Mr. Justice CURTIS
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas.
The plaintiff in error filed a petition, in which he avers, that on the 1st day of June, 1839, he was seised in his demesne as of fee of three tracts of land, described in the petition by metes and bounds, and that the defendant, with force of arms, ejected him therefrom, and has thenceforward kept him out of possession thereof; • and he prays judgment for damages and costs, and for the lands described. The defendant filed what is styled an
answer, containing nine distinct articles, or pleas, each of which seems to have been intended, and has been treated, as a substantive defence.' The plaintiff demurred to the third, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth, of these pleas. There was no joinder in demurrer by the defendant, but the District Court treated-the demurrers as raising, issues in law, and gave judgment thereon for the defendant. The plaintiff has brought the record here by a writ of error.
Upon this record, questions of great difficulty, and understood to affect the titles to large quantities of land, have been elaborately argued at the bar. These questions involve and depend upon the interpretation of the Colonization Laws of the Republic of Mexico, and their practical administration; the relative rights and powers of-the central government, and of the. State of Coahuila and -Texas, in reference to the public domain; the rpodes of declaring and vindicating those rights, and exercising those powers under the constitution of the Mexican- Republic; the effect of the separation of the State of Coahuila and Texas from México, by the revolution of 1836, upon titles made by the State authorities before the revolution, arid alleged to be defective for want of the sanction of the central government; as well as several important laws of the Republic of Texas, framed for the protection of the public domain, and for the repose of titles in that country.
It is impossible that the court should approach an adjudication of a case, involving elements so new and difficult, without, much anxiety, lest they should have failed entirely to comprehend and fitly to apply them. And it is obvious, that before it is possible to do so, all the facts constituting the title of each parly, and essential to a complete view of- the case, and especially the documentary evidences of those titles, should be placed before us, in a determinate form.
This record is far from being sufficient -in these substantial, and, indeed, necessary particulars. The petition avers a seisin in fee, on a particular day, and an ouster by the defendant. •The defendant shows no title in himself to the land demanded, but asserts that the plaintiff claims title by a pretended grant, made on the 20th day of September, 1835; that the land was within the twenty frontier leagues bordering on the United States; that the approbation of the executive of the national government of Mexico was not given; and, in other pleas, avers other facts, to show that if any such grant had been made it would not have been valid. But no grant, under which either party claims, appears on the record, nor is the court informed, through an exhibition of any title papers, by what authority, or through what instrument, or for what consideration, or upon
what conditions the title to these lands, originally passed from the State; or, whether more than one title thereto has, in fact, been made by the State ; nor how, .or when, if at all, any title came from the State to either of the parties.
Having thus stated what the record fails to show, we proceed to declare our- judgment on each of the issues in law raised by the demurrers.
The first plea which is demurred to, is in the following words: “ 3. And the defendant further says, that as to the pretended grant or .title of the plaintiff, to the land described in his petition, (if any paper title he has,) the same bears date, to wit, the twentieth day of September, A. D. 1835, and the land described in said pretended grant or title, and in said petition, is, and was, at the date of said grant, situated in the twenty frontier leagues bordering on the United States line, and said pretended grant was made without the approbation or assent of the executive of the national government of Mexico.”
According to the settled principles of the common law, this is not a defence to the action. The plaintiff .says he was seised in fee, and the defendant ejected him from the possession. The defendant, not denying this, answers, that if the plaintiff had any paper title, it wTas under a certain grant .which was not valid. He shows no title whatever in himself. But a.mere intruder cannot enter on a person actually seised, and eject him, and then question his title, or set up an outstanding title in another. The maxim that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of the defendant’s, is applicable to all actions for the recovery of property. But if the plaintiff had’ actual prior possession of the. land, this is strong enough to enable him to' recover it from a mere trespasser, who entered without any title. Ho may do so-by a writ of entry, where that remedy is still practised, (Jackson v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 1 Cush. 575,) or by an ejectment, (Allen
v.
Rivington, 2 Saund. R. 111; Doc
v.
Read, 8 East, 356; Doe
v.
Dyboll, 1 Moody & M. 346; Jackson
v.
Hazen, 2 Johns. R. 438; Whitney
v.
Wright, 15 Wend. 171,) or, he may maintain trespass, (Catteris
v.
Cowper, 4 Taunt. 548; Graham
v.
Peat, 1 East, 246.)
Nor is there any thing in the form of the remedy, in Texas, which rendérs thése principles inapplicable to this case.
By the act of February 5th, 1840, (Hartley’s Digest, 909,) it is proved, that the method of trying titles to lands shall be- by action of trespass, and that .the action shall be tried on its merits, conformably to the principles of trial by ejectment; and where the defendant' sets up title to the land, he is. required to plead the same.. We understand that the technical forms of
pleading, fixed by the common law, are dispensed with, but the principles which regulate the merits of a trial by ejectment, and the substance of a plea of title to such an action, are preserved. Tested by these principles, this plea is bad. ’
Without setting up any title in the defendánt, it pleads certain evidence or source of title, which, it avers, the plaintiff relies on, and then states facts, to show that such title is invalid. This is not admissible.
The office of a plea is, to state on the record the answer 'of the defendant to the allegations of the plaintiff, but not to the evidence by which the defendant conjectures the plaintiff will endeavor to support those allegations. We cannot concéive that such a mode of pleading could be admissible under any system. At the common law, if the allegation that the plaintiff’s paper title is- under a grant mentioned in the plea, had been traversed, it would have led to an issue which, if found .for the plaintiff, would determine nothing, and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot'be required to answer such a plea.
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Mr. Justice CURTIS
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas.
The plaintiff in error filed a petition, in which he avers, that on the 1st day of June, 1839, he was seised in his demesne as of fee of three tracts of land, described in the petition by metes and bounds, and that the defendant, with force of arms, ejected him therefrom, and has thenceforward kept him out of possession thereof; • and he prays judgment for damages and costs, and for the lands described. The defendant filed what is styled an
answer, containing nine distinct articles, or pleas, each of which seems to have been intended, and has been treated, as a substantive defence.' The plaintiff demurred to the third, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth, of these pleas. There was no joinder in demurrer by the defendant, but the District Court treated-the demurrers as raising, issues in law, and gave judgment thereon for the defendant. The plaintiff has brought the record here by a writ of error.
Upon this record, questions of great difficulty, and understood to affect the titles to large quantities of land, have been elaborately argued at the bar. These questions involve and depend upon the interpretation of the Colonization Laws of the Republic of Mexico, and their practical administration; the relative rights and powers of-the central government, and of the. State of Coahuila and -Texas, in reference to the public domain; the rpodes of declaring and vindicating those rights, and exercising those powers under the constitution of the Mexican- Republic; the effect of the separation of the State of Coahuila and Texas from México, by the revolution of 1836, upon titles made by the State authorities before the revolution, arid alleged to be defective for want of the sanction of the central government; as well as several important laws of the Republic of Texas, framed for the protection of the public domain, and for the repose of titles in that country.
It is impossible that the court should approach an adjudication of a case, involving elements so new and difficult, without, much anxiety, lest they should have failed entirely to comprehend and fitly to apply them. And it is obvious, that before it is possible to do so, all the facts constituting the title of each parly, and essential to a complete view of- the case, and especially the documentary evidences of those titles, should be placed before us, in a determinate form.
This record is far from being sufficient -in these substantial, and, indeed, necessary particulars. The petition avers a seisin in fee, on a particular day, and an ouster by the defendant. •The defendant shows no title in himself to the land demanded, but asserts that the plaintiff claims title by a pretended grant, made on the 20th day of September, 1835; that the land was within the twenty frontier leagues bordering on the United States; that the approbation of the executive of the national government of Mexico was not given; and, in other pleas, avers other facts, to show that if any such grant had been made it would not have been valid. But no grant, under which either party claims, appears on the record, nor is the court informed, through an exhibition of any title papers, by what authority, or through what instrument, or for what consideration, or upon
what conditions the title to these lands, originally passed from the State; or, whether more than one title thereto has, in fact, been made by the State ; nor how, .or when, if at all, any title came from the State to either of the parties.
Having thus stated what the record fails to show, we proceed to declare our- judgment on each of the issues in law raised by the demurrers.
The first plea which is demurred to, is in the following words: “ 3. And the defendant further says, that as to the pretended grant or .title of the plaintiff, to the land described in his petition, (if any paper title he has,) the same bears date, to wit, the twentieth day of September, A. D. 1835, and the land described in said pretended grant or title, and in said petition, is, and was, at the date of said grant, situated in the twenty frontier leagues bordering on the United States line, and said pretended grant was made without the approbation or assent of the executive of the national government of Mexico.”
According to the settled principles of the common law, this is not a defence to the action. The plaintiff .says he was seised in fee, and the defendant ejected him from the possession. The defendant, not denying this, answers, that if the plaintiff had any paper title, it wTas under a certain grant .which was not valid. He shows no title whatever in himself. But a.mere intruder cannot enter on a person actually seised, and eject him, and then question his title, or set up an outstanding title in another. The maxim that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of the defendant’s, is applicable to all actions for the recovery of property. But if the plaintiff had’ actual prior possession of the. land, this is strong enough to enable him to' recover it from a mere trespasser, who entered without any title. Ho may do so-by a writ of entry, where that remedy is still practised, (Jackson v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 1 Cush. 575,) or by an ejectment, (Allen
v.
Rivington, 2 Saund. R. 111; Doc
v.
Read, 8 East, 356; Doe
v.
Dyboll, 1 Moody & M. 346; Jackson
v.
Hazen, 2 Johns. R. 438; Whitney
v.
Wright, 15 Wend. 171,) or, he may maintain trespass, (Catteris
v.
Cowper, 4 Taunt. 548; Graham
v.
Peat, 1 East, 246.)
Nor is there any thing in the form of the remedy, in Texas, which rendérs thése principles inapplicable to this case.
By the act of February 5th, 1840, (Hartley’s Digest, 909,) it is proved, that the method of trying titles to lands shall be- by action of trespass, and that .the action shall be tried on its merits, conformably to the principles of trial by ejectment; and where the defendant' sets up title to the land, he is. required to plead the same.. We understand that the technical forms of
pleading, fixed by the common law, are dispensed with, but the principles which regulate the merits of a trial by ejectment, and the substance of a plea of title to such an action, are preserved. Tested by these principles, this plea is bad. ’
Without setting up any title in the defendánt, it pleads certain evidence or source of title, which, it avers, the plaintiff relies on, and then states facts, to show that such title is invalid. This is not admissible.
The office of a plea is, to state on the record the answer 'of the defendant to the allegations of the plaintiff, but not to the evidence by which the defendant conjectures the plaintiff will endeavor to support those allegations. We cannot concéive that such a mode of pleading could be admissible under any system. At the common law, if the allegation that the plaintiff’s paper title is- under a grant mentioned in the plea, had been traversed, it would have led to an issue which, if found .for the plaintiff, would determine nothing, and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot'be required to answer such a plea. And where pleadings are' so conducted as not to terminate in issues, as in Texas, such an answer neither, confesses and avoids, nor denies the seisin, or trespass, alleged in the declaration. United States
v.
Girault, 11 How. 22.
There'are cases in which such allegations, showing the source or nature of the plaintiff’s title, are a necessary part of a defence. Whenever the defendant must plead specially any matter which is a good defence to one title, and not good to others, and the declaration does not show'on what particular title the plaintiff relies, the defendant must-, by proper averments, set out the plaintiff’s title and the answer to it; these averments then become material and traversable as part of the defence, and if found for the plaintiff, the defence fails. An instance of this is the defence of a statute of limitations,, barring only particular titles. In such a plea, if would be necessary to show, if ir did not appear in the declaration, that the plaintiff had only such a title. But this rule has no application to the defence under consideration. If the plaintiff really relies on such a title as is alleged, whenever fie shows it in support of his petition, the defendant will have opportunity to object to it, and to give in evidence any collateral facts bearing upon it. He has no occasion, nor is it regular, to plead specially,, for his general denial of the plaintiff’s title compels the plaintiff to produce his title, and thus opens to the defendant all legal objection to it. Moreover, this article in the answer does not admit, or deny, that the plaintiff had any grant, or any paper title whatever, but says, if he had any, it was of a certain description. If it was intended to make the case turn on the validity of a particular grant, its existence ought
to be. admitted; for why should the court be called' upon to determine the sufficiency in law'of Such a grant, when it does not appear it exists ?
These objections are equally applicable to the sixth plea, which is therefore also insufficient.
• The next plea is as follows :
“ 7.
And the said defendant says, that the said plaintiff claims the land described in his petition under and through a pretended grant purporting to have been made to one Miguel Arceniega, by authority of the, government of the State of Coahuila and Texas, bearing date, to wit, the twentieth day of September, A. D. 1833, and under and through a pretended chain of. transfers from said Arceniega to plaintiff, and that within six years from the.date of said pretended grant, and before the annexation of Texas to the United States, the said pretended transfers were made to said'plaintiff, and that this plaintiff was hot, at the date of said pretended giant .to him, and previous thereto, had never been a resident citizen of Texas or Mexico, but was then, and thence hitherto, continued to be a resident and citizen of the United States of America, owing and paying allegiance to the government thereof.” •
This plea alsoffis subject to the same objections as the others: so'far as it attacks the plaintiff’s title; and if it was intended as a plea to the action of the alienage of the plaintiff, it is manifestly bad, for the plaintiff, being a citizen of the United States, is. capable of maintaining an action to recover lands in the State of Texas, to which-he has title.
The éighth plea sets up a statute of limitations. In order to bring himself within it, the defendant avers, “ that he is the owner of the following tracts or parcels of land,.to
wit; ”
and he then gives the metes and bounds of sundry tracts of land, and makes certain other'averments-as to his'possession, and con-, eludes, “And the defendant disclaims-ownership and possession of any portion of the land described in plaintiff’s petition, not included in the metes and bounds of the several tracts and parcels above set forth.”
The court cannot treat this plea as an answer to the decláration. . |t is not averred therein, nor is there .any thing on the record to show, that the tracts of land described in it are parcel of the’ demanded premises. The defendant says he disclaims ownership and possession of any portion of the land described in the petition, and not, included in the bounds he sets out. For aught we can know, this disclaimer may cover the whole of the land described in the petition. And as it does not appear, -by any direct traversable averment, that, the disclaimer does not apply to all the. lands demanded, or that the defence applies to
any, or if any, to what part of them, the court cannot know for what to give judgment, or whether it should be for the one party or the other.
The ninth plea is as follows:
“ 9. Said defendant further says, that the land claimed by plaintiff in his petition, is located in the territory designated as the twenty frontier leagues, bordering on the United States of the North, in the act of the Congress of the Republic of Texas, approved January 9th, 1841, and enticed ‘An act to quiet the land titles within the twenty frontier leagues boi-dering on the United States of the North,’ and is claimed by plaintiff hy virtue of said location, made prior to the seventeenth day of March, A. D. 1836, and that said plaintiff, and those under whom he claims said land, did not commence an action to try the validity of said claim within twelve months from the passage of the act aforesaid.”
Assuming what we do not decide, that this plea shows, that if the plaintiff claims under such a location as is mentioned, his title-is not good as against the State of Texas, still it is not a defence, because no title in the defendant is shown. If the plaintiff, as his petition avers, was' actually seised, and the defendant being a mere intruder, ejected him, it was an unlawful act, and the action is maintainable, notwithstanding the State of Texas may have the true title, or may have granted it to another.
For these reasons, we are of opinion the demurrer to each of these pleas must be sustained, the judgment of the District Court reversed, and the cause remanded; and as it will undoubtedly become necessary to amend the. pleadings, we think it proper to suggest, that in a case involving questions so new and of so much magnitude and importance, it would be more satisfactory, and more conducive to a just decision, for the parties to exhibit fully their respective titles, and all collateral facts bearing upon them, and have them placed upon the record, either by bill of exceptions, or a special verdict, to the end that the court may consider then title papers in connection with the extraneous facts, and not be required to decide upon partial or abstract views, which may occasion substantial injustice, not only to the one party or the other, but possibly to third persons having similar titles.
■Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the District of Texas, and' was argued by counsel. On consideration, whereof, it is no.w here ordered and adjudged, by this
court, that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed, with cosfs, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said District Court for further proceedings to be had therein, in conformity to the opinion of this court, and as to law and justice shall appertain.