CHU

19 I. & N. Dec. 81
CourtBoard of Immigration Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 1984
DocketID 2966
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 19 I. & N. Dec. 81 (CHU) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Immigration Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CHU, 19 I. & N. Dec. 81 (bia 1984).

Opinion

Interim Decision #2966

MATTER OF CHU

In Visa Petition Proceedings

A-24303227

Decided by Board May 3, 1.984

(1) Certificates issued by notarial offices in the People's Republic of China ("PRC") which are offered as proof of post-1950 adoptions in mainland China shall be ac- cepted as evidence both that the adoptive relationship was created and that the adoption is regarded as valid by the PRC Government. Matter of May, 18 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1983), distinguished. Matter of Ho, 18 I&N Dec. 152 (BIA 1981), su- perseded. (2) A certificate issued by one of the PRC's notarial offices is an essential element of proof in establishing the existence of a valid post-1950 adoption in the PRC in that if an applicant for such certificate is unable to persuade notarial officials that the certificate should be issued, either because of questioun relating to the establishment of the adoption or its conformance to PRC public policy, then he cannot satisfy his burden of proving that the claimed relationship exists for pur- poses of our immigration laws. (3) Certificates issued by notarial offices in the PRC shall not be regarded as conclu- sive proof of the facts certified because of the potential for fraud or error in their issuance: fraud or mistake may reasonably be suspected where the facts recited on the notarial certificate are contrarlietcql by other evidence and the inconsistencies have not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioner or where there is an ab- sence of sufficient corroborating evidence. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Jim Toni Haynes, Esquire Eloise Roses 1140 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Appellate Trial Attorney Washington, D.C. 20036

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members

In a decision dated August 26, 1983, the district director denied the visa petition filed by the lawful permanent resident petitioner to accord the beneficiary preference status as an adopted daughter pursuant to section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, S U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1982). The petitioner appealed from that decision and oral argument in the case was heard by the Board on 81 Interim Decision #2966

December 22, 1983. The record will be remanded to the district di- rector. The beneficiary is a 14-year-old native and citizen of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). The petitioner, also a native of the PRC, claims to have adopted the beneficiary in 1975 when the ben- eficiary was 6 years of age. In support of her visa petition, the peti- tioner submitted certificates issued by one of China's notarial of- fices which state that the beneficiary is the adopted daughter of the petitioner and her husband, the adoption having taken place in the PRC on October 2, 1975. The district director denied the visa petition for failure on the part of the petitioner to establish the existence of the claimed rela- tionship between herself and the beneficiary. The district director noted that on documents executed in connection with her own im- migration to the United States in 1979, the petitioner had declared only her natural children and had made no mention of the benefi- ciary. The district director also relied upon a memorandum from the American consulate general at Guangzhou, the State Depart ment consular district in which the beneficiary resides, which was prepared in response to a request the district director had made for an overseas opinion as to the validity of the mfloption. The State Department memorandum, dated July 28, 1982, expresses the view that the visa petition should not be approved: the memorandum ad- vises that notarial certificates such as those submitted by the peti- tioner carry some weight but, standing alone, do not establish that a legal adoption has taken place, particularly where they are con- tradicted by other evidence such as the petitioner's past failure to acknowledge the beneficiary as her daughter. Appended to the memorandum is an airgram that discusses post-1950 adoptions in the PRC which the consulate at Guangzhou had previously, on August 19, 1981, directed to various State Department and Immi- gration and Naturalization Service offices. At issue in this case is the evidence required to substantiate a claimed adoption created after the Civil Code of China was sus- pended in 1950 by the Communist Chinese Government which had seized control of the mainland of China. An adoption that is valid under the law of the place where it occurred will be recognized as valid for purposes of our immigration laws. Matter of Kwok, 14 I&N Dec. 127 (131A 1972); Matter of R-, 6 I&N Dec. 760 (31A 1955). It is settled that adoptive relationships created after the Commu- nist Chinese Government came to power are recognized in the

82 Interim Decision #2966

PRC. Matter of Yee, 14 I&N Dec. 132 (BIA 1972); see also Matter of Ho, 18 I&N Dec. 152 (BIA 1981), and addendum. 1 However, as we noted in Matter of Ho, supra, the Communist government has to date promulgated no specific procedural or sub- stantive requirements for creating an adoption to replace the sus- pended Civil Code of China. 2 Any "requirements" for adoption are apparently derived from policy considerations, rather than from pre existing statutory criteria, and the legitimacy of the adoption is -

evaluated in terms of whether the adoption violates a known law or important policy. Matter of Ho, supra, and addendum. The inter- ests of the child and the society at large are relevant. PRC authori- ties might decline to recognize the validity of an adoption where,. for example, the adopted child had been sold to the adopter for the purpose of performing labor or where a peasant child has been adopted by an urban family in contravention of the policy of dis- couraging population shifts from rural areas into the cities. Id. The precise question before us, which was raised but not resolved in Matter of Ho, supra, may be stated as follows: In the absence of any clear procedural or substantive standards against which to measure a post-1950 adoption in mainland China, what evidence, if any, will suffice to establish that the adoption is recognized as valid by the PRC Government? The Board recently considered the evidentiary value to be ac- corded certificates issued, as were those submitted by the petitioner in support of her visa petition, by notarial offices in the PRC. Matter of May, 18 I&N Dec. 381 (BIA 1983). We adopted the State

Article 13 of the 1950 Marriage Law of the PRC provided: Parents have the duty to rear and to educate their children; the children have the duty to support and to assist their parents. Neither the parents nor the children shall maltreat or desert one another. The foregoing provision also applies to foster parents and foster children_ Infanti- - -

cide by drowning and similar criminal acts are strictly prohibited. Article 20 of the 1980 Marriage Law, which superseded the 1950 Marriage Law, provides: The state protects lawful adoption. The relevant provisions in this law governing the relations between parents and children are applicable to the rights and duties in the relations between foster-parents and their foster-children. The rights and duties in the relations between foster-children and their natural parents are terminated on the establishment of relationship of adoption. The term "foster" has been held to mean legally binding adoptive relationships. Matter of Yee, supra. For further discussion, see June 4, 1981, report of the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress, appended to Matter of Ho, supra, entitled "Adoption in the People's Republic of China?' 2 The. Board in Matter of Ho, supra, retreated from the contrary position taken in Matter of Yee, supra, in which we held that procedures for effecting adoptions in the PRO had been adequately spelled out.

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