Churchill Funding I, LLC v. Easy Financial, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedJuly 19, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-00398
StatusUnknown

This text of Churchill Funding I, LLC v. Easy Financial, LLC (Churchill Funding I, LLC v. Easy Financial, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Churchill Funding I, LLC v. Easy Financial, LLC, (W.D.N.C. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION CASE NO. 3:23-CV-00398-FDW-SCR CHURCHILL FUNDING I, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ORDER ) EASY FINANCIAL, LLC, ) ) Defendant. ) )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 25), and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. No. 27). For the reasons set forth below, both outstanding Motions are DENIED. In light of this ruling, the Court also modifies portions of the Case Management Order as explained below. Summary Judgment “Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Connor v. Covil Corp., 996 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added; quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In addressing a motion for summary judgment, the Court “‘must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and refrain from weighing the evidence or making credibility determinations.’” Sedar v. Reston Town Ctr. Prop., LLC, 988 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up)); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). However, “[m]ere unsupported speculation is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion if the undisputed evidence indicates that the other party should win as a matter of law.” Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 308 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also Matsushita Elec, Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). “When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003).

Both instant motions have been thoroughly briefed, as evidenced by the multiple memoranda, affidavits, and pleadings filed with this Court, not to mention the myriad articles of supporting evidence. However, after careful consideration of these motions and all related filings, this Court finds genuine issues of material fact remain, precluding summary judgment for either party at this point. While neither party contests a breach has occurred, there is substantial dispute over what breach occurred, when a breach occurred and the extent of the breaches more generally. For example, there is disagreement as to whether Easy Financial, LLC (“Easy Financial”) retained full right and authority to transfer or sell the Church Street Mortgage to other parties at time of the sale to Churchill Funding I, LLC (“Churchill”). (Compare Doc. No. 31, pp. 7–8, with

Doc. No. 33, p.5; see also Doc. Nos. 25-2; 25-13; 25-16.) More precisely, while both parties acknowledge the existence of another lien upon the Church Street Property (the “Saratoga Lien”), there are questions of fact regarding the validity of the lien, whether the lien was effectively extinguished and whether the lien had primacy over the lien sold by Easy Financial to Churchill. (Compare, e.g., Doc. Nos. 26, pp. 5 – 6; 31, pp. 7 – 8, with Doc. No. 29, p. 5–6; see also Doc. Nos. 25-2; 25-12; 25-16; 28-9; 28-10.) The parties further dispute whether Easy Financial received prompt notification of the existence of the Saratoga Lien and potential associated title defects, and whether the method offered by Easy Financial to cure title defects, namely delivery of an insurance policy, was commercially reasonable as per Section 7.03 of the Master Loan Purchase Agreement (“MLPA”). (Compare Doc. Nos. 26, pp. 6–8; 33, pp. 7–8, with Doc. Nos. 29, p. 6; 33, pp. 4–8; see also 25-2; 25-17.) Both questions operate under a fact-intensive standard, and it would thus be inapposite to enter summary judgment without further weighing of the evidence at trial. See, e.g., NationsBank of N. Carolina, N.A. v. Am. Doubloon Corp., 481 S.E.2d 387, 390 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“Commercial reasonableness is a jury question and does not readily lend itself to summary

judgment.”); Troche v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-234-RJC-DSC, 2015 WL 4920280, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2015) (“Reasonableness is a question of fact, generally to be decided by a jury.”); see also Rheinberg-Kellerei GMBH v. Vineyard Wine Co., 281 S.E.2d 425, 428 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding the definition of “prompt notice” will vary on a case-by-case basis); Crescent Univ. City Venture, LLC v. AP Atl., Inc., No. 15 CVS 14745, 2019 WL 3765313, at *13 (N.C. Super. Aug. 8, 2019) (finding the question of whether notice was prompt “is thus one of fact to be answered by the factfinder at trial”). Moreover, there remains a disputed question of fact as to whether Churchill waived its right to demand repurchase of delinquent mortgage loans through continued performance and

acceptance of monthly interest payments and back-dues for extended periods of time before notifying Easy Financial of any delinquency. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 263 S.E.2d 763, 767 (N.C. 1980) (“The presumption is that a party’s intentional election to continue performing or receiving performance after knowledge of a breach is an indication that he does not consider the contract totally repudiated and in fact probably still receives considerable benefit under it.”); Klein v. Avemco Ins. Co., 220 S.E.2d 595, 599 (N.C. 1975) (“The crucial question was whether the plaintiff intended to waive his breach. The intention to waive may be expressed or implied from acts or conduct that naturally leads the other party to believe that the right has been intentionally given up.”). Looking to Section 7.06 of the MLPA, disputes exist as to whether Churchill had the capacity to transfer and assign the liens following a repurchase demand given ownership of the liens appears to have changed in all three cases. (See Doc. No. 26, pp. 10 – 11, 13, 15; see also Doc. Nos. 25-19; 25-28; 25-29; 25-33; 25-1, pp. 34–35.) The disputes above, among others, cannot and should not be determined on cross-motions for summary judgment. Instead, the answers must be found at trial, where a jury will have a more

complete opportunity to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, this Court concludes that the parties are not entitled to summary disposition of this matter, and the Court shall DENY both cross-motions for summary judgment. Pretrial Submissions and Pretrial Conference In light of this case proceeding to trial, the Court sua sponte revises the Case Management Order (“CMO”) entered in this case, (Doc. No.

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Related

Henry v. Purnell
652 F.3d 524 (Fourth Circuit, 2011)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Rheinberg-Kellerei GMBH v. Vineyard Wine Co.
281 S.E.2d 425 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1981)
Klein v. Avemco Insurance
220 S.E.2d 595 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1975)
Wheeler v. Wheeler
263 S.E.2d 763 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1980)
NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. American Doubloon Corp.
481 S.E.2d 387 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1997)
Rossignol v. Voorhaar
316 F.3d 516 (Fourth Circuit, 2003)
Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
888 F.3d 651 (Fourth Circuit, 2018)
Camille Sedar v. Reston Town Center Property
988 F.3d 756 (Fourth Circuit, 2021)
Darrell Connor v. Covil Corporation
996 F.3d 143 (Fourth Circuit, 2021)

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Bluebook (online)
Churchill Funding I, LLC v. Easy Financial, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/churchill-funding-i-llc-v-easy-financial-llc-ncwd-2024.