Chunes v. Duluth, W. & P. Ry. Co.

298 F. 964, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1697
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedMarch 3, 1924
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 298 F. 964 (Chunes v. Duluth, W. & P. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chunes v. Duluth, W. & P. Ry. Co., 298 F. 964, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1697 (mnd 1924).

Opinion

McGEB, District Judge.

On March 20, 1923, Messrs. Dahl & McDonald, attorneys at law, residing and practicing law in the city of Minneapolis, Minn., commenced this, a personal injury action, in the district court of Dakota county, Minn. The case was removed to this court on the ground of diversity of citizenship of the parties. Thereafter a motion was made on behalf of the plaintiff to remand the case to the state court on the ground that the complaint states a cause of action under and within the provisions of the federal Employers’ Liability Act (Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), and under the terms of that act is not removable. The motion to remand was denied. See Chuñes v. Duluth W. & P. Ry. Co. (D. C.) 292 Fed. 153.

A second action on the same cause of action was commenced in the name of the plaintiff by the same attorneys in the district court of Wright county, Minn., on March 26, 1923, and was also removed to this court, and is now pending. A third action on the same cause of action was commenced on March 29,_ 1923, in the district court of St. Louis county, Minn., in the name of the plaintiff, by Messrs. Barton & Kamuchey, attorneys at law, residing and practicing law in St. Paul, Minn., which action was removed to this court. A motion to remand was made and denied.

There are, therefore, pending at this time in this court three actions based on 'the same cause of action, brought by two different firms of attorneys, both claiming authority from the plaintiff to represent him in commencing the same. The practice of bringing a number of different actions on the same cause of action in courts in different parts of the state of Minnesota was condemned by this court in Savarin v. Union Pac. R. Co. (D. C.) 292 Fed. 157, 161, 162, and it was very plainly indicated that severe disciplinary action would follow an indulgence in that practice. In that case it was said:

[965]*965“As hereinbefore stated, this case was commenced on January 13, 1923, in the district court of Faribault county, in Southern Minnesota. Three days later, on the 16th day of January, 1923, exact copies of the summons and complaint herein were filed and an action commenced on the same cause of action in the district court of Stevens county, in Northern Minnesota. In other words, within three days the same attorneys commenced two cases on the same cause of action in different parts of the same state. It is a matter of common knowledge that this practice in growing in Minnesota, and seems to be confined to attorneys who specialize in personal injury litigation, and largely to cases imported into Minnesota from foreign states.
“The object and irarpose of the practice seems to be to ascertain the counties in which juries are most liberal in fixing damages in the class of cases mentioned. While in the present casé only two cases have been commenced on the same cause of action, in other instances it is understood that as high as four or five cases have been commenced- in as many different counties; the summons and complaint being identical in all of them. This practice requires defendants to retain counsel and to appear and answer in each ease, and, if they are removable cases, to effect a removal of the same to this court, thus unreasonably increasing the work in the clerk’s office and further congesting calendars already badly congested.
“The two cases now before the court aptly illustrate the effect of this practice on the litigants and the court; that is, instead of one there are two cases, two removable proceedings, two motions to remand, and two motions to vacate the service of the summons. In other words, there is an increase of 100 per cent, in the expense of the litigation to the defendants, and in the work of the clerks of both courts and of the coujrt itself. It is a course of conduct that cannot be justified. It is at war with generally accepted ideas of professional ethics, propriety, and decency. The judges of this court have had this matter under consideration and are in agreement on the proposition that the practice mentioned is a gross abuse of the process and machinery of both the national and state courts, and, if further pursued, this court will feel called upon to resort to disciplinary methods sufficient in severity to effectually put an end to the practice.”

The defendant, conceiving that it had just cause to complain that it was being harassed in the matter and put to the unnecessary and burdensome expense of appearing in three different state courts in widely separated parts of the state, and forced to resort to removal proceedings in three different cases, all founded upon the same cause of action, and in this court to meet three motions to remand the cases to the state court, submitted a motion to require the two firms of attorneys mentioned to show by what authority they commenced and appear in the actions mentioned.

Messrs. Dahl & McDonald, on the hearing of the motion, submitted an affidavit which, if true, would show adequate authority in them to commence the action. The affidavit is as follows:

“Itobt. J. McDonald, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says;
“(1) That he is a member of the firm of Dahl & McDonald, Attorneys at Law, Minneapolis, Minn., who are the attorneys for the above-named plaintiffs; that on the 2Gth day of February, 1923, tbe firm of Dahl & McDonald were retained in the above-entitled action by plaintiff, -and at said time plaintiff and Dahl & McDonald, by this affiant, made the following contract, copy of which is hereto attached and marked Exhibit A:
“ ‘John F. Dahl. Robt. J, McDonald.
“ ‘Dahl & McDonald, Attorneys at Law,
“ ‘327 Metropolitan Bank Bldg., Minneapolis, Minn.
“ ‘Telephone Atlantic 7978. February, 26, 1923.
“ T hereby retain and employ Dahl & McDonald as attorneys at law to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by me, Geo. Chuñes, on or about February 15, 1923, at or near Bartlett, Minn., through the negligence [966]*966of D.¡ W. & Pac. By. Co., and I agree to pay them for said, services a sum equal to 33% per cent, of tire amount finally recovered, hut no settlement of said claim shall be made without first securing my written consent thereto.
“ ‘[Signed] George Chuñes, Claimant,
“ ‘We hereby accept the above claim and cause of action and agree to prosecute the same to settlement or judgment, on the terms above set forth.
“ ‘Dahl & McDonald, by Robt. J. McDonald.’
“(2) That at the time of making said contract plaintiff informed affiant of all details with reference to the accident, gave your affiant the names of witnesses, and all information necessary to conduct an investigation and proceed with said law suit.
“(3) That immediately after obtaining said contract said Dahl & McDonald, duly made an investigation of facts and started an action for damages against said defendant in the district court of Dakota county.

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Related

In Re Randolph
347 S.W.2d 91 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1961)
In Re Disbarment of Robert J. McDonald
284 N.W. 888 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1938)
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad v. Wolf
226 N.W. 297 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1929)
Weinard v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
298 F. 977 (D. Minnesota, 1924)

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Bluebook (online)
298 F. 964, 1924 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1697, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chunes-v-duluth-w-p-ry-co-mnd-1924.