25CA0757 Christ’s Body v ICAO 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0757 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 1357-2025
Christ’s Body Ministries,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Michael Stevens,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LUM Lipinsky and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Robinson Waters & O’Dorisio, P.C., Juli E. Lapin, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Michael Stevens, Pro Se ¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, employer, Christ’s Body
Ministries (CBM), seeks review of a final order of the Industrial
Claim Appeals Office (Panel) dismissing as untimely CBM’s appeal
of the hearing officer’s decision. We affirm the Panel’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Michael Stevens worked for CBM, a nonprofit agency that
provides services to unhoused individuals. Stevens performed
multiple tasks, including maintenance, food setup, and organizing
volunteers. He separated from CBM in October 2024.
¶3 When Stevens applied for unemployment benefits in
connection with his job separation, a deputy with the Division of
Unemployment Insurance (Division) determined that he was not
eligible to receive benefits under section 8-70-140(1)(a), C.R.S.
2024. See id. (providing, for purposes of the Colorado Employment
Security Act, that “employment” does not include services
performed in the employ of a church or organization that is
operated primarily for religious purposes).
¶4 Stevens appealed the Division’s decision to a hearing officer.
But the hearing was dismissed when Stevens failed to appear.
Stevens then requested, and was granted, a new hearing. On
1 January 22, 2025, the division mailed the parties a notice of that
the hearing was scheduled for February 10, 2025.
¶5 Only Stevens appeared at the February 10 hearing. Based on
the evidence presented, the hearing officer reversed the Division’s
decision, concluding that (1) CBM was neither a church nor
operated primarily for religious purposes, and (2) Stevens was
eligible for unemployment benefits. See id.
¶6 The Division mailed the hearing officer’s decision to the parties
on February 12, 2025. The decision contained an advisement
notifying CBM of its rights to appeal or request a new hearing, so
long as the Panel received any such filing within twenty days from
the decision’s mailing date. CBM’s deadline to appeal or request a
new hearing was March 4, 2025. However, CBM filed its appeal1 on
March 28, 2025 — twenty-four days past the deadline.
¶7 The Panel did not find good cause to excuse CBM’s late filing
and dismissed the appeal as untimely.
1 The Panel construed CBM’s appeal as both an appeal of the
hearing officer’s decision and an “implicit request” for a new hearing. For simplicity, we refer to CBM’s filing as an “appeal.”
2 II. Standard of Review
¶8 We may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel
acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was
procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings do not support its
decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-
107(6), C.R.S. 2024; Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2013
COA 124, ¶¶ 9-10. We may not disturb factual findings if they are
supported by substantial evidence. Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr. Dist. v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17; Yotes, ¶ 10.
III. Analysis
¶9 CBM contends that the Panel erred by concluding that it
lacked good cause for its untimely appeal. More specifically, it
argues that the Panel’s findings don’t support this conclusion.
¶ 10 The Panel must receive a party’s appeal of a hearing officer’s
decision or request for a new hearing within twenty calendar days
after the party is notified of that decision. § 8-74-104(1), C.R.S.
2024; Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 11.2.13.2, 7 Code Colo. Regs.
1101-2. The Panel may review an untimely appeal or untimely
request for a new hearing only upon finding that good cause
3 excuses the late filing. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Regs. 11.2.13.2,
12.1.3.3, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.
¶ 11 In determining whether good cause exists, the Panel has the
discretion to weigh various factors, including, but not limited to,
(1) whether the party acted in the manner that a reasonably
prudent entity would have acted under the same or similar
circumstances; (2) whether the Division committed an
administrative error; (3) whether the party exercised control over
the untimely action; (4) the length of delay in filing; (5) whether the
delay prejudiced any other interested party; and (6) whether
denying good cause would lead to a result that is inconsistent with
the law. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 12.1.8, 7 Code Colo. Regs.
1101-2; Nguyen v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 174 P.3d 847, 848-49
(Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 12 The Panel considered the reasons CBM provided for its late
filing. CBM explained that (1) “we did not look at the Hearing
Officer’s decision when it arrived in the mail,” but instead placed it
in Stevens’s personnel file; (2) the decision was not provided to
CBM’s Director of Finance, who worked part-time; and (3) it “had
concluded that this matter was closed” based on its receipt of the
4 deputy’s decision that Stevens was ineligible for benefits. CBM also
explained that it “did not attend the Hearing on Feb 10, 2025
because the issue of the organization being a church had been
settled since 2017 and the CDLE web portal lists the organization
as . . . Religious.”
¶ 13 However, the Panel determined there was not good cause for
accepting the late appeal and hearing request. In so concluding,
the Panel found as follows:
• CBM received timely notice of the hearing officer’s decision;
• CBM was physically able to act in a timely manner;
• CBM was not prevented from acting in a timely manner due to
circumstances outside of its control;
• no relevant circumstances substantially interfered with CBM’s
opportunity to act in a timely manner;
• CBM did not act in a manner that was consistent with how a
reasonably prudent entity would have acted in the same or
similar circumstances;
• no administrative error by the Division contributed to CBM’s
untimely request;
• CBM made little or no effort to request an extension of time;
5 • the length of the delay — twenty-four days — was substantial;
and
• although neither party would be prejudiced as a result of the
delay, the lack of prejudice didn’t “outweigh the absence of
reasonable justification for the delay.”
¶ 14 On appeal, CBM nonetheless reasserts that it acted in a
reasonably prudent manner under the circumstances. CBM
contends that it believed the proceedings related to Stevens’s
benefits claim had concluded and, further, that its status as a
religious organization was “settled and would not be disturbed.”
¶ 15 However, it was undisputed that CBM received notice of the
February hearing on Stevens’s benefits claim. But, having
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25CA0757 Christ’s Body v ICAO 08-21-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0757 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 1357-2025
Christ’s Body Ministries,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Michael Stevens,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LUM Lipinsky and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 21, 2025
Robinson Waters & O’Dorisio, P.C., Juli E. Lapin, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Michael Stevens, Pro Se ¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, employer, Christ’s Body
Ministries (CBM), seeks review of a final order of the Industrial
Claim Appeals Office (Panel) dismissing as untimely CBM’s appeal
of the hearing officer’s decision. We affirm the Panel’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Michael Stevens worked for CBM, a nonprofit agency that
provides services to unhoused individuals. Stevens performed
multiple tasks, including maintenance, food setup, and organizing
volunteers. He separated from CBM in October 2024.
¶3 When Stevens applied for unemployment benefits in
connection with his job separation, a deputy with the Division of
Unemployment Insurance (Division) determined that he was not
eligible to receive benefits under section 8-70-140(1)(a), C.R.S.
2024. See id. (providing, for purposes of the Colorado Employment
Security Act, that “employment” does not include services
performed in the employ of a church or organization that is
operated primarily for religious purposes).
¶4 Stevens appealed the Division’s decision to a hearing officer.
But the hearing was dismissed when Stevens failed to appear.
Stevens then requested, and was granted, a new hearing. On
1 January 22, 2025, the division mailed the parties a notice of that
the hearing was scheduled for February 10, 2025.
¶5 Only Stevens appeared at the February 10 hearing. Based on
the evidence presented, the hearing officer reversed the Division’s
decision, concluding that (1) CBM was neither a church nor
operated primarily for religious purposes, and (2) Stevens was
eligible for unemployment benefits. See id.
¶6 The Division mailed the hearing officer’s decision to the parties
on February 12, 2025. The decision contained an advisement
notifying CBM of its rights to appeal or request a new hearing, so
long as the Panel received any such filing within twenty days from
the decision’s mailing date. CBM’s deadline to appeal or request a
new hearing was March 4, 2025. However, CBM filed its appeal1 on
March 28, 2025 — twenty-four days past the deadline.
¶7 The Panel did not find good cause to excuse CBM’s late filing
and dismissed the appeal as untimely.
1 The Panel construed CBM’s appeal as both an appeal of the
hearing officer’s decision and an “implicit request” for a new hearing. For simplicity, we refer to CBM’s filing as an “appeal.”
2 II. Standard of Review
¶8 We may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel
acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was
procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings do not support its
decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-
107(6), C.R.S. 2024; Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2013
COA 124, ¶¶ 9-10. We may not disturb factual findings if they are
supported by substantial evidence. Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr. Dist. v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO 78, ¶ 17; Yotes, ¶ 10.
III. Analysis
¶9 CBM contends that the Panel erred by concluding that it
lacked good cause for its untimely appeal. More specifically, it
argues that the Panel’s findings don’t support this conclusion.
¶ 10 The Panel must receive a party’s appeal of a hearing officer’s
decision or request for a new hearing within twenty calendar days
after the party is notified of that decision. § 8-74-104(1), C.R.S.
2024; Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 11.2.13.2, 7 Code Colo. Regs.
1101-2. The Panel may review an untimely appeal or untimely
request for a new hearing only upon finding that good cause
3 excuses the late filing. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Regs. 11.2.13.2,
12.1.3.3, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.
¶ 11 In determining whether good cause exists, the Panel has the
discretion to weigh various factors, including, but not limited to,
(1) whether the party acted in the manner that a reasonably
prudent entity would have acted under the same or similar
circumstances; (2) whether the Division committed an
administrative error; (3) whether the party exercised control over
the untimely action; (4) the length of delay in filing; (5) whether the
delay prejudiced any other interested party; and (6) whether
denying good cause would lead to a result that is inconsistent with
the law. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 12.1.8, 7 Code Colo. Regs.
1101-2; Nguyen v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 174 P.3d 847, 848-49
(Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 12 The Panel considered the reasons CBM provided for its late
filing. CBM explained that (1) “we did not look at the Hearing
Officer’s decision when it arrived in the mail,” but instead placed it
in Stevens’s personnel file; (2) the decision was not provided to
CBM’s Director of Finance, who worked part-time; and (3) it “had
concluded that this matter was closed” based on its receipt of the
4 deputy’s decision that Stevens was ineligible for benefits. CBM also
explained that it “did not attend the Hearing on Feb 10, 2025
because the issue of the organization being a church had been
settled since 2017 and the CDLE web portal lists the organization
as . . . Religious.”
¶ 13 However, the Panel determined there was not good cause for
accepting the late appeal and hearing request. In so concluding,
the Panel found as follows:
• CBM received timely notice of the hearing officer’s decision;
• CBM was physically able to act in a timely manner;
• CBM was not prevented from acting in a timely manner due to
circumstances outside of its control;
• no relevant circumstances substantially interfered with CBM’s
opportunity to act in a timely manner;
• CBM did not act in a manner that was consistent with how a
reasonably prudent entity would have acted in the same or
similar circumstances;
• no administrative error by the Division contributed to CBM’s
untimely request;
• CBM made little or no effort to request an extension of time;
5 • the length of the delay — twenty-four days — was substantial;
and
• although neither party would be prejudiced as a result of the
delay, the lack of prejudice didn’t “outweigh the absence of
reasonable justification for the delay.”
¶ 14 On appeal, CBM nonetheless reasserts that it acted in a
reasonably prudent manner under the circumstances. CBM
contends that it believed the proceedings related to Stevens’s
benefits claim had concluded and, further, that its status as a
religious organization was “settled and would not be disturbed.”
¶ 15 However, it was undisputed that CBM received notice of the
February hearing on Stevens’s benefits claim. But, having
“concluded that this matter was closed,” it disregarded the notice of
the hearing. Regardless of whether it was reasonable for CBM to
believe that its historical religious status shielded it from Stevens’s
claim, it was not reasonable for CBM to disregard the Division’s
notice. Had CBM appeared at the February hearing, it could have
asserted its religious status. But CBM did not avail itself of that
opportunity.
6 ¶ 16 And then, after failing to appear at the hearing, CBM also
unreasonably failed to “look at” the hearing officer’s decision when
it arrived in the mail. In so doing, CBM delayed learning of both the
hearing officer’s decision and its appeal rights, causing it to file its
appeal well after the deadline had passed. No evidence reveals
circumstances beyond CBM’s control that precluded it from taking
timely action. Accordingly, we do not disturb the Panel’s finding
that CBM did not act as a reasonably prudent entity would have.
See Mesa, ¶ 17.
¶ 17 CBM also points out that no interested party, including
Stevens, experienced prejudice due to the delay. But while the
Panel determined that CBM’s delay didn’t prejudice other interested
parties, it also concluded that the lack of prejudice didn’t outweigh
the absence of reasonable justification for CBM’s “substantial” delay
in filing the appeal. And we perceive no abuse of the Panel’s
discretion in its weighing of the relevant factors. See Nguyen, 174
P.3d at 848-49.
¶ 18 CBM further argues that (1) denying good cause would result
in a determination that is inconsistent with the law, and (2)
fundamental fairness requires a finding of good cause. But because
7 CBM failed to raise these arguments in the administrative
proceedings below, we do not consider them on appeal. See Velo v.
Emp. Sols. Pers., 988 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Colo. App. 1998) (declining
to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); see also
People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (generally, appellate
courts only review matters on which the court ruled in the order
being appealed).
¶ 19 Because the Panel properly considered and weighed the
applicable factors in concluding that CBM failed to establish good
cause for its untimely appeal, and because the Panel’s findings
support its decision, we discern no basis for reversal. See § 8-74-
107(6)(c); Nguyen, 174 P.3d at 848-49.
IV. Disposition
¶ 20 The Panel’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE PAWAR concur.