Chung v. Yung-Hui

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-1318
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELIZABETH CHUNG, No. 24-1318 D.C. No. 5:22-cv-01983-PCP Plaintiff-Appellant, MEMORANDUM* v.

CHUNG YUNG-HUI; INTERTRUST (BAHAMAS) LIMITED

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California P. Casey Pitts, District Judge, Presiding

Argued July 9, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.**

This case relates to a marital dissolution proceeding in California state court,

in which plaintiff-appellant Elizabeth Chung (“Elizabeth”) alleges that her

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. estranged spouse, David Chung (“David”), placed marital assets into a series of

trusts that were purportedly settled by David’s mother, the late Chung Peng Chih-

Mei (“Chih-Mei”).1 David contends that the disputed assets, which are presently

held in trust by defendant-appellee Intertrust (Bahamas) Limited (“Intertrust”),

belonged to Chih-Mei. In this action, Elizabeth seeks, inter alia, (1) a declaration

that the disputed assets were not and were never Chih-Mei’s and (2) corresponding

injunctive relief. Elizabeth timely appeals from the district court’s order granting

Intertrust’s and Chih-Mei’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Morrill

v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017). “The plaintiff bears the

burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.” Id. (cleaned up). The

complaint’s uncontroverted allegations are deemed true, and factual disputes are

resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See id.

The district court correctly held that Chih-Mei is not subject to specific

personal jurisdiction in California. Elizabeth has not met her burden to establish

that her claims “arise out of” or “relate to” Chih-Mei’s alleged contacts with

1 Chih-Mei died while this case was pending before the district court, but no party moved to substitute her daughter and personal representative, Chung Yung-Hui, until this Court issued an order to show cause shortly before oral argument. Chung Yung-Hui has now been substituted as defendant-appellee.

2 24-1318 California. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th

Cir. 2004). First, Elizabeth’s claims “arise out of” the alleged events surrounding

the creation of the original Maple Family Trust in 2004. It was at that point, when

Elizabeth and David resided in Hong Kong and Chih-Mei resided in Taiwan, that

David allegedly disguised marital assets as Chih-Mei’s assets and that Elizabeth

acquiesced in that wrongful conduct by not challenging it in any legal action at that

time (or indeed for many years thereafter).

Although Elizabeth alleges that thereafter David (as Chih-Mei’s purported

agent) provided investment advice from California and directed that trust assets be

invested in the parent of a California corporation, she does not allege any wrongful

transfer of marital assets potentially constituting a “but for” cause of her claims

other than the original transfer in 2004. See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines,

897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).

Moreover, at oral argument, Elizabeth’s counsel conceded that the assets presently

in dispute wholly derive from the assets that were placed in trust in 2004.

Second, although the district court did not address whether Elizabeth’s

claims “relate to” Chih-Mei’s contacts with California, Elizabeth’s argument that

they do would expand the “relates to” standard far beyond the bounds that the

Supreme Court and this Court have set. While that standard “contemplates that

some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing,” it also

3 24-1318 “incorporates real limits” and requires a showing similar to a defendant’s ongoing

and systematic marketing of a product in the forum state. Ford Motor Co. v.

Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351, 362, 364-66 (2021); see also

Yamashita v. LG Chem, Inc., 62 F.4th 496, 506 (9th Cir. 2023). Nothing remotely

similar occurred here.

The district court also correctly held that Intertrust is not subject to personal

jurisdiction in California. The district court did not decide whether Intertrust

purposefully availed itself of the privileges of doing business in California when it

(1) adopted a corporate resolution listing David’s California address and

appointing him as “Investment Advisor” of one of the trusts at issue and

(2) subsequently executed David’s investment instructions. See Silk v. Bond, 65

F.4th 445, 457-58 (9th Cir. 2023) (finding purposeful availment where out-of-state

estate’s decedent appointed advisor who lived and worked in California). But even

assuming that Intertrust thereby purposefully availed itself of California, Elizabeth

has again not carried her burden to demonstrate that her claims “arise out of” or

“relate to” Intertrust’s contacts. Intertrust’s appointment of David as investment

advisor cannot be a “but for” cause of David’s alleged wrongful transfer of marital

assets to Chih-Mei because Intertrust appointed David eight years after the alleged

transfer occurred. Nor, for the same reason, can there be a causal relationship

between Elizabeth’s claims and any investment decisions that David made on

4 24-1318 Intertrust’s behalf in his capacity as investment advisor. And Elizabeth’s claims do

not “relate to” Intertrust’s California activities because she has not shown that

Intertrust engaged with California in the continuous or deliberate manner that is

necessary to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. See Ford, 592

U.S. at 361-65.

Because the district court correctly held that Chih-Mei and Intertrust are not

subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California, we do not reach the

alternative grounds for affirmance proffered by defendants-appellees.

AFFIRMED.

5 24-1318