Chuck Harper v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 21, 2007
• Docket: 01-06-00495-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued June 21, 2007

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-06-00495-CR

CHUCK HARPER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 351st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1064870

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted appellant, Chuck Harper, of robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). After appellant pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs alleging prior convictions for aggravated robbery, the jury assessed appellant's punishment at 99 years in prison. See id. § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 2006). We determine whether the evidence was factually sufficient to prove appellant's identity. We affirm.

Facts

Kayla Vuong worked as a cashier at a Baskin Robbins ice cream parlor located on Bellaire and Chimney Rock in the City of Bellaire, Texas. At about 1:00 p.m. on the afternoon of November 8, 2004, Vuong had just finished serving ice cream to a couple in line, who then left the store, when she turned her attention to appellant. She served him his ice cream ,and when she opened the cash register to collect his money, appellant pulled out what Vuong believed was a knife, told her to be quiet, and took approximately $100 from her cash register. Vuong then called police and reported the robbery. There was no video-taped surveillance system in place at the store at that time.

When officers arrived on the scene around 1:19 p.m., they were informed that some citizens had seen a black male running out of the Baskin Robbins. Vuong described the suspect to the officers as a black male wearing dark pants and a dark, striped shirt.

Roy Ledesma, a City of Houston worker, saw appellant come out of an apartment complex and enter a convenience store. Ledesma described appellant as wearing black jeans and a dark colored shirt and having "real short" hair and no facial hair. Ledesma also testified that appellant had not been sweating.

Appellant was then seen by two plain-clothes police officers, Lieutenant Leal and Sergeant Bartlett, who were in an unmarked car at the convenience store. When confronted by the officers, appellant fled. Lieutenant Leal testified that appellant was "very sweaty," and Sergeant Bartlett testified that appellant may have been sweating, although not "profusely."

Appellant was eventually caught about 50 yards from the convenience store location and arrested at 1:32 pm, approximately 14 minutes after Vuong's call reporting the robbery. Shortly thereafter, police took Vuong to the convenience store, where she identified appellant, who was in police custody at the time, as the man who had robbed her. Vuong identified him because he was wearing the same clothes and testified that he had no beard and short hair. ⁽¹⁾

After appellant's arrest, the police recovered $179.58, including four rolls of coins, from appellant. During booking, appellant stated that he had dropped the knife when he was running away from the scene. The knife was never located.

Factual Sufficiency

In his sole point of error, appellant argues that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict because the testimony of the witnesses was inconsistent and because the identification of appellant by Vuong was not reliable.

1. Standard of Review

When conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Perales v. State, No. 01-05-01019-CR, 2006 WL 3628902, at *2 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 14, 2006, no pet.). A review of the factual sufficiency of the evidence begins with the presumption that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the judgment. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We will set the verdict aside only if (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. ⁽²⁾

Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *2.

Under the first prong of Johnson, we cannot conclude that a conviction is "clearly wrong" and "manifestly unjust" simply because, on the quantum of evidence admitted, we would have voted to acquit had we been on the jury. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *2. Under the second prong of Johnson, we cannot declare that a conflict in the evidence justifies a new trial simply because we disagree with the jury's resolution of that conflict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417; Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *2. Before concluding that evidence is factually insufficient to support a verdict under the second prong of Johnson, we must be able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury's verdict. Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417; Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *2.

In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we must also discuss the evidence that, according to the appellant, most undermines the jury's verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *2. We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *2. The fact-finder alone determines the weight to place on contradictory testimonial evidence because that determination depends on the fact-finder's evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 408-09; Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *3. As the determiner of the credibility of the witnesses, the fact-finder may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407 n.5; Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *3.

B. The Law

The indictment alleged that appellant had committed the offense of aggravated robbery by the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, specifically, a knife or an unknown metal object. A person commits aggravated robbery, as the indictment alleged and the jury was charged here, if he commits robbery and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). The jury acquitted appellant of aggravated robbery, but found appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of robbery. Under the charge given here, a person is guilty of robbery if, while in the course of committing theft, and with intent to obtain or to maintain control of the property of another, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. See id. § 29.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). A person commits theft if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property. Id. § 31.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006). An accused's mental state may be inferred and proven circumstantially from acts or surrounding circumstances. See Ledesma v. State, 677 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

C. Discussion

Appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict because the testimony of the witnesses was inconsistent throughout the trial and because the eye-witness identification was not reliable. Specifically, appellant points to (1) the contradictions regarding the level of his perspiration; (2) the contradictions concerning his hair length; and (3) the reliability of Vuong's identification of appellant because he was identified in an on-the-scene confrontation, instead of in a police lineup.

Appellant first relies on inconsistencies regarding testimony about the level of his perspiration. Ledesma testified that appellant was not sweating. However, two police officers testified that appellant was sweating, though they disagreed on the degree of perspiration. The jury could have reasonably believed that differing descriptions of appellant's level of perspiration were differences in visual perspective, time of observation, or degree of physical perception; therefore, the above testimony is not inherently inconsistent. Moreover, to the extent that the testimony conflicted, the jury determines the weight to place on contradictory testimonial evidence because that determination depends on the fact-finder's evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 408-09; Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *3.

Appellant next relies on inconsistencies regarding testimony about the length of his hair. Vuong testified at trial that the man who had robbed her had short hair. Vuong also stated that she was able to identify appellant as the robber because he was wearing the same clothes and had short hair and no beard. ⁽³⁾ Ledesma testified that the man that he saw at the convenience store had short hair. However, Ledesma, who observed appellant's arrest, testified that this was the same person whom he had seen run out of an apartment complex and into a convenience store. In contrast, appellant's arrest photograph and the testimony of three police officers indicated that appellant was bald. The jury determines the weight to place on contradictory testimonial evidence because that determination depends on the fact-finder's evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 408-09; Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *3. As the determiner of the credibility of the witnesses, the fact-finder may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407 n.5; Perales, 2006 WL 3628902, at *3. The jury could reasonably have believed that the description of the length of appellant's hair may not have been an important feature considering Vuong's immediate, positive identification of appellant as the person who had robbed her.

Finally, appellant appears to contend that because he was the only person Vuong was shown and because he was in police custody at the time, her identification of him is unreliable. However, the jury could have believed that because the robbery had happened shortly before Vuong's identification and because appellant fit the description of the suspect that Vuong had given the police, even if appellant was the only person in police custody at the convenience store, her identification was reliable. In addition, appellant was found in the area of the robbery, wearing clothes matching the description of the robber, and, when approached by officers, appellant fled. See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that flight shows consciousness of guilt and is circumstance from which inference of guilt may be drawn). When arrested, appellant was in possession of money generally matching the money taken during the robbery.

Regardless of how the jury weighed the evidence and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is not permitted to usurp the jury's role on appeal. See King, 29 S.W.3d at 562; Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407 n.5, 408-09. The fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Reconciliation of any conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury. Id.; see Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The jury was entitled to believe whomever's testimony they chose, despite any inconsistencies that it may have contained, and was entitled to give it the weight that the jury deemed appropriate. See Miles v. State, No. 01-05-00346-CR, 2006 WL 2892418, at *3 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 12, 2006, no pet.); Davis v. State, 831 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (affirming robbery conviction when only one eyewitness identified defendant, despite testimony of five alibi witnesses who testified for defendant).

Viewing the evidence in the appropriate neutral light, we hold that the verdict was not based on evidence that was so weak as to render the verdict clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. We thus hold that the evidence was not factually insufficient for the reasons that appellant argues in his point of error.

We overrule appellant's sole point of error.

Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tim Taft

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings, and Acala.

Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

1. Appellant testified that he was bald at the time that the robbery was committed.

2. Appellant appears to raise only the first challenge, that the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, on appeal.

3. Prior to identifying appellant as the robber, she had described the suspect to the officers as a black male wearing dark pants and a dark, striped shirt.