. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id.

B. Points on Appeal

1. Second-degree battery

A person commits second-degree battery if:

(4) The person knowingly, without legal justification, causes physical injury to or incapacitates a person he or she knows to be:

(A)(i) A law enforcement officer, firefighter, code enforcement officer, or employee of a correctional facility while the law enforcement officer, firefighter,

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code enforcement officer, or employee of a correctional facility is acting in the line of duty.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2025).

Kimbrell contends that Sergeant Falasca’s injury resulting from being bitten does not meet the statutory definition of physical injury because the bite caused only mild bruising, swelling, and a visible mark. We disagree and affirm.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-102(14) (Repl. 2024) defines “physical injury”

as an impairment of the physical condition, infliction of substantial pain, or infliction of bruising, swelling, or a visible mark associated with physical trauma. Scratches and abrasions meet the definition of physical injury. Conner v. State, 75 Ark. App. 418, 58 S.W.3d 865 (2001).

Kimbrell concedes that she broke Falasca’s skin when she bit Falasca, and the bite caused “mild coloring and swelling.” Kimbrell contends that if the court of appeals affirms her conviction, it would expand the definition “beyond anything before.” We disagree.

The State presented substantial evidence of second-degree battery. The photo of Falasca’s arm shows a bite mark, and Falasca testified that the photo does not show the full extent of the bruising and swelling that occurred. Falasca recalled that Kimbrell bit her and did not let go for around twenty seconds and that it “hurt pretty good.” Moreover, the bite potentially exposed Falasca to communicable diseases and resulted in repeated blood tests for those diseases. The State presented sufficient evidence of infliction of substantial pain, bruising, swelling, and a visible mark.

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The instant case is similar to Chambers v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 54, 595 S.W.3d 371.

Chambers was being booked into the county jail when he began resisting officers’ efforts to do so. Chambers spat a mixture of blood and saliva into an officer’s face, and during the scuffle, the officer suffered an abrasion to his forehead. This court held that this was sufficient evidence to support Chambers’s conviction of second-degree battery. Our court held that

[t]he jury is not required to abandon common sense, and it may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

....

To determine if a physical injury exists, a jury may rely on its common knowledge, experiences, and observations in life to make that determination. Furthermore, a jury may consider the severity of the attack and the sensitivity of the area of the body to which the injury was inflicted.

2020 Ark. App. 54, at 6, 595 S.W.3d at 375–76 (citations omitted).

Here, the jury could reasonably infer that a bite lasting twenty seconds, leaving a mark, and breaking the skin resulted in substantial pain and physical injury.

2. Aggravated assault on certified law enforcement officers In her second point on appeal, Kimbrell argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that she committed aggravated assault on Deputy Jones and Deputy Angel because merely spitting on a correctional officer “renders the first and second elements” of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-211(a)(1) (Repl. 2024) superfluous (extreme indifference to the employee’s safety and that the defendant have the purpose of creating a potential danger of infection). Kimbrell’s argument is not preserved for appeal.

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This court may address only the arguments an appellant made in his or her directed-

verdict motion. Davis v. State, 365 Ark. 634, 232 S.W.3d 476 (2006) (directed-verdict motion must address specific element challenged in order to preserve argument for review).

In her directed-verdict motion, Kimbrell argued that there was insufficient evidence of aggravated assault on a correctional facility employee because the State failed to establish that Ms. Kimbrell purposely put the deputies in contact with bodily fluids.

There was a allegation or a claim through testimony that she had purposely spit on them. The video itself establishes that, while they might have saliva on them or one reacting to saliva, there’s no demonstration from the video that she purposely did so.

There’s no movement forward of her toward Deputy Angel and there’s no video, whatsoever, of any contact with Deputy Jones.

(Emphasis added.)

Below, Kimbrell did not argue that the State failed to prove the elements of extreme indifference to the employee’s safety and creating a potential danger of infection when she moved for a directed verdict; thus, we cannot reach the merits of her argument now.

3. Illegal sentence

Kimbrell contends that the circuit court lacked the authority to sentence her on the second count of aggravated assault involving Deputy Angel because the charge was omitted from the second amended information. She contends that her sentence is illegal and, thus, that she may argue the issue on appeal without having raised it below. Her argument fails.

Kimbrell’s argument provides no basis for reversal because it is not cognizable as an illegal-sentence issue. See Gray v. State, 2026 Ark. App. 302, at 5, 738 S.W.3d 331, 335. Her argument that the jury was erroneously instructed on the second aggravated assault on a

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certified law enforcement officer is an allegation of trial error that should have been raised at trial. See Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 380, at 4 (per curiam); see Bridges v. State, 327 Ark. 392, 399, 938 S.W.2d 561, 565 (1997) (“It is well settled that no party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before or at the time the instruction is given, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.”). Kimbrell agreed to the jury instructions—including both aggravated-assault charges—and she did not object to the repeated verbal instructions to the jury regarding the second aggravated-assault charge. Kimbrell never objected to Angel’s testimony as irrelevant. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

WOOD and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.