Churchill v. Palmer

115 Mass. 310
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court·Decided June 25, 1874·Published·Cited by 18 cases

Opinion

The Court then suggested that the case should stand over for a day, and that the counsel should see if they could agree upon an abridgment of the testimony on the coming in of the court.

On the next day the counsel for the plaintiffs stated that he had no further suggestions to offer.

Gray, C. J.

The authority given by statute to the Superior Court to make reports to this court extends only to questions of law. A report, like a bill of exceptions, should be so framed by the presiding judge, or by the counsel with his approval, as to state the nature of the case, and the questions of law intended to be reserved, and so much only of the facts or the evidence as may be necessary to present those questions to this court. The decision of the jury or the court below upon questions of fact or the weight of evidence is not open to revision here.

[314] The purpose of the St. of 1870, c. 812,* providing for Ike appointment by the Superior Court in this county of stenographers to take reports of the evidence introduced and the rulings made and instructions given, is to afford assistance to the court and the counsel in conducting the trial, and in drawing up reports and bills of exceptions ; not that a complete record of all that took place in the court below, whether material or immaterial to the understanding of the questions of law reserved, should be transmitted to this court.

The report signed by the presiding judge in the present case states none of the rulings upon the admission and rejection of evidence, but merely refers for them to the entire record of the stenographer, through which they are scattered. The remaining question reserved is whether there was any evidence to be submitted to the jury upon the principal issues in the case. The stenographer’s record, as printed, covers nearly two hundred pages, and consists, in greater part, of irrelevant and unimportant details of testimony, long cross-examinations affecting only the bias and credibility of witnesses, and interlocutory discussions between the judge and the counsel; and leaves it to this court to sift out from this large volume of worthless matter the several rulings of the judge and the comparatively small portions of the [315] evidence which have any bearing upon the questions of law to be determined.

Such a manner of reporting a case, while it puts the parties to needless expense in the preparation of copies, fails to present with adequate clearness and precision the legal questions upon which this court is to pass. The record now before us affords so extraordinary an example of irregularity in this respect, that it cannot, consistently with a due regard for the orderly and intelligent administration of justice, be entertained in its present shape. It will be open to the plaintiffs to apply to the judge who presided in the Superior Court for a report in proper form of the questions of law which were reserved at the trial.

This question of practice being an important one to the rights of parties in this and other cases, opportunity was given to the counsel to be heard upon the subject, it has been deliberately considered during the adjournment, and the opinion now announced is the unanimous judgment of the court.

Report dismissed.

The case subsequently came before the court on a report of Rockwell, J., in substance as follows, so far as it relates to the questions decided:

The suit is brought to recover either the money paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants, or damages for breach of contract and warranty in the sale and purchase of seven cases of kid gloves.

The plaintiffs introduced William H. Perley as a witness, but contending that, as he was a defendant, though defaulted, they being obliged to use him, would not be bound by his testimony, if it was contradicted by other testimony, or not believed; and from his testimony,* it appeared that Rogers Bros. & Co. of [316] Naples, through John Munroe & Co., at Paris, in the early spring of 1870, consigned for sale several cases of kid gloves to the defendant Andrew T. Hall, which had been originally designed and intended for Bigelow, Peyser & Co. of Boston, then pecuniarily embarrassed, and who for years had been glove importers and dealers; that the defendants P. A. Hall and John F. Macomber were copartners, and had their place of business in the same office with said Andrew T. Hall, but were not connected in business with him; that Macomber, as partner of F. A. Hall, in April, 1870, in behalf of Andrew T. Hall, verbally agreed with the defendant Perley, who for years had been a copartner of Bigelow, Peyser & Co., and was then doing business solely as glove dealer, under the name of Bigelow, Peyser & Co., after an examination by said Perley of two of said cases of gloves, which were perfect in every respect, to sell him eleven of said cases of gloves, at six dollars per dozen, to be perfect in every respect, equal if not better than the two cases examined, to be paid for, cash on delivery, two of the cases to be delivered and paid for on or before May 10,1870, and the remaining cases on or before September 1, 1870, and in mean time, before delivering all said cases of gloves, Andrew T. Hall was to retain possession of said gloves. Perley then knew that the gloves had been originally designed and intended for said Bigelow, Peyser & Co.

The plaintiffs introduced evidence tending to show that they constituted the firm of N. W. Churchill & Co. at the time of the transaction in question; that they bought of Perley, in the last of April or first of May, 1870, two cases of kid gloves, which were delivered to them billed in the name of Bigelow, Peyser & Co., and paid for by them at the price of seven dollars a dozen; that subsequently they entered into negotiations with Perley for the sale and purchase of nine cases more ; that the said two cases were bought by sample and specifications, and answered the contract ; that in negotiating the sale of the other nine, Perley represented that he was not the owner, but was selling them for somebody else, a responsible party, whom he refused to and did not name; that he agreed to sell them to the plaintiffs, by sample and specifications, which were given to them and which they were to answer, and they were to be, when delivered, as good [317] bs, if not better than the other two cases previously sold and delivered as aforesaid, and which were of high quality and perfect, the price to be seven dollars a dozen, and the goods delivered at any time within four months, which would be about the first day of September, 1870, with payment on delivery; that they knew Perley was not responsible, and would not have relied on him , and after the agreement had been made, or the plaintiff Churchill had concluded in his own mind to take them, and the terms settled between them, insisted that before they would buy them they must know of whom they were buying; that said Perley then, about ten days before September 1, told them that Andrew T. Hall, old Honesty himself, was the owner, and he was selling for him, which was satisfactory to the plaintiffs; but that N. W. Churchill, one of the plaintiffs, for the purpose of assuring himself, went to see A. T. Hall, and this interview occurred, to wit; as testified to by the plaintiff Churchill:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Churchill v. Palmer, 115 Mass. 310 (Mass. 1874).

115 Mass. 310 (Churchill v. Palmer) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Chief Justice v. Office & Professional Employees International Union, Local 6
807 N.E.2d 814 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2004)
Rines
122 N.E.2d 364 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1954)
Smith v. Commonwealth
121 N.E.2d 707 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1954)
Daddario v. City of Gloucester
107 N.E.2d 819 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1952)
Winslow Bros. & Smith Co. v. Hillsborough Mills
65 N.E.2d 1 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1946)
Gilbert v. Beacon Hill Credit Union
192 N.E. 25 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1934)
A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Case Shingle & Lumber Co.
276 P. 892 (Washington Supreme Court, 1929)
Stoehrer & Pratt Dodgem Corp. v. Greenberg
250 Mass. 550 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1925)
Commonwealth v. Cronin
139 N.E. 647 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1923)
Crowe v. Boston & Maine Railroad
136 N.E. 189 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1922)
Reed v. Chase
130 N.E. 257 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1921)
Atlantic Maritime Co. v. City of Gloucester
228 Mass. 519 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1917)
Commonwealth v. National Contracting Co.
87 N.E. 590 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1909)
Electric Welding Co. v. Prince
86 N.E. 947 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1909)
Smith v. Lincoln
84 N.E. 498 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1908)
Gaar Scott & Co. v. Green
58 N.W. 318 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1896)
Kilgore v. Bruce
44 N.E. 108 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1896)
Ryder v. Jenkins
40 N.E. 848 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1895)