CHU DE QUEBEC–UNIVERSITE LAVAL v. DREAMSCAPE DEVELOPMENT GROUP HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedApril 22, 2026
Docket4:21-cv-00182
StatusUnknown

This text of CHU DE QUEBEC–UNIVERSITE LAVAL v. DREAMSCAPE DEVELOPMENT GROUP HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL. (CHU DE QUEBEC–UNIVERSITE LAVAL v. DREAMSCAPE DEVELOPMENT GROUP HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CHU DE QUEBEC–UNIVERSITE LAVAL v. DREAMSCAPE DEVELOPMENT GROUP HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL., (E.D. Tex. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

CHU DE QUEBEC–UNIVERSITE § LAVAL § § v. § CIVIL NO. 4:21-CV-182-SDJ § DREAMSCAPE DEVELOPMENT § GROUP HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff CHU de Quebec–Universite Laval’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. #86), and the parties’ subsequent briefing on the motion, (Dkt. #95, #104, #110, #190, #192). After full consideration, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part. I. BACKGROUND CHU de Quebec–Universite Laval (“CHU”) is the largest university hospital network in the Canadian province of Quebec. (Dkt. #45 ¶ 1). At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Quebec tasked CHU with purchasing face masks for use in the Quebec healthcare system. (Dkt. #45 ¶ 14). Consistent with the government’s instructions, CHU collaborated with the Quebec Government Acquisitions Center, then operating under the name SigmaSante, to source and arrange for purchase of the masks. (Dkt. #86 at 9). A. CHU Enlists R Negotiations to Purchase Masks on Its Behalf. In early April 2020, SigmaSante came into contact with a New York company called R Negotiations, through one of its representatives, Brian Podolak. (Dkt. #86 at 9); (Dkt. #86-2 at 2–3). Podolak indicated that R Negotiations could assist in sourcing masks and would do so upon receiving a purchase order and placement of the purchase money into escrow. (Dkt. #86 at 9–10). The purchase money would be held by Gregory Kuczinski, an attorney working for R Negotiations as an escrow

agent. (Dkt. #86 at 9–10). Shortly thereafter, CHU issued three purchase orders to R Negotiations, each for one million 3M model 1860 N95 masks (for a total of three million masks), and each in the amount of $6 million (for a total of $18 million). See (Dkt. #86-2 at 3, 12–17). The same day, CHU transferred $18 million to Kuczinski’s escrow account. (Dkt. #86 at 10). Kuczinski received the money the next business day. (Dkt. #86-2

at 3, 10). B. R Negotiations Purchases Masks From DDGI. Around the same time, R Negotiations encountered Darrel Fritz. (Dkt. #86-2 at 4). Fritz purported to act on behalf of a company called Dreamscape Development Group, Inc. (“DDGI”) that sold personal protective equipment, including face masks.1 (Dkt. #86-2 at 4). Acting on CHU’s behalf, Kuczinski and Robert Werner, R Negotiations’ president, entered into discussions with Fritz via telephone for the

purchase of the masks. (Dkt. #86 at 10); (Dkt. #86-2 at 4). During those discussions, neither Kuczinski nor Werner disclosed CHU’s identity, but they did inform Fritz that they were acting on behalf of an undisclosed end buyer located in Quebec, affiliated with the Quebec government, and that delivery was to be made at a location in Quebec. (Dkt. #86-2 at 4–5).

1 Fritz was DDGI’s president, CEO, and primary shareholder. (Dkt. #86-4 at 14). The parties soon reached an oral agreement: DDGI would supply three million masks at $3.50 per unit, for a total of $10.5 million. Kuczinski would transfer a deposit of $5.25 million (50% of the purchase price) to DDGI’s account at Morgan

Stanley; the remainder would be paid upon delivery of the masks.2 (Dkt. #86 at 10–11); (Dkt. #86-2 at 4). Following the parties’ oral discussions, R Negotiations issued a purchase order to DDGI with the agreed-upon terms. See (Dkt. #86-2 at 23). The next day, DDGI sent back an invoice, largely matching the terms of the purchase order. See (Dkt. #86-2 at 25). The invoice did, however, include one term missing from the purchase order—

an estimated delivery “timeframe” of “5–7 days . . . after payment receipt confirmation.” Compare (Dkt. #86-2 at 25), with (Dkt. #86-2 at 23) (purchase order listing “Ship date” as “TBD”). Immediately after receiving the invoice, Kuczinski transferred the $5.25 million deposit to DDGI’s Morgan Stanley account. (Dkt. #86-2 at 5, 19); (Dkt. #86-11 at 2). A day later, on April 16, 2020, Kuczinski emailed Fritz a letter (the “April 16 Letter”) purporting to confirm the parties’ agreement. That letter reads in full:

Dreamscape Development Group, Inc., 7009 Tilbury Ct. McKinney TX 75071

RE: Escrow payment of $5,250,000

2 The parties dispute two facts related to their initial oral discussions. First, according to CHU, “Fritz indicated that DDGI could deliver the masks within 7 days of receiving an order.” (Dkt. #86 at 10). Defendants deny that Fritz ever made such a promise. See (Dkt. #95 at 7). Second, according to CHU, the parties agreed that the deposit money “would be held in escrow by DDGI.” (Dkt. #86 at 10). Defendants deny that they agreed to hold the money in escrow. See (Dkt. #95 at 7). Dear Mr. Fritz:

As a follow up to our conversation, please accept this letter as confirmation of our agreement with respect to the above referenced escrowed funds.

The above referenced escrow was transferred to your Escrow account with Morgan Stanley on April 15, 2020, from my Attorney Escrow Acount, as Escrow Agent. This transfer represented the requisite deposit for the production of 3,000,000.00 3M N95 masks, model 1860, on behalf of the end buyer. As discussed with you, our client, the end buyer in this transaction, is not only in dire need of these masks, but due to previous unsuccessful attempts to obtain the same, has placed a time limit on the production of these masks. Accordingly, if you are unable to produce the entire or at least a partial order of the masks within two weeks of today, then the client requests the full return of the above referenced escrow. You have agreed to these conditions. Accordingly, I have entered into an escrow agreement with the end buyer outlining this these [sic] conditions.

Please indicate your acceptance of these conditions by signing below where indicated.

Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.

Very truly yours, [/s/ Gregory Kuczinski] Gregory Kuczinski, Esq. (Dkt. #86-2 at 27). Fritz countersigned the letter, per its instruction. See (Dkt. #86-2 at 27) (“AGREED and ACCEPTED: BY [/s/ Darrel Fritz]”). A few features of the April 16 Letter are worth noting. First, the letter makes clear that Kuczinski and R Negotiations were acting on behalf of an unidentified “end buyer.” (Dkt. #86-2 at 27). Second, the letter describes the $5.25 million deposit as an “escrow” payment to be held in DDGI’s “escrow” account with Morgan Stanley. (Dkt. #86-2 at 27). Third, the letter conveys a sense of urgency. Because the end buyer was in “dire need of these masks,” it placed a two-week “time limit” on their production. (Dkt. #86-2 at 27). If DDGI failed to produce “the entire or at least a partial order of the masks” by the two-week deadline, the end buyer could “request[] the full return” of its deposit. (Dkt. #86-2 at 27).

C. DDGI Fails to Procure the Masks. As it turns out, DDGI did not actually have masks in its possession, nor was it an authorized 3M distributor.3 So to fulfill R Negotiations’ order, DDGI needed to buy the masks from an authorized 3M distributor or other third party. DDGI’s attempts to do so were unsuccessful. According to Fritz, DDGI’s first attempt to source the masks “fell through when laws were put in place restricting the export of masks out

of Germany.” (Dkt. #95-1 ¶ 1). Then, at some point during the two-week delivery window, Fritz says he began negotiating with a company called Primex Clinical Laboratories, Inc. (Dkt. #95-1 ¶ 3). Primex was not itself an authorized 3M distributor but apparently had a relationship with one. See (Dkt. #95 at 13); (Dkt. #95-1 ¶¶ 3–5). During the negotiations, Fritz learned that Primex could not supply the full quantity of masks (three million) or specific N95 model (1860) that R Negotiations had ordered. (Dkt. #95-1 ¶ 4). But it

could supply 1.5 million units of a different N95 model (8210). (Dkt. #95-1 ¶ 4).

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